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ABSTRACT 
Donors have increasingly promoted the provision of security assistance to states 
emerging from civil war as a tool to establish peace. Driven by both security and development 
concerns, donors have asserted the value of this assistance to improve both the governance and 
effectiveness of the security sector. Despite this increase in aid, however, we know relatively 
little about its effects. In some cases, security assistance has promoted security force 
professionalization and a consolidation of peace. In others, security assistance has gone towards 
fueling corruption and repression, seriously jeopardizing the stability of the recipient state. 
This dissertation seeks to address this gap, contributing to our understanding of security 
assistance and post-conflict reconstruction. First, I outline the connection between security sector 
governance and peace, arguing that security institutions with high levels of civilian control, 
accountability, and respect for human rights are more likely to support peace and stability 
(Chapter 2). Second, I present a theory to explain the divergent effects of security assistance 
(Chapter 3). I show that different types of aid have differential effects on governance, and that 
the magnitude of this effect is conditioned by the timing of its disbursement. I test this theory 
through an analysis of the experiences of Côte d’Ivoire (Chapter 4), Burundi (Chapter 5), and 
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In March 2003, the West African nation of Liberia emerged from a decade-long civil war 
that had resulted in the death of over 250,000 people, destroyed physical infrastructure across the 
country, and wrought havoc on the political and security institutions of the state. In the years that 
followed, the government of Liberia worked to reform the state’s security institutions, garnering 
over $265 million in security assistance from the US between 2005 and 2010.1 Five years after 
these reforms began, the government and its partners had stabilized the country. The military—
once a predatory institution—now protected the people it used to abuse.2 Three thousand miles 
south, the parties to the Second Congo War negotiated an end to a similarly brutal civil war, 
ending in 2009. Like Liberia, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo received 
substantial security assistance in the five years following the end of fighting to support military 
and police reform, attracting over $185 million from the US alone.3 However, both the 
Congolese government and donors failed to integrate and professionalize the military. Worse, the 
high level of corruption and politicization that persisted in the security sector contributed to the 
rise of new rebel groups across the country.4 In 2013, renewed violence in the eastern region of 
Kivu pulled the country back into conflict – peace had failed.5 
 
1 Data taken from the Security Assistance Monitor, “Security Aid” (Washington, DC: Center for International 
Policy, 2020), https://www.securityassistance.org/data. 
2 Sean McFate, Building Better Armies: An Insider’s Account of Liberia (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War 
College Press, 2013), 91. 
3 Data taken from the Security Assistance Monitor, “Security Aid.” 
4 Judith Verweijen, “Half-Brewed: The Lukewarm Results of Creating an Integrated Military in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo,” in New Armies From Old: Merging Competing Militaries After Civil Wars, ed. Roy 
Licklider (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 151–52. 





Liberia and the DRC are just two examples of a varied empirical record of security 
assistance in post-conflict transitions. Security assistance has supported transformational change 
and peace in some states. In others, it has supported corruption and repression, without 
producing significant improvements in operational effectiveness. What explains why some 
security assistance interventions help sustain peace in some post-conflict states when others do 
not? 
Despite the volume of security assistance disbursed to post-conflict states, we know 
relatively little about the relationship between security assistance, governance, and stability. 
Although a burgeoning literature has emerged on security sector reform (SSR), few studies test 
the implicit hypothesis that security sector governance is related to peace. Even fewer look at the 
impact of traditional military assistance on post-conflict governance and stability. Furthermore, 
the studies that do exist rarely consider how different aid types might interact. Dube and Naidu 
conclude that: “Most previous studies… have not distinguished between military and other types 
of foreign aid, and there has been little empirical analysis of how military assistance affects 
either institutions or violence.”6 Further, as Biddle et al. note, despite the significant academic 
attention on civil wars—many of which involve security assistance to one or more parties—little 
attention has been given to the effect of security assistance on the forces that receive it.7  
This dissertation seeks to address these gaps. In this dissertation, I offer a theory of 
security assistance, governance, and conflict relapse. First, I argue that good security sector 
governance reduces the likelihood of conflict relapse by increasing the credibility of power-
 
6 Dube and Naidu, “Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of U.S. Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia,” 
4. 
7 Stephen Biddle, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker, “Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military Effectiveness of 





sharing promises. Good behavior by security forces may further bolster peace by increasing 
popular perceptions of regime legitimacy. Second, I argue that the effect of security assistance on 
security sector governance is a factor of the type of aid and the timing of its disbursement. 
Security assistance that supports institutional development is more likely to lead to governance 
improvements, while security assistance provided to support operational effectiveness may 
negatively affect governance – it may even undermine the reform efforts underway.  
The failure of peace is not just an academic question. Conflict imposes severe 
humanitarian, economic, and strategic costs. The Institute for Economics and Peace estimates 
that the global economic toll of violence in 2017 was $14.76 trillion – 12.4 percent of world 
gross domestic product.8 For the countries that experience these conflicts, the cost to 
development is significantly higher. States locked in conflict and instability suffer not only the 
direct effects of violence, but losses in foregone trade and investment.  
The security sector is charged with providing the most basic public good a state can offer: 
stability. The ability of the security sector to create stability is intrinsically linked to the quality 
of its institutions; as an OECD report concludes: “Inappropriate security structures and 
mechanisms can contribute to weak governance and to instability and violent conflict.”9 The 
intervention of the military in politics and the economy can lead to waste and corruption.10 
 
8 Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), “The Economic Value of Peace 2018: Measuring the Global Economic 
Impact of Violence and Conflict” (Sydney: Institute for Economics and Peace, October 2018), 9, 
http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Economic-Value-of-Peace-2018.pdf. 
9 OECD, “Security System Reform and Governance,” DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (Paris: Organisation 





10 Clare Short, “Security Sector Reform and the Elimination of Poverty” (Speech, Centre for Defence Studies, Kings 




Worse, politicization of the security sector and repression may perpetuate instability. In contrast, 
well-governed security sectors can support broader governance improvements. The Commander 
of the U.S. Southern Command, Admiral Kurt Tidd, advocated for security professionalization 
support precisely for this reason: “Transparent, accountable militaries and security forces help 
reinforce good governance by being responsive to civil authority and respectful of the rule of 
law.”11 
The rest of this chapter provides the context for this study. In the next section, I lay out 
the empirical trends in security assistance and the growth of the “new wars” described above. I 
then discuss the existing explanations for conflict recurrence; in the third section, I lay out my 
theory of how security sector governance impacts the likelihood of conflict relapse. The final 
section of this chapter presents a roadmap for the rest of this dissertation. 
 
More Aid, Less Peace? 
Security Assistance as a Tool for Stabilization 
The past twenty years have seen a sizeable increase in the amount of security assistance 
provided to post-conflict states driven by both strategic and developmental motivations. The 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 shifted the world’s perception of fragile states from a 
humanitarian issue to a security concern. US President George Bush argued that these attacks 
highlighted the changing nature of the international security environment: Western states were 
 
11 Admiral Kurt Tidd, Commander of the United States Southern Command, 2017, quoted in Pat Paterson, 
“Measuring Military Professionalism in Partner Nations: Guidance for Security Assistance Officials,” Journal of 




now threatened “less by conquering states than by failing ones.”12 Compounding the West’s 
attention to state fragility was a growing recognition of a shift in the nature of global conflict and 
the impact of these “new wars” on regional and international stability. The 2004 Action Plan 
published by the German Bundeswehr captures the issue:  
“Today’s conflicts are often waged with varying degrees of intensity over long 
periods of time. In the reality of these new wars, the contours of the three 
traditional phases of conflict are becoming increasingly blurred – the crisis phase 
preceding the outbreak of violence, the actual war phase marked by systematic use 
of force, and the phase of peace-building following the formal termination of 
armed conflict. Only in about half of all cases does the formal termination of 
hostilities lead to enduring peace.”13   
The link between state fragility and international security has been reiterated in the 
defense policy documents of most major Western states, including the 2010 and 2015 National 
Security Strategies of the US, the 2010 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review, the 2013 
French White Paper, and the 2006 and 2016 German White Papers.14 In addition to some direct 
 
12 “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, DC: Office of the President of the 
United States, September 2002), 2, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf. 
13 “Action Plan: ‘Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and Post-Conflict Peace-Building’” (Berlin: Die 
Bundesregierung, May 2004), 7–8, http://www.konfliktbearbeitung.net/downloads/file711.pdf. 
14 “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, DC: Office of the President of the 
United States, May 2010), 26–27, http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf; “National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America” (Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, February 2015), 10–11, 
http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf; “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The 
Strategic Defence and Security Review” (London: Office of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, October 
2010), 44–45, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62482/strategic-
defence-security-review.pdf; “French White Paper on Defence and National Security” (Paris: Office of the President 
of the French Republic, 2013), 38–40, 
http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/pdf/the_white_paper_defence_2013.pdf; “White Paper 2006 on 
Germany Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr” (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006), 18, 




military assistance, most states have adopted an indirect approach to stabilization, prioritizing 
partner capacity building, sending increasing amounts of security assistance to “train and equip” 
host nation forces. Between 2000 and 2016, the US alone provided over five billion dollars in 
security assistance to post-conflict states, not including aid to Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan 
(Figure 1.1).15  
 
At the same time, the concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR) was gaining traction 
among donors looking to support stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction. SSR seeks to 
improve the ability of states “to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a 
 
Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr” (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, June 2016), 39–40, 
https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/111704/2027268/2016%20White%20Paper.pdf. 
15 Note: All dollar amounts have been converted to USD 2016. This includes only security assistance given to states 
that are no longer experiencing fighting, defined here as fewer than 25 battle-related deaths per year. Data taken 
from the Security Assistance Monitor. (https://www.securityassistance.org/content/security-aid-dashboard) 




manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance and the rule of 
law.”16 Specifically, these programs focus on reforming the institutions of the security sector – 
building systems of accountability, increasing civilian control, and instilling respect for human 
rights. Underlying these programs is an assumption that the quality of security sector governance 
is intrinsically valuable, beyond its contribution to security force effectiveness. Unlike other 
development programs, the majority of support for SSR programs comes as security assistance.  
Civil Wars and Conflict Recurrence 
While civil wars are not a new feature of world politics, it appears that the nature of these 
conflicts is changing. Civil wars have grown longer and larger in scale, their occurrence and 
recurrence increasingly limited to states that have already experienced war. With a couple of 
notable exceptions, most instances of internal conflict are minor episodes of previously 
terminated conflicts, rather than new wars. Figure 1.2 shows the breakdown of internal conflict 
since 1990: of the 84 instances of conflict onset displayed, only 13 were the beginning of new 
civil wars. The rest were instances of conflict relapse.17  
 
16 OECD, “Security System Reform and Governance,” 11. 
17 Data on conflict episodes taken from Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset,” 
Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 5 (2002): 615–37.. “Relapse” here is defined as the resumption of a previously 
ended conflict resulting in 25 or more battle-related deaths; “civil war onset”, in contrast, signifies the outbreak of a 







Understanding the “New Wars” 
Studies of conflict relapse have expanded dramatically within the past ten years. Scholars 
have focused primarily on four lines of argument. The first set of theories focuses on the 
motivation for the initial civil war: citizens may be more likely to return to conflict if their 
contentions are not addressed. Structural conditions like underdevelopment and economic 
inequality that increase the probability of initial conflict outbreak are likely to have been 
exacerbated during the conflict, increasing grievances. The threat of ethnic conflict may also be 
greater in post-conflict states. All of the factors theorized to contribute to conflict onset—societal 
polarization, in-group/out-group perceptions, and unequal access to state resources—still exist 
when conflict ends. In addition, violence that falls along ethnic lines during the course of war 




will create new grievances.18 While the logic of these arguments is intuitive, they are unable to 
explain why some conflicts relapse when others do not.19 Take, for example, Rwanda and 
Burundi. Originally part of the same colony, Rwanda and Burundi share a similar terrain, history 
of ethnic grievances, and level of development.20 However, while Burundi continues to relapse 
into conflict, Rwanda has maintained peace since the late 1990s.  
A second line of theory looks at the nature of the initial civil war, arguing that the 
duration and conduct of conflict influence the willingness of combatants to return to violence. 
These theories generally adopt a bargaining model to explain the choice to fight. According to 
this logic, long, costly wars tend to be the least likely to recur. As war continues, combatants 
gain more information about the relative capabilities of their adversary, helping each group to 
better assess the costs of future war. However, if the ultimate winner inflicts too many casualties 
on their adversary, they may create new grievances that could increase the likelihood of a return 
to conflict.21 As Kalyvas explains, personal feelings of vengeance and retribution can linger long 
after a conflict ends.22 Considering the destruction of physical infrastructure and reduction of 
 
18 See Cederman Wimmer and Min on importance of impartiality in governance, Walter on conflict exacerbating 
grievances, Posen 28 on the security dilemma and ethnic conflict. Kalyvas argues that the conduct of war creates 
feelings of vengeance and desires for retribution, making war “personal.” Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence 
in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Barbara F. Walter, “Does Conflict Beget Conflict? 
Explaining Recurring Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (May 2004): 373. 
19 Analyzing occurrences of repeat civil war, Walter (2015) finds that while grievances are strong predictors of 
conflict onset, they are not significant predictors of recurrence. See Barbara F. Walter, “Why Bad Governance Leads 
to Repeat Civil War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 7 (2015): 1253–54, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002714528006. 
20 Devon E. A. Curtis, “Development Assistance and the Lasting Legacies of Rebellion in Burundi and Rwanda,” 
Third World Quarterly 36, no. 7 (2015): 1366, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1041103. 
21 Barbara F. Walter, “Bargaining Failures and Civil War,” Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 256; 
Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated 
Settlement of Civil Wars (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 60; J. Michael Quinn, T. 
David Mason, and Mehmet Gurses, “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,” International 
Interactions 33, no. 2 (2007): 85, https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620701277673; Walter, “Does Conflict Beget 
Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War,” 379. 





state capacity immediately following a war, it may be easier for dissatisfied parties to renew their 
cause.23 
A third, and related, line of research suggests that the way conflicts end has a significant 
impact on the durability of peace. Scholars have traditionally contrasted conflicts ending in 
military victories by one party against conflicts ending in negotiated agreements, finding that 
peace following a military victory tends to be the most stable.24 At this point, it is still unclear 
whether peace is more durable following a rebel victory or a government victory.25 Negotiated 
settlements have proven to be less stable: even if both parties are satisfied with the terms of 
agreement, the fact that groups retain some crucial resources creates uncertainty about 
commitment to the agreement. For this reason, peace agreements bolstered by international 
peacekeepers who can ensure compliance are much more likely to succeed.26 Furthermore, 
implementing extensive power-sharing provisions may increase the stability of peace.27  
The fourth major strand of the literature focuses on the characteristics of the post-conflict 
state and how they influence the durability of the peace. These theories begin with the hypothesis 
that conflict relapse may be a distinct phenomenon: the drivers spurring actors to return to 
 
23 Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel, “Civil War,” Journal of Economic Literature 48, no. 1 (2010): 37–38; 
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” The American Political Science 
Review 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75–90; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, “Beyond Greed and 
Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 61, no. 1 (2009): 1–27. 
24 Roy Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993,” The American Political 
Science Review 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 86; Monica Duffy Toft, Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of 
Civil Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 68. 
25 Victory by the incumbent regime often leaves many of the underlying motivations for rebellion unaddressed; for 
this reason, military victory may be the most stable when secured by the rebels. (Hartzell and Hoddie, Crafting 
Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars, 146; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, 
“Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,” 183–84; Kreutz, “How and When Armed Conflicts 
End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset,” 247.  
26 Virginia Page Fortna, “Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects,” World Politics 56, 
no. 4 (July 2004): 501; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and 
Quantitative Analysis,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (December 2000): 795. 




conflict may be different than what motivated conflict in the first place. The course and conduct 
of conflict transform societies, changing the grievances and social dynamics of actors in the post-
conflict state.28 Once the conflict has ended, the governing strategies pursued by the post-conflict 
regime are likely to influence whether actors believe it is in their interest to work within the new 
system or return to arms. 
Walter (2015) argues that institutionalized mechanisms of accountability provide ex-
combatants a peaceful way to ensure the post-conflict regime holds up its end of the bargain: 
“the more accountable the government is to a wide range of people, the easier it will be to 
credibly commit to share power and reform, and the fewer incentives groups will have to return 
to violence.”29 Governments that are accountable to a wide range of people may also be more 
likely to make policies that benefit the population at large. Better governance may thus reduce 
the likelihood of conflict recurrence by reducing perceptions of inequalities, decreasing inter-
group tensions and resentment.30 The prospects of peace are further enhanced in states with 
representative and inclusive governance institutions.31 As the 2017 World Development Report 
concludes, “Violence recedes when individuals, groups, and governments have incentives not to 
use it to pursue their objectives, and when not using it eventually becomes the norm. Institutions 
create incentives to reach agreements (cooperation) and enforce them (commitment).”32  
 
28 Charles T. Call, Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Consequences of Civil War Recurrence (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2012), 65. 
29 Walter, “Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War,” 1245. 
30 See Havard Hegre and Havard Mokleiv Nygard, “Governance and Conflict Relapse,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 59, no. 6 (2015): 986, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713520591; Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede 
Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug, Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), 31. 
31 Call, Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Consequences of Civil War Recurrence, 4. 
32 World Bank, “Governance and the Law,” World Development Report (Washington, DC: The World Bank Group, 




Until recently, scholars have focused primarily on the domestic factors of conflict, 
limiting analyses of foreign intervention to peacekeeping and the negotiation of conflict 
termination.33 These studies have found strong evidence to support the value of peacekeeping 
missions. Interventions by external actors to maintain ceasefires and stabilize conflict zones can 
reduce the likelihood of a relapse into conflict by providing security guarantees – monitoring 
actors’ compliance, and reassuring adversaries that their rivals are respecting their 
commitments.34 However, not all foreign military interventions are benign. External 
interventions during conflicts may create a moral hazard problem making relapse more likely.35 
Peacebuilding support given after a conflict has ended may be appropriated by domestic actors 
looking to advance their political or military position in the post-conflict state.36  
The internationalization of domestic conflict that has occurred in the past thirty years 
makes the focus on domestic factors insufficient to explain conflict recurrence. International 
actors are involved in conflict termination and post-conflict reconstruction in numerous ways 
beyond peacekeeping and mediation. Foreign states and international organizations provide 
humanitarian assistance, diplomatic support, and development aid to post-conflict states. They 
negotiate trade agreements and promote investment to spur private sector growth. They also 
provide a significant amount of security assistance.  
 
 
33 Niklas Karlén, “The Legacy of Foreign Patrons: External State Support and Conflict Recurrence,” Journal of 
Peace Research 20, no. 10 (2017): 3, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317700465. 
34 Doyle and Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,” 795; Hartzell and 
Hoddie, Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars, 62. 
35 Karlén, “The Legacy of Foreign Patrons: External State Support and Conflict Recurrence.” 
36 Milli Lake, “Building the Rule of War: Postconflict Institutions and the Micro-Dynamics of Conflict in Eastern 





The work of Lake (2017) and Karlén (2017) show how external factors can impact post-
war politics by influencing the strategic calculations of domestic actors. I argue that security 
assistance may impact post-conflict peace in a similar way. Specifically, I posit that security 
assistance impacts the likelihood of peace through its effect on the quality of governance of the 
security sector: security assistance that supports the development of a transparent and 
accountable security sector will likely increase the probability of peace, while assistance that 
supports patronage and repression may fuel a relapse into conflict. 
The impact of security assistance varies by both its type and the political and institutional 
context under which it is disbursed. I break security assistance into two types: institutional 
assistance, given to support institutional reform and development, and operational assistance, 
given to increase the operational effectiveness of the recipient state’s security forces. 
Institutional assistance is likely to have a positive impact on security sector governance, while 
operational assistance may have a negative impact. Thus, institutional aid is likely to reduce the 
probability of conflict relapse, while operational assistance may increase it. The size of the 
impact of aid on governance, however, is conditioned by timing. Drawing from the insights of 
historical institutionalism, I argue that aid will have a larger effect on governance when it is 
given at moments of high regime vulnerability – institutional assistance will have larger positive 
effects on governance, and operational assistance will have larger negative effects. Specifically, 
assistance that is given at moments of transition will have a greater impact on governance than 




I test this argument through a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. First, 
I test the relationship between security sector governance and conflict relapse among post-
conflict states using a discrete-time logistic regression where “conflict relapse” is the dependent 
variable. The results of these analyses show a clear correlation between security sector 
governance and the likelihood of relapse: states with good governance are have a lower 
probability of relapsing into conflict. Having established a relationship between security sector 
governance and relapse, I then turn to examine the effect of security assistance on governance. I 
do this using a qualitative method called comparative process tracing, a method chosen to better 
illustrate the mechanisms through which security assistance affects governance within states, and 
whether those mechanisms are similar across cases. To get a sense of how different combinations 
of aid may lead to different outcomes, I analyze the experiences of Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, and 
Sierra Leone, three states with similar backgrounds but varied aid profiles. 
 
Dissertation Roadmap 
 The following six chapters of this dissertation provide the theoretical and empirical 
support for the proposed relationship between security assistance, governance, and conflict 
relapse. In the next chapter, I make my case for studying security assistance by laying out the 
connection between security sector governance and conflict relapse. After outlining my theory, I 
use quantitative data to test the empirical relationship between governance and conflict relapse. 
The results of this analysis provide compelling support of a correlation between security sector 
governance and peace: states with higher levels of civilian control and rights-respecting security 




military and police reform have a lower rate of relapse than those with little or no reform. These 
findings serve as the framework for the rest of the dissertation, answering the question: why 
should we care about security sector governance? 
 Chapters 3 – 6 address the relationship between security assistance and security sector 
governance. Chapter 3 presents my theory of security assistance in greater detail. After laying 
out my theory and hypotheses, Chapter 3 concludes with a discussion of the research strategy 
taken to investigate these hypotheses. Chapters 4 – 6 examine the impact of security assistance 
on governance in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. The experiences of these three 
countries highlight how aid type and timing condition its impact.  
Chapter 4 considers the experience of Côte d’Ivoire after the first and second Ivorian 
conflicts. Following the first Ivorian war, donors were loath to provide support to the transitional 
government, which they viewed as corrupt and inefficient. Without the financial support they 
required, the new security institutions established to facilitate security sector reform languished. 
The outbreak and escalation of the second Ivorian conflict in 2011 is considered by many to be a 
failure of these institutions to properly demobilize combatants and reform the security sector. 
When the 2011 crisis ended, donors were quick to provide assistance to the new government. 
However, while donors intervened quickly and provided high levels of institutional assistance, 
the electoral and military victory won by Alassane Ouattara left little room for donor influence. 
Unlike the years following the first conflict, regime vulnerability was low. As my theory would 
predict, this aid did little to support positive governance improvements. Fears by Ivorian security 
experts of a potential relapse into conflict during the 2020 elections expose the continued 




Chapter 5 examines the impact of security assistance in Burundi. Burundi received high 
levels of operational assistance during a moment of regime vulnerability, enabling the 
government to put off politically difficult—but necessary—reforms. Although the Netherlands 
initiated a program of institutional assistance shortly thereafter, its effect was limited: the inflows 
of operational assistance received for participation in peacekeeping missions and 
counterterrorism support allowed the government to continue policies that maintained the 
politicization of the security sector, undercutting the institutional assistance it received. 
Chapter 6 presents a success story: Sierra Leone, receiving high inflows of institutional 
assistance in the immediate aftermath of conflict, set upon a course of security sector reform in 
the early post-war years that has continued today. When the government started to receive high 
levels of operational assistance in 2011, the institutions of the security sector were stable enough 
to absorb the aid without experiencing significant deteriorations of governance. Even in the 
success story, however, operational assistance did not contribute to lasting positive outcomes. 
Much of the equipment provided and systems put in place by this aid went to waste, 
unmaintained by the institutions receiving it.  
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation with a comparison of the three presented 
cases. Together, these chapters lend support to my theory and suggest other potential factors 
mitigating the impact of security assistance on governance and peace. After discussing the 
empirical results of this dissertation, Chapter 7 concludes with a discussion of the policy 





SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE AND POST-CONFLICT PEACE 
 
In the previous chapter, I asserted that the security assistance plays an important and 
underexamined role in the peace and stability of post-conflict states through the way it impacts 
governance. Aid that supports civilian control, accountability, and professionalism in the security 
sector will likely bolster the likelihood of peace. Aid that supports operational effectiveness, in 
contrast, may have a negative impact on governance, potentially contributing to a relapse into 
conflict. These effects are moderated by the level of regime vulnerability of the recipient state.  
Before delving into an examination of security assistance and its effects on governance, 
this chapter examines the validity of my assertion that security sector governance is related to 
conflict relapse. In the following section, I discuss the theoretical connection between security 
sector governance and conflict relapse. I argue that the quality of security sector governance is an 
important predictor of the sustainability of peace in post-conflict states, and that states that take 
steps to reform their security sector are more likely to see peace. Next, I test this relationship 
with a discrete-time duration analysis of relapse. I find strong evidence of a relationship between 
security sector governance and conflict relapse: among the states in my sample, better security 








Governance and Conflict Relapse 
What is Good Governance? 
Increasingly, scholars and practitioners have advocated the importance of “good 
governance” for breaking cycles of conflict and moving towards sustainable peace. Post-conflict 
states face myriad challenges ranging from rebuilding destroyed physical infrastructure, 
relocating displaced peoples, demobilizing and disarming former rebels, and restoring state 
services. The institutions charged with these responsibilities face significant shortfalls in 
available resources and trust of the population. Social and regional divisions among the 
population have likely been exacerbated throughout the course of conflict, aggravating tensions 
and heightening perceptions of unequal treatment by the government. Demobilized combatants 
may feel disenfranchised, wary of the post-war regime and its willingness to accommodate their 
demands. Theoretically, improving governance should increase the state’s ability to overcome 
these hurdles. 
Despite a prolific body of literature dedicated to the topic, scholars of both economics 
and political science have yet to agree on a common definition of governance. Most conceptions 
of governance, however, center on the way the state exercises its authority. States with good 
governance produce more and better public goods, including political goods, e.g. stability; 
economic goods, e.g. wealth and development; and social goods, e.g. health care and education.37 
The formal rules and informal practices that define the process of government decision-making 
also shape the way that these goods are provided: ideally, states will distribute goods fairly and 
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impartially.38 While scholars often connect good governance with democracy, governance is 
theoretically distinct from regime type: non-democratic regimes can be accountable providers of 
public goods, just as formally democratic regimes may fail to fulfill the needs of their citizens.39 
States with good governance generally share similar qualities: responsiveness, effectiveness, 
transparency, accountability, and participation.40 
These studies have focused primarily on political governance. However, governance of 
the state is closely tied to governance of the security sector, i.e. the actors and institutions 
charged with the provision, management, and oversight of security in a country. Considering the 
value attached to control of the security sector by state and non-state actors, the way it is 
governed will have important implications for the perceptions of rival groups that the 
government is committed to accommodating them. By increasing accountability and inclusion in 
the security sector, the government may have a greater chance of incentivizing its opponents to 
work within the system. At a more fundamental level, the quality of security sector governance 
in a state impacts the state’s ability to provide the most basic public good: security. By 
improving stability throughout the country, the state will be better able to address the grievances 
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Defining Security Sector Governance 
Security sector governance describes the exercise of authority by the actors and 
institutions charged with the provision, management, and oversight of security within a state. 
Good security sector governance is characterized by many of the same principles of general 
governance: accountability, transparency, participation, responsiveness, and effectiveness. 
Specifically, states with good security sector governance will generally share the following 
features: (1) a formal institutional framework that outlining the roles and responsibilities of 
security actors; (2) civilian control; (3) accountable and transparent management; (4) capacity to 
meet the security needs of the population; and (5) respect for human rights and the rule of law.41  
 A formal legal framework that outlines the roles and responsibilities of each institution 
helps to set standards regarding the proper functioning of security forces, the appropriate use of 
force, the hierarchy of command, and the roles of different institutions in respect to one another. 
Beyond setting standards, the codification of these roles provides a legal basis for redress if they 
are not respected.  
Good security sector governance requires a high degree of civilian control and oversight 
across the security sector. Croissant et al argue that true civilian control requires that civilians 
alone have the power to set national policy and determine its implementation in traditional 
political governance, internal security, and external security. Importantly, this requires that 
civilians have effective oversight and sanctioning powers over the military.42 Increasing effective 
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civilian oversight of the security sector has implications for several aspects of governance, 
including the integrity of electoral politics, respect for civil and political rights, and 
accountability. The accountability of the security sector is further supported if it is representative 
of the ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity of the country it serves.43  
Accountability is either supported or undermined by the quality of management systems. 
Transparency in public expenditure management is thought to reduce corruption and waste by 
increasing information about potentially fraudulent defense contracts or spending. This may also 
enhance performance by increasing the efficiency of resource allocations.44 Mechanisms for 
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accountability within and across security institutions are important for improving the 
professionalism of forces and personnel. Strong command and control systems within security 
forces enhance the ability of the administration to enforce accountability. 
The capacity of security institutions to meet the security needs of the population is often 
diminished in post-conflict settings, where years of conflict have taken a toll on physical 
infrastructure, human capital, and civilian trust in state security. Restoring the capacity of the 
security sector often requires first restoring government authority throughout the country. Once 
conflict has ended, improving capacity also entails a particular focus on supporting the police 
force and its ability to respond to the needs of local communities. 
Finally, good security sector governance requires that members of the security system–
whether soldiers, police officers, intelligence agents, or otherwise—act in accordance with 
international standards for human rights.  
Improving security sector governance has important normative benefits, such as the 
promotion of human rights and democratic governance. It also has critical instrumental value. 
Post-conflict governments face a range of issues complicating the provision of security, 
beginning with the need to re-establish their authority throughout the state. Previous work has 
shown that states that build inclusive and accountable post-war governance institutions are more 
likely to sustain peace. In the security sector, this means that choosing force integration and 
professionalization will be more likely to lead to peace than coup-proofing and repression.  
The State of the Security Sector after Civil War  
Post-conflict governments often face a condition of dual sovereignty, where an 




sovereignty is particularly likely if conflict did not end with a military victory by either the 
government or the opposition, leaving doubts as to the military supremacy of the government 
and allowing opposition groups to persist.45 The existence of social networks of former rebels 
poses a threat to the sustainability of peace: past research indicates that former fighters are more 
likely to return to conflict when mobilizers activate social ties.46 In order to effectively provide 
security throughout the country, the government must establish itself as the only legitimate 
provider of security and gain a monopoly on violence. As Rotberg (2007) claims: “if a nation 
state does not hold that monopoly it cannot provide full security.”47  
Complicating this, the conduct of war often corrupts the relationship between the state, 
the security sector, and society. The post-war political landscape is characterized by a range of 
actors, with different interests. In an inherently fragile situation, the regime’s top priority will be 
self-preservation. In states that have implemented some degree of military integration, ethnic or 
political cleavages between the regime and a section of the officer corps may increase distrust of 
the military.48 The regime may distrust the security sector even after cases of military victory, as 
the elevation of the security apparatus during conflict may have created expectations among the 
officer corps of continued inclusion in politics or of rewards for their part in securing victory 
after the war has ended. Thus, self-preservation for the regime will likely require some form of 
protection against military intervention against the state, either through promoting civilian 
control or by instituting coup-proofing measures. 
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Like their political counterparts, security elites have an interest in maintaining their 
power and position. In states where the military or other security actors have a large stake in 
politics or the economy, officers may feel that participation in the government is of even greater 
value. This is especially likely in states with a historically ethnically-imbalanced military, where 
officers may fear the repercussions of a shift in the balance of power.49 Opposition groups have 
an intense interest in capturing control of government institutions, the security sector in 
particular. If it becomes clear to one or more of the parties that they cannot hold full control of 
the military, they will likely work to achieve the “second-best option”: preventing their rival 
from gaining control.50  
These competing interests often come to light in the process of negotiating an end to 
conflict. Given the value of the security sector, rebel groups are likely to demand some form of 
power-sharing in the security sector, either through military integration or larger, sector-wide 
reforms. Whether the conflict ends with a negotiated settlement that stipulates reforms or a 
military victory, the post-war regime must decide on a governing strategy. As Powell (2019) 
summarizes, “to gain and maintain power is the first order of business”.51 Post-conflict regimes 
have to choose between two potential governing strategies to maximize their chances of staying 
in power: consolidate power over the opposition or include them. The choice made by the 
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government between power consolidation and inclusion has important implications for the 
quality of security sector governance and the likelihood of peace. 
Governing Strategies: Power Consolidation or Inclusion 
Consolidating power often requires politicizing the security sector: incentivizing loyalty 
through systems of patronage, implementing coup-proofing measures, and repressing the 
opposition. As discussed above, post-conflict regimes are likely to experience a higher level of 
distrust of the security sector, potentially perceiving a heightened risk of a coup d’état. States 
have historically implemented a host of “coup-proofing” measures to reduce their vulnerability 
to a military takeover, including establishing parallel security institutions to weaken state forces, 
rotating command positions to weaken social ties, and purging security elites with questionable 
loyalty. All of these policies come with a cost: by reducing the effectiveness of the security 
sector, leaders are also reducing their ability to respond to a threat. Sensing a weakness in state 
capacity, rebel groups might feel emboldened to raise an insurrection.52 Repression may also be 
an attractive tool for governments that are unwilling to offer institutional accommodations to 
challengers.53 However, this policy choice can have serious consequences. States that rely on 
repression may increase the risk of relapsing into conflict for both emotional and informational 
reasons: victims of war who are subjected to repression by state security forces are likely to 
experience “moral outrage” at the actions of the government; they are also likely to update their 
beliefs about the willingness of the government to accommodate their needs.54  
 
52 For a greater discussion of this, see Jun Koga Sudduth, “Coup-Proofing and Civil War,” in The Oxford Research 
Encyclopedia of Politics, ed. Thompson William R. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/57631/1/Sudduth_2016_Coup_proofing_and_civil_war.pdf. 
53 Eric Keels and Angela D. Nichols, “State Repression and Post-Conflict Peace Failure,” Conflict, Security & 
Development 18, no. 1 (2018): 20, https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2017.1420313. 




In contrast, a strategy of inclusion requires some degree of participation of opposition 
groups in the government. Inclusion is not without risk: incorporating former adversaries into the 
security may create opportunities for insurrection within the security apparatus. Mixing groups 
may lead to insubordination, either by the soldiers or police officers who do not trust their 
superiors, or by officers who do not respect the authority of the new government. Despite these 
challenges, inclusion is more likely to lead to lasting peace. As Toft (2010) argues, force alone is 
unlikely to be sufficient in maintaining peace; rather, “peace requires an additional factor: 
credible mutual benefit.”55   
In the security sector, inclusive governance strategies may entail some degree of force 
integration. To be effective, however, they require going beyond integration to extending civilian 
control over the security apparatus, including the right of oversight by representative bodies 
outside of the security institutions themselves. In other words, effective strategies of inclusion 
require improving security sector governance. 
States that with strong civilian control, transparent and accountable management, and 
rights respecting security forces should be less susceptible to the corruption and abuse of power 
that inflame grievances against the state. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1. States with good security sector governance are less likely to 










Improving Governance through Security Sector Reform 
To address these issues, donors now advocate for security sector reform.  The OECD 
defines SSR as the “transformation of the ‘security system’ – which includes all the actors, their 
roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a 
manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, 
and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.”56 SSR proponents recognize the 
health and functioning of the security sector as crucial for peace. Along with preventing a return 
to violence, practitioners aim to address politicization of forces, militarization of internal 
security, ethnicization of the security sector, corruption and patronage, and lack of 
professionalism.57 As part of the reform process, many policymakers advocate expanding the 
remit of the security sector from traditional to human security. SSR programs vary from country 
to country, but generally include five areas of focus: (1) disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration of former combatants; (2) security institution building; (3) military integration and 
reform; (4) internal security reform; and (5) professionalization of the security services.  
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs aim to restore the state 
as the single provider of security within the state by demobilizing ex-combatants and 
reintegrating them into society. As the name implies, DDR involves identifying all combatants to 
a conflict and deciding upon which of these combatants will be allowed to continue serving in an 
official capacity and which will be reintegrated into society as civilians. Most programs focus on 
economic reintegration, with the hopes that this will lead to deeper community reintegration and 
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ultimately, political reintegration. This approach is based on the understanding of the salience of 
economic grievances for conflict onset and the high remobilization potential of under-employed 
former soldiers.58 The goal of DDR is to reduce the coercive capacity of rebel groups, break 
down their social networks, and change the motivations of former rebels in ways that discourage 
them from turning to violence.  
Security institution building and professionalization efforts correspond closely with the 
principles of good security sector governance laid out above. Donor efforts to improve the 
institutional structure of the security sector generally aim to decrease corruption and waste, 
increase civilian oversight, and strengthen accountability measures in the Ministry of Defense. 
Professionalization efforts generally include normative training and technical training. 
Normative training focuses on respect for human rights and codes of conduct, while technical 
training is concerned with improving the operational capacity of the forces, such as improving 
military doctrine or police investigative skills. Donors are generally more concerned with the 
normative component of training.59   
Military integration and internal security reform are more institution specific. The 
integration of combatants into one army is often promoted as a way to simultaneously reduce the 
number of demobilized fighters in society and assuage societal groups that they are represented 
in the new regime. Governments have three options for military integration at the end of a 
conflict: (1) building an army from scratch; (2) drawing existing forces into a new army; or (3) 
merging existing forces. If successful, military integration should allow the military to retain a 
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necessary level of effectiveness without breaking down the social cohesion holding units 
together. Ideally, military integration will also be accompanied by reforms that promote civilian 
control and oversight, and a unified command structure while depoliticizing the institution.60 
These reforms support not only the professionalism of the military, but the stability of the state. 
As Wilen et al (2018) explain: “politicization, questionable loyalties, abuses of power, corruption 
and lack of accountability to civilian authorities, are likely to affect not only the military’s role in 
society in general, but also the larger peacebuilding process.”61  
Like military reform, reform of the internal security institutions often requires some 
integration of former combatants, creation of oversight mechanisms, and depoliticization. In 
many conflict-affected states distrust for the police runs high. Like the state institutions they 
served before the conflict, many police forces were corrupt and abused their positions for 
personal gain or to perpetuate state repression. The overall goal for most police reform programs 
is to create a decentralized civilian police force with specialized units.62 Intelligence services are 
another important area for reform. Corrupt or authoritarian states often abuse intelligence 
services to gain information regarding political rivals or regime dissidents. Weak post-conflict 
regimes are likely to continue using state intelligence for personal gains. Professionalization 
efforts with the intelligence services and modifying institutional structures to support their 
independence is thus an important step for preserving the rule of law and supporting governance 
reforms. 
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SSR should reduce the likelihood of conflict relapse by helping to establish the 
government as the only legitimate provider of security. Together, these processes should help to 
break down former combatant networks, bringing some fighters into state forces and 
reintegrating the rest into society. By improving security sector governance and integrating 
former combatants into state institutions, SSR further supports peace duration by offering the 
institutional accommodation described above. However, for these reforms to be effective, they 
must be implemented fully. Halfway measures are unlikely to take root; worse, they may even 
detract from the functioning of the security sector. Furthermore, incomplete implementation of 
security sector reforms may lead the opposition to doubt the government’s commitment to 
accommodation and inclusion. As discussed above, the security sector is the state’s greatest prize 
– if it appears that the government is unwilling to share it, the opposition may be more willing to 
return to war. The importance of complete implementation of reforms is reflected in hypothesis 
2: 
Hypothesis 2: SSR reduces the likelihood of conflict relapse when it is 
implemented fully. 
Several studies have been done considering the relationship between security sector 
reform and peace. However, most of these studies use very limited measures to examine the 
relationships they posit, often looking only at whether the peace agreement includes a provision 
for SSR, ignoring the extent of its implementation.63 As discussed above, it is unlikely that SSR 
would have any impact on the likelihood of relapse if not implemented; worse, promises of 
reform that were made and not kept may have the opposite effect. By not looking at 
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implementation, these studies leave us with an incomplete picture of security sector governance 
and peace. 
In the following sections, I test the hypotheses listed above using a discrete-time logistic 
analysis of governance quality on peace during, looking at two indicators of governance and two 
indicators of reform as predictors of relapse. There are innumerable factors influencing whether 
or not a state relapses into conflict, many of which are unique to each case. Thus, statistical 
analyses of this kind are limited in what they can tell us about the relationship between 
governance and peace. The goal of these analyses is not to prove causation; rather, the following 
tests are intended simply as a probe of the relationships described above. If good security sector 
governance and security sector reform improves the sustainability of peace, we should see a 
negative correlation between governance quality and the probability of conflict relapse. 
 
Testing the Governance-Relapse Relationship 
 Civil war, conflict relapse, and governance are widely studied by political scientists. I 
follow the conventions of the literature in the way I define and operationalize these concepts. 
Similarly, I adopt the theoretical assumptions of most authors in this field: namely, that actors 
seek to gain and hold power, that the quality of governance of post-conflict states is likely to be 
low, and that change in governance, when it occurs, is slow. In this section, I outline the scope of 
this study and the concepts and definitions I employ. For the sake of consistency, I maintain the 
same parameters for the logistic analysis of governance and conflict relapse conducted in this 






This project looks at the impact of foreign aid on states emerging from civil war, defined 
as a conflict occurring between at least one rebel group and the government, producing a 
minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths. To differentiate between a lapse in fighting and an end 
to war, I require that the end of conflict is followed by at least two years with fewer than 25 
battle-related deaths. Defining conflict episodes by battle deaths is preferable to using conflict 
settlement for two reasons: first, as conflicts such as the Sudanese civil war demonstrate, states 
can conclude several peace deals and continue to fight; and second, as Kreutz (2010) shows, the 
majority of conflicts do not end with a definitive victory or negotiated settlement, making coding 
difficult.64 Because of data availability, I limit my analysis to the years 1996-2016. Table 1 in the 
Appendix lists all of the countries included in this population.65 
Conflict Relapse 
I define “conflict relapse” as the recurrence of conflict in a post-civil war society, 
following at least two years of little to no conflict activity (defined in terms of battle-related 
deaths). To qualify as relapse, the conflict episode must either (a) last for two or more 
consecutive years or (b) result in 1,000 or more battle-related deaths. I make these stipulations to 
differentiate between what could be the sporadic actions of a few unsatisfied ex-combatants and 
a real threat of renewed civil war. Among the 26 states included in this study, twelve relapsed 
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into conflict. Of these twelve states, three – Somalia, the Republic of Congo, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo – experienced a second relapse into conflict, bringing the total instance of 
relapse to 15. I follow the majority of scholars in choosing the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Database (ACD) for data on conflict episodes.66  
Security Sector Governance 
As I discuss above, the quality of security sector governance is a function of formal 
institutions, civilian control, accountability, capacity, and respect for human rights. 
Unfortunately, there are very few data sources available to assess the quality of security 
governance.67 In the following analyses, I test the following dimensions of security sector 
governance: civilian control and security forces’ respect for human rights. 
  I operationalize civilian control using the “Military in Politics” measure from the PRS 
Group’s International Country Risk Guide. This measure considers the involvement of the 
military in political decision-making, based off of a subjective analysis of available information. 
I recode their indicator, so that scores range from 0 (most involvement) to 5 (least involvement); 
thus, higher scores indicate high levels of civilian control (i.e. better governance).68 Although 
this measure does not capture some of the more nuanced aspects of civilian control, such as 
civilian oversight of the military by groups other than the executive, it provides a good indicator 
of the most prominent aspect of civilian control. 
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threshold of “war” for COW, it still indicates a failure of the post-conflict peace. (Call, Why Peace Fails: The 
Causes and Consequences of Civil War Recurrence, 9.) 
67 I have not found any available data measuring the institutional framework or management of the security sector; 
while measures are available to approximate for the capacity of the security sector, they are too closely related to the 
dependent variable (conflict relapse) to employ in a statistical analysis like this. 





I measure state repression using data from the Political Terror Scale, which defines 
political terror as “violations of basic human rights to the physical integrity of the person by 
agents of the state within the territorial boundaries of the state in question.” This includes 
violations ranging from political imprisonment and torture to abductions to extrajudicial killings 
or deadly force, committed by a range of security actors.69 Using the three political terror scores 
included in the PTS, I construct a 5-point scale, with measures ranging from 0 (highest level of 
repression) to 4 (lowest level of repression); in other words, higher scores indicate better 
governance.70 The decision to repress is one taken by the government. However, once presented 
with the order to repress, security forces must decide whether or not to comply. When security 
forces view their responsibility as to the people instead of the regime, they are less likely to 
comply with orders to repress.71 Security forces that have a high level of respect for human rights 
should be less likely to comply with orders to repress. As discussed above, the work of Keels and 
Nichols (2018) shows a positive, significant relationship between repression and conflict 
relapse.72 However, while their analysis includes measures for regime type, they do not consider 
other indicators of governance. Thus, it is unclear whether their results capture the direct effect 
of political violence on peace, or governance more broadly. By including repression into these 
models, this analysis will enhance our understanding of how the conduct of security forces 
impacts the sustainability of peace. 
 
69 For a full list, see the Appendix. 
70 The PTS includes three measures of political terror, each of which reflect counts of physical violations as recorded 
by the US State Department, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch. See Mark Gibney et al., “The 
Political Terror Scale 1976-2018,” Political Terror Scale, 2019, 1–3, http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/. 
71 David Pion-Berlin, Diego Esparza, and Kevin Grisham, “Staying Quartered: Civilian Uprisings and Military 
Disobedience in the Twenty-First Century,” Comparative Political Studies 47, no. 2 (2014): 241–45, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414012450566. 




These measures are blunt indicators of security sector governance. They do not take into 
account many of the other factors associated with good governance in post-conflict states, such 
as accountability, formal institutions, or capacity. However, with no measures available for those 
aspects of security governance, I argue that military involvement in politics and repression offer 
valuable indicator of governance.  
Security Sector Reform 
 To capture the level of security sector reform in a state, I construct two measures 
capturing the level of military and police reform in a state, drawing from data from Notre 
Dame’s Peace Accords Matrix.73 These measures capture whether the state included a measure 
for military or police reform in a peace agreement and, if they did, whether the agreed upon 
reforms were carried out. “Military Reform” and “Police Reform” are categorical variables, 
scored 0 to 3. If the state did not specify reforms or did not follow through with them, it receives 
a score of 0. Minimal implementation is scored “1”, moderate implementation “2”, and full 
implementation of reforms is scored “3”.  
Like the other indicators employed in this analysis, these give a somewhat incomplete 
accounting of reform as they do not take into account the variation in the content of peace 
agreements, i.e. a state that stipulates only military integration is considered the same way as a 
state that commits to a more expansive set of reforms. The qualitative analyses in later chapters 
will allow a deeper, more multi-faceted analysis of the relationship between governance, security 
sector reform, and peace. 
 
73 Madhav Joshi, Jason Michael Quinn, and Patrick M. Regan, “Annualized Implementation Data on Intrastate 





To maximize the power of these analyses, I limit the control variables I include to those 
that are most theoretically relevant. Theories about the feasibility of civil war posit that conflict 
is more likely to occur where the state has less ability to put down an insurrection. I include the 
logged value of GDP and the logged value of the population to control for state capacity. The 
grievance literature commonly posits underdevelopment to be a driver of conflict and conflict 
relapse. To account for this, I also include a measure of infant mortality, which is commonly 
used in the economics literature as a proxy for level of development.74  
Security sector governance is likely related to the political governance quality of the 
state. To control for political governance, I use a composite measure created with the political 
corruption, rule of law, and accountability indices from the Varieties of Democracy Dataset 
(VDEM). These indices are coded using expert surveys to capture the pervasiveness of 
corruption; the extent to which the regime is accountable to the population, civil society, and 
other branches of government; and the respect for the rule of law.75  To account for regime type, 
I use the revised combined polity score from the POLITY IV dataset, created for use with time-
series data.76  
In light of the theoretical and empirical work relating the form of conflict termination and 
post-conflict governance, I include an indicator for “conflict outcome,” taken from the UCDP 
 
74 Data on GDP, population, and infant mortality were taken from the World Bank. See World Bank, “World 
Development Indicators,” The World Bank, 2020, https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-
indicators. 
75 Michael Coppedge et al., “V-Dem Codebook V8,” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), 2018, 
https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18. 
76 Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, “POLITY IV PROJECT: Political Regimes and Characteristics, 1800-




Conflict Termination Dataset.77 Conflicts may end in four ways: (1) with a negotiated settlement, 
(2) a ceasefire, (3) victory by the incumbent government; (4) victory by the rebels; or (5) low 
activity – many conflicts do not end decisively, but dwindle until there are no more violent 
confrontations. In the following regressions, “negotiated settlement” is the baseline outcome.  
To control for the strategic interest of OECD donors, I remove Israel, Egypt, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq from the analysis because of their unique strategic value to the U.S. Given 
the strong security ties of most OECD donors with the United States and size of security and 
development assistance they receive, including these states is likely to skew the results of the 
analysis. States that are rich in extractable resources may be more likely to relapse into conflict; 
as they do not rely on taxed income for revenue, these states may not feel as great a need to 
accommodate the demands of their citizens. Additionally, full control of the state and its 
institutions may seem like a greater prize to elites, making those in power more desperate to keep 
power and those outside of power more motivated to take it.78 To capture this, I include a 
measure of “resource wealth” taken from Ross Mahdavi (2008), recoded as a binary variable to 
reflect whether the state is a net exporter of oil or gas.79 
 
Analysis and Results 
To test the effect of governance quality on the likelihood of conflict relapse, I derive 
maximum likelihood estimators of relapse using a discrete-time hazard model. Discrete-time 
 
77 Kreutz, “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset.” 
78 Desha M. Girod, Explaining Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 15–17; Eric 
Keels, “Oil Wealth, Post-Conflict Elections, and Postwar Peace Failure,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, no. 5 
(2015): 1025, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715595702. 





hazard models offer an alternative to the Cox proportional hazards model and are better able to 
address the possibility of temporal variation when the data group time into blocks. Instead, Beck, 
Katz, and Tucker (1998) argue that a pooled logistic regression with cubic splines is the best 
approach to model grouped duration data like these. I follow their advice and use a traditional 
logit model with restricted cubic splines to estimate duration in this model.80  
Table 2.1 reports the results of the logistic analyses testing security sector governance 
and conflict relapse. Table 2.2 displays the logistic regressions analyses of security sector reform 
and relapse. To account for dependence within units, I apply robust standard errors clustered at 
the country level to Models 2 - 4. Unfortunately, data coverage by the ICRG within this sample 
is limited. Because of the constrained sample size, Model 1 is run without country-clustered 
standard errors. Removing clustered standard errors decreases the accuracy of these results as 
compared to the rest of the models I present. 
Civilian control (Model 1) has a negative, significant relationship with conflict, as shown 
in Figure 2.2. In other words, states with greater civilian control are less likely to relapse into 
conflict than those states in which the military takes an active role in politics. Within this sample, 
the mean score for military in politics is 2.34, putting the average country at around a 17 percent 
risk of conflict relapse, all else equal. These results indicate that reducing the level of military 
involvement in politics by one standard deviation (1.54), cuts the risk of conflict relapse by over 
two-thirds, bringing the likelihood of relapse to around 5 percent. 
 
 
80 I specify four knots at 0, 3, 7, and 16 years after conflict has ended. To determine knot placement, I use STATA 















Table 2.1 Security Sector Governance and Conflict Relapse 
Discrete-Time Logistic Regression  
M1 M2  
Logit Logit, PCSE 
  b/(se) b/(se) 





Respect for Human Rights 
 
-0.638   
-0.721 
Revised Polity 7.683* -0.081  
-3.72 -0.3 




-0.095**   
-0.034 
Outcome (Base = Peace Agreement) 
  
Ceasefire 160.415 8.366**  
-2550.97 -3.175 
Government Victory 145.264* 7.610*  
-70.898 -3.266 
Low Activity 139.913 9.051**  
-2550.737 -3.215 
Log GDP -27.824* -3.393  
-14.135 -1.87 
Log Population 53.426* 4.105  
-26.495 -2.353 
Resource Wealth 40.379 4.38  
-21.241 -2.249 




Spline 1 7.73 3.136*  
-4.011 -1.226 
Spline 2 -32.379 -14.195*  
-19.314 -6.603 
Spline 3 69.12 25.782*  
-40.95 -12.693 
Constant -792.149 -52.479* 
  -2578.378 -24.932 
Wald Chi-Squared 49.38 21.43 
Prob > Chi-Squared 0.00 0.09 
Pseudo R-squared 0.738 0.374 
N 197 266 
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
















Model 2 shows the relationship between respect for human rights by security forces on 
the likelihood of relapse. The average effect of repression is insignificant. However, as Figure 
2.3 shows, repression has varied marginal effects: in the mid-range, repression shows a 
significant relationship with relapse. Theoretically this makes sense: very low rates of repression 
are unlikely to incite grievances; very high rates of repression may deter potential rebels from 
picking up arms against the government. The states in this sample share a mean score of 2.06 on 
respect for human rights, which is within the range of significance. If respect for human rights is 
improved by one standard deviation (0.87), the likelihood of relapse is nearly cut in half. Put 
differently, reducing repression by state security forces reduces the risk of conflict.  






Figure 2.3: Marginal Effect of Respect for Human Rights on Relapse 
 
 
Models 3 and 4 test the impact of military reform and police reform on relapse, 
respectively. The results show strong support for Hypothesis 2: reform only reduces the 
likelihood of conflict when implemented fully. The negative, significant coefficients for full 
implementation of military and police reform indicate that honoring promises for reform made 
during peace negotiations lowers the risk of relapsing into conflict, but that this effect only holds 
when reforms are made in full. Specifically, full implementation of military reform is associated 
with a 13 percent reduction in the probability of relapse as compared to states where no reforms 
were pursued. Full implementation of police reforms reduces the likelihood of relapse by seven 
percent as compared to no reform. Figure 2.4 portrays the coefficients listed in Models 3 and 4, 
respectively. To simplify these figures, I include only the indicators that showed a statistically 




















 These figures illustrate relationships common across all four models. First, these models 
provide only weak support for arguments tying conflict relapse to state capacity. While the 
Table 2.2 SSR and Conflict Relapse 






 Logit, PCSE Logit, PCSE 
 b/(se) b/(se) 
Security Sector Reform (Base = None)    
Minimal 0.734 0 
 -2.217 (.) 
Moderate 0 2.149 
 (.) -2.397 
Full -3.552* -3.237** 
 -1.421 -1 
Revised Polity 0.02 0.078 
 -0.297 -0.227 
Governance Quality -0.092 -0.161 
 -0.222 -0.203 
Infant Mortality -0.112 -0.140* 
 -0.058 -0.057 
Outcome (Base = Peace Agreement)   
Ceasefire 10.443** 10.532*** 
 -3.695 -3.005 
Government Victory 9.240** 6.578** 
 -3.586 -2.468 
Low Activity 8.487* 9.029** 
 -3.755 -3.253 
Log GDP -3.971 -4.263* 
 -2.113 -2.144 
Log Population 4.461 4.561 
 -2.282 -2.357 
Resource Wealth 5.349 5.983* 
 -3.4 -2.831 
Peacekeeping Operation 8.862** 8.466*** 
 -3.027 -2.129 
Peace Years   
Spline 1 4.851* 3.775* 
 -2.447 -1.494 
Spline 2 -20.803 -16.294* 
 -12.097 -7.833 
Spline 3 37.258 29.108 
 -22.637 -14.881 
Constant -55.649** -49.885* 
  -21.58 -19.612 
Wald Chi-Squared 41.41 200.37 
Prob > Chi-Squared 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.439 0.409 
N 219 265 




direction of the coefficients for GDP and population point in the direction predicted by these 
theories, they only reach significance in model 1. Resource wealth is positively correlated with 
conflict relapse across all four models. 
Grievance theories 
received slightly more support: 
Infant mortality is negatively 
correlated with relapse across 
all four models, reaching 
significance in Models 2 and 4. 
Similarly, governance quality 
is negative across all four 
models, but only reaches 
significance in Model 1. The 
insignificance of governance 
quality in these models is 
surprising, as prior work would 
indicate a strong relationship 
between governance and peace. 
Rather than interpreting these 
results as evidence against the 
governance-relapse link, it seems likely that their insignificance is a function of model choice. 
By pooling observations, these models are unable to test for within-country variation over time. 
Unfortunately, data limitations prohibit the use of a conditional fixed-effects analysis. 




In contrast, these results provide strong support of relationship between conflict 
termination and relapse. In this sample, conflicts that ended with a negotiated settlement were 
less likely to relapse into conflict than those that end with ceasefires, military victory by the 
government, or taper out due to low activity. Peacekeeping operations appear to be a strong 
positive predictor of conflict relapse. This counterintuitive finding likely reflects what Fortna 
(2004) finds in her study of PKO effectiveness – the states that host peacekeeping missions are 
usually the “toughest cases,” the states that experienced the most intractable conflicts and the 
most precarious peace.81 Thus, the seemingly positive relationship between PKOs and conflict 
relapse is likely misleading. These results also provide strong support for a time trend. States 
face a heightened risk of relapsing into conflict within the first four years of peace; after that, the 
risk of relapse falls quickly. 
Conclusion 
 The four analyses presented above all support a similar conclusion: the quality of security 
sector governance is connected to the likelihood that post-conflict states relapse into conflict. 
States with security forces that refrain from intervening in politics and respect the physical 
integrity of citizens are less likely to see peace fail than states with low civilian control and high 
rates of repression. Furthermore, states that adopt and implement security sector reforms are 
more likely to remain at peace.  
 




 Given the evidence of a relationship between governance and relapse, understanding the 
impact of security assistance on security sector governance becomes all the more important. In 





CHAPTER 3  
A THEORY OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND GOVERNANCE 
 
In this chapter, I propose a theory of security assistance in post-conflict states. I argue 
that the impact of security assistance on security sector governance is a function of the type of 
aid and the timing of its disbursement. I assert that different types of security assistance have 
differential effects on governance: aid that supports institutional development (“institutional 
assistance”) is likely to have a positive effect on governance, while aid that supports operational 
effectiveness (“operational assistance”) will be more likely to have a negative effect on 
governance. Following the work of historical institutionalists, I argue that the impact of this aid 
is conditioned by the political context: institutional assistance that is provided during moments of 
regime vulnerability will be more likely to lead to positive governance changes than aid provided 
during periods of regime stability. Similarly, operational assistance that is provided during 
uncertainty will be more likely to lead to a deterioration in governance. It may even undercut the 
governance interventions underway.  
This chapter proceeds in the following sections. First, I review the literature on security 
assistance and its impact on governance. Like the literature on development assistance, scholars 
of military aid generally fall in two camps: optimists and pessimists. Second, I present a theory 
to help explain the divergent theoretical and empirical expectations of aid scholars. I argue that 
military assistance has differential effects on security sector governance because of differences in 
the composition and timing of aid interventions. Third, I explain the research strategy I employ 
to investigate this theory in the rest of the dissertation. Finally, I conclude with a review of the 




Can Aid Improve Governance? Reviewing the Aid Debate 
In contrast to the large body of political science and economics literature devoted to 
development assistance, military assistance has received relatively little scholarly attention. Like 
development assistance, military aid experts diverge on their expectations regarding its effects. 
Critics of military aid argue that security assistance could be damaging to both the security and 
governance of the recipient state. In states with fraught civil-military relations, the regime is 
likely prioritize its own survival over domestic security. Where this is the case, the regime may 
employ measures to reduce the likelihood that military officers will attempt a coup d’état, such 
as creating parallel security institutions, creating special security units loyal only to the regime, 
and intervening in military affairs to reward loyalty over merit.82 These strategies are often 
expensive, creating an incentive for the regime to mobilize all available defense funds to 
maintain their coup-proofing measures.  
Mara Karlin highlights this issue in her study of US military assistance, offering the 
example of Yemen:  
“In Yemen, from 2007 to 2011, the U.S. government disbursed more than $500 
million to assist the country’s military in its fight against a mix of domestic 
insurgents and al Qaeda affiliates. In its narrow focus on counterterrorism, 
however, the United States failed to fully appreciate that Yemen’s security 
challenges were only one of many problems facing the country. Its president, Ali 
Abdullah Saleh, had filled the military with friends and family members who 
 
82 For a good discussion of various coup-proofing measures and their effectiveness, see Erica De Bruin, “Preventing 





grew rich while nearly everyone else in the country suffered from poverty, 
hunger, and unemployment. Moreover, Saleh used the U.S. funds and equipment 
intended for counterterrorism to enrich his family and bolster his personal security 
detail. In 2015, when Yemen descended into outright civil war, Pentagon officials 
admitted that they had lost track of millions of dollars’ worth of military 
equipment and could not guarantee that U.S. weapons would not fall into the 
wrong hands.”83  
In addition to institutionalizing poor security sector governance, the decision to coup-proof 
requires an inherent trade-off in conventional effectiveness: the same strategies that make a 
military less of a threat to the government also make it less able to respond to security threats.84 
Second, inflows of equipment and training to repressive regimes could make it easier for 
the state to punish dissidents and opposition groups. This was clearly the case in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo in the run-up to the 2015 elections as the Congolese government used its 
security forces to implement increasingly repressive measures against political opponents.85 
Where aid enables the state to repress the opposition, it contributes to political grievances against 
the state, potentially enabling support for a return to conflict. Increases in coercive power may 
also disincentivize the government from making political concessions to the opposition if they 
believe their increased power makes them a more formidable foe.86 Alternatively, some scholars 
suggest that the increased power and standing of the military may jeopardize stability by 
 
83 Mara Karlin, “Why Military Assistance Programs Disappoint: Minor Tools Can’t Solve Major Problems,” 
Foreign Affairs, December 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-10-16/why-military-assistance-
programs-disappoint. 
84 Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes, 47–50. 
85 Kersti Larsdotter, “Security Assistance in Africa: The Case for Less,” Parameters 45, no. 2 (Summer 2015): 30. 
86 Stephen Watts et al., Building Security in Africa: An Evaluation of U.S. Security Sector Assistance in Africa from 




increasing the likelihood of a coup d’état, or at least increasing tension between officers and 
civilian leaders. 87    
Proponents of assistance argue that certain forms of security assistance have the potential 
to transmit liberal norms of civilian control and respect for human rights, and improve 
institutional quality and capacity in weak states. Credible threats by donors to withhold aid for 
human rights abuses may raise the cost of repression for recipient governments and incentivize 
changes in behavior.88  
Like certain forms of development assistance, security assistance in the form of force 
professionalization and defense institution building are focused on building professional norms 
and building institutions. This assistance also has the ability to break down existing networks of 
patronage in the security sector by prioritizing formal systems of recruitment and promotion. 
Thus, in addition to improving security sector governance, security assistance that addresses 
these “sensitive affairs” is likely to improve effectiveness as well.89  
Generally, this form of aid constitutes a small percentage of overall security assistance. 
However, funding devoted to security institution building in post-conflict states has grown in the 
past twenty years as the development community has embraced security sector reform as key for 
post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Security sector reform (SSR) projects aim to 
professionalize the military and police through instituting civilian leadership and a clear chain of 
 
87 Jesse Dillon Savage and Jonathan D Caverley, “When Human Capital Threatens the Capitol: Foreign Aid in the 
Form of Military Training and Coups,” Journal of Peace Research 54, no. 4 (July 1, 2017): 545, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317713557. 
88 Sam R. Bell, K. Chad Clay, and Carla Martinez Machain, “The Effect of US Troop Deployments on Human 
Rights,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, no. 10 (November 2017): 2025, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716632300. 
89 Mara Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States (Philadelphia: University of 




command; de-politicizing army recruitment; professionalizing the police force; and to bring the 
military and police under the purview of the judicial system. The goal of these actions is to 
reduce the influence of the military in politics and strengthen the state’s efforts to promote the 
rule of law and reduce corruption.  
 
Supporting Governance to Support Peace 
Recent empirical work in political science and economics shows that different types of 
development aid have differential effects on governance: aid provided to support democracy and 
accountability often has a positive effect on governance.90 However, all of these studies have 
only considered development assistance. I argue that certain types of military aid function in the 
same way, supporting accountability and transparency of operations. I define institutional 
assistance as assistance provided specifically to improve institutional quality by supporting 
systems of transparency, accountability, and public administration. Operational assistance is 
generally provided to expand the recipient state’s resource base or improve the operational and 
tactical skills of security forces. Given the value of the organization and control of the security 
sector as a tool for conserving power, regime elites have large incentives to misuse this aid.  
These different effects come down to a question of fungibility – the idea that aid money 
may be spent in ways that the donor did not intend. Aid becomes fungible due to the perfect 
substitutability of money – i.e. money that is provided for one activity relaxes the recipient 
 
90 See, for example, Jones and Tarp, “Does Foreign Aid Harm Political Institutions?”; Heinrich and Loftis, 
“Democracy Aid and Electoral Accountability”; and Savun and Tirone, “Foreign Aid as a Counterterrorism Tool: 
More Liberty, Less Terror?”. For a critique of democracy assistance, see de Zeeuw, “Projects Do Not Create 




government’s budget constraints, making it possible for the recipient to take the money it had 
intended on spending on the financed project and spending it somewhere else. Some scholars 
distinguish between fungibility through substitution, and fungibility through manipulation, in 
which the recipient government applies the funding provided for one sector or project to 
another.91 For example, funding provided to build a hospital could be diverted towards the 
military. This is possible with all types of aid, and can be quite significant in scale. One study 
found that for every dollar spent by donors on health-related aid, recipient governments reduce 
domestic spending by $0.43 to $1.14.92 
Fungibility is not necessarily a bad thing – for cash-strapped governments, project 
support by donors can free up scarce resources for productive investment. For less scrupulous 
regimes, however, the fungibility of aid can be useful for maintaining patronage systems or 
funding politically popular (but unnecessary) projects. Aid that is low in fungibility and directed 
specifically towards improving transparency and accountability (i.e. institutional assistance) is 
more likely to lead to governance improvements than aid that is more fungible and intended to 
improve operational effectiveness (i.e. operational assistance). 
 
How Fungibility Influences Aid Impact 
Aid varies in fungibility based on the motivation of the donor and the form of assistance. 
Though aid recipients can request a certain type of funding, the choice of aid modality is 
 
91 For a discussion of the different conceptions of fungibility, see Stefan Leiderer, “Fungibility and the Choice of 
Aid Modalities: The Red Herring Revisited,” Working Paper (Helsinki: UNU World Institite for Development 
Economics Research, August 2012), 4, https://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-
reviews/Fungibility%20and%20the%20Choice%20of%20Aid%20Modalities.pdf. 
92 Chunling Lu et al., “Public Financing of Health in Developing Countries: A Cross-National Systematic Analysis,” 
Lancet 375 (April 2010): 1375; cited in Haley J. Swedlund, The Development Dance (Ithaca: Cornell University 




ultimately up to the donor, and she may make the decision regarding which type of aid to send 
for either altruistic or strategic reasons. Altruistic donors are primarily interested in the political 
and economic development of the recipient state, and provide aid based on what they evaluate to 
be the most effective plan for that state. Strategic donors, in contrast, provide aid to further their 
self-interest. Aid allocated to further the strategic interests of donors is less likely to improve the 
institutional quality of states because donors want the support of the incumbent regime and thus 
may be less likely to impose or enforce policy conditions that are costly to the recipient regime. 
When donors cannot credibly threaten to enforce policy conditions, aid operates like other non-
tax revenue sources such as oil: recipient governments have full discretion over its use, with no 
responsibility to put it towards the provision of public goods.93 I follow the literature in adopting 
the assumption that states with poor governance are likely to appropriate aid to fund regime 
survival. This is effect may be greater in post-conflict settings, where incumbent governments 
face a greater risk of coups or rebellion.94 Empirical evidence supports this assumption: while 
there is variation among post-conflict states, states emerging from conflict have significantly 
worse governance than other developing countries.95 
Security assistance comes in a variety of forms. Unlike development assistance, there are 
no common terms used by donors to describe the types of assistance provided. Still, an analysis 
of the security assistance provided by the U.S. and three of its allies—the UK, France, and 
Australia—reveals common trends in aid giving. Donors generally provide security assistance 
 
93 David H. Bearce and Daniel C. Tirone, “Foreign Aid Effectiveness and the Strategic Goals of Donor 
Governments,” The Journal of Politics 72, no. 3 (July 2010): 840, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381610000204; 
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American Journal of Political Science 56, no. 1 (January 2012): 190. 
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through four main modalities: (1) education, (2) tactical and operational assistance, (3) 
institutional support and guidance, and (4) direct military support. These forms of assistance are 
distinct from peacekeeping operations and counter-terrorism activities.96 Table 3.1 outlines the 
characteristics of each type of aid. 
Education is given to improve the skills and capacity at the individual and unit levels. 
This assistance is generally provided by sending teams from the donor country to work one-on-
one with the recipient state’s forces or by paying for individuals within the recipient state’s 
security sector to attend training abroad. For example, France has established a network training 
centers across Africa as part of an initiative called Écoles nationales à vocation régionale 
(Region-Focused National Schools, ENVR) to provide specialized military training to forces 
across the continent.97 The American International Military Education Training (IMET) program 
provides funding to send selected military officers to receive an education at a military institution 
in the U.S. This training is intended not only to improve participants’ expertise, but to transmit 
Western norms of military professionalism and democratic governance. Despite the fact that this 
training is directly administered by donor country personnel, it is still susceptible to being 
appropriated or misused. In many states, selection for participation in trainings—particularly 
overseas trainings—is highly sought after. Selection has thus become a way for many regimes to 
reward political supporters.  
 
96 Jennifer D.P Moroney et al., Lessons from U.S. Allies in Security Cooperation with Third World Countries: The 











Table 3.1: Security Assistance Modalities 









































Provide advice and 
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and structural matters 
 






services to the 
population in cases to 
supplement/replace 
partner nation forces 
Troops, 
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Donors interested in supporting the capacity of partner states may choose to provide 
tactical and operational assistance, either through loans, grants, or equipment donations to the 
recipient state. This aid is the most fungible type of military assistance. Like program aid, 
financial and equipment transfers free up government funding for alternative expenses. Group-
level training also fits into this category. Like direct financing and equipment, donors provide 
this assistance to support the capacity of the recipient state. While training done by donor forces 




education provided through professionalization aid. Trainings administered in-country may free 
government resources for other purposes; alternatively, trainings may be misdirected. For 
example, millions of dollars of security assistance to the DRC were wasted by Congolese 
President Kabila who directed inflows of training and equipment to maintain the factionalized 
military he had created to support his rule.98  
Donors who are more concerned with developing institutions may send high-level 
advisors to partner states to provide institutional support and guidance, providing expertise on 
strategic issues and assisting in structural reforms. For most states, these advisors are provided to 
focus primarily on improving effectiveness and capacity, such as Australia or France. Recently, 
several states have shifted defense policies to support governance reform programs within the 
security sector, focusing attention on reforming defense institutions and building their capacity. 
These programs still constitute a very small percentage of security assistance. While their impact 
may vary from state to state, donors generally have a very high degree of control over the 
dispensation of these types of assistance. 
Direct military support is generally provided only in times of crisis or emergency. Like 
humanitarian relief, it is provided when recipient states do not have the capacity to provide 
essential services to their population. As they are using their own troops and systems to provide 
assistance, donors have the highest degree of control over direct support missions. Still, although 
donors maintain control over the use of their own resources, this assistance is still fungible, due 
to its substitutability. Like humanitarian relief, direct military support is not intended to support 
longer-term developments in the recipient state.  
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These aid modalities can be provided in different combinations depending on the donor’s 
intent. In additions, post-conflict states receive large sums of assistance to facilitate DDR and 
fund reintegration training and stipends. Although the majority of this funding is provided 
directly to former combatants, I include it in my analysis as aid provided to support the security 
sector. 
I argue that security assistance can be divided into two categories: institutional assistance 
and operational assistance. I define institutional as assistance provided specifically to improve 
institutional quality by supporting systems of transparency, accountability, and public 
administration. Specifically, this aid is often earmarked for security system management and 
reform or for defense institution building and is given in the form of education assistance and 
institutional support and guidance. This aid is primarily given in the form of education and 
institutional support and guidance, rather than more easily appropriated assistance like grants or 
equipment donations.99 Additionally, this aid is only provided by donors whose intent is to foster 
better governance and are thus more likely to enforce policy conditions. This combination of 
modality and donor intent contributes to low fungibility, increasing the probability that 
institutional assistance is used as intended. 
Hypothesis 3: Institutional assistance increases the quality of security sector governance. 
Operational assistance is generally provided as tactical and operational support to expand 
the recipient state’s resource base or improve the operational and tactical skills of security forces. 
Like many forms of development aid, operational assistance is highly fungible and thus easily 
misused: recipient governments can direct donor spending and use their own defense budgets 
 
99 Empirical work supports the idea that regimes are less able to stifle democratic change with less fungible aid. See 
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into arms purchases or selectively reward officers with donor-provided training and equipment. 
Given the value of the organization and control of the security sector as a tool for conserving 
power, regime elites have large incentives to misuse this aid. Donors interested in pursuing their 
own strategic goals are more likely to provide operational assistance. Take, for example, the 
approach taken by donors following the conclusion of the Second Congo War in the DRC. 
Suspecting that President Kabila might remain in power, donors put little pressure on his 
government to fulfill the requirements of the peace agreement, even when it became clear that he 
was using his position as president to safeguard his position. Instead, donors focused their efforts 
on purely technical projects, such as building infrastructure or training soldiers.100  
 Hypothesis 4. Operational assistance decreases the quality of security sector 
governance. 
 Table 3.2 outlines the characteristics of institutional and operational assistance and their 
predicted effect on governance. 
 
100 Verweijen, “Half-Brewed: The Lukewarm Results of Creating an Integrated Military in the Democratic Republic 
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Table 3.2: Predicted Effects of Security Assistance on Governance 
Aid Type Aid Modality Aid Objective 

























Timing Matters: Regime Vulnerability and the Magnitude of Effects 
Breaking security assistance into types helps to explain which forms of assistance are 
more likely to lead to positive governance outcomes. However, the historical record is riddled 
with examples of states that received large amounts of institutional assistance without 
experiencing any improvement in security sector governance, as well as states that received large 
amounts of operational assistance without experiencing a significant reduction in governance 
quality. Take, for example, the experience of East Timor, the recipient of some of the world’s 
largest SSR assistance packages. Despite receiving enormous sums in the years since its war 
ended, East Timor has struggled reconcile its security forces, delineate institutional 
responsibilities, and reduce patronage and corruption within the institution.101 In contrast, El 
Salvador has successfully created an inclusive, civilian-controlled security sector in the midst of 
large flows of operational assistance from the US.102 I argue that to understand why some 
governance interventions succeed when others do not, one must also look at the timing of aid 
interventions. Drawing from the literature on historical institutionalism, I argue that institutional 
and operational assistance will be more likely to impact governance institutions when provided 
during periods of regime vulnerability.  
I define regime vulnerability as periods of time in which the incumbent regime faces 
severe uncertainty regarding its survivability. While regimes may face external threats that 
challenge their position, this definition focuses on the domestic pressures that could result in a 
regime losing power. All governments are vulnerable at times, regardless of regime type. For 
 
101 “Timor-Leste SSR Background Note,” International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), Geneva Centre for 
Security Sector Governance, October 27, 2016, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Country-
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post-conflict states, regime vulnerability is a factor of (1) the form of conflict termination, and 
(2) the domestic political cycle. 
As discussed earlier, the form of conflict termination plays a strong role in determining 
the balance of power between rival factions. Conflicts that end in a military victory give the 
winning party discretion over whether or not it includes the opposition in the government. Even 
if it chooses to include the opposition, the opposition is unlikely to supplant it due to the power 
imbalance that led to the military victory. Conflicts that end in a negotiated settlement, ceasefire, 
or low activity are much more vulnerable. Whether or not the post-conflict regime chooses to 
include the opposition in government, the power balance remains closer to parity, increasing the 
threat of a coup or return to conflict. 
Domestic political cycles influence the tenure of the incumbent regime and the potential 
for their replacement. For democratic governments, vulnerability will be highest during 
elections, particularly those in which the opposition has a high probability of victory. 
Authoritarian regimes are most vulnerable when the political balance of power shifts, either 
within the leading party or when a group outside of the regime gains greater political influence. 
This vulnerability increases with the share of power held by the opposition in the post-conflict 
regime.  
Research into the leadership dynamics of authoritarian regimes suggests that the early 
period of rule is the most fraught. Distrust among the leader and the ruling coalition will be 
highest in the first months and years of an authoritarian regime, as both sides fear that they might 
have their position taken from them. Empirically, dictators are at the highest risk of a coup 




that the dictator is consolidating power, which may be used to eliminate them.103 These dynamics 
create competing incentives in terms of control of the security sector. Fearing a coup, the leader 
will be tempted to purge opposition members from the ranks of the security forces and create 
forces that are loyal to him. However, these actions may inadvertently threaten his tenure by 
making others in the regime fear for their own security. In post-conflict regimes where the 
opposition is included in the government or security sector, the threat of a coup may be higher, 
increasing the costs of power consolidation by the leader. 
These periods of vulnerability create critical junctures, in which dramatic institutional 
change is possible. In these moments, decision-makers are generally presented with a wider 
range of viable courses of action than usual.104 These periods are often characterized by high 
uncertainty, making actors more likely to create new institutions or change existing ones 
 
103 Daehee Bak, “Autocratic Political Cycle and International Conflict,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 
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depending on their perceptions of what is in their short-term interest. It is often in these moments 
that democratic transitions occur.105 Similarly, Barany argues that the creation of what he 
describes as “democratic armies” (i.e. armed forces governed by accountable civilian rule) is 
usually the result of a shock to the political system.106  
In this atmosphere of heightened vulnerability, the actions of donors are likely to have 
greater weight. The provision of aid may change the decision calculus of actors, making some 
policy options more attractive than others. The potential for security assistance to alter the path 
of the security sector is especially powerful in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, when 
there is still uncertainty about the post-war distribution of power, including control of the 
security sector. Like other political transitions, post-war institutions are not created on a “clean 
state” – pre-war and conflict institutions and power structures still exert a powerful influence on 
politics.107 Still, these moments offer greater opportunity for institutional change and reform. 
During these times, elites act strategically, making consequential decisions about which 
governance strategy to pursue. A coordinated effort by donors to premise assistance on sector-
wide reforms may shift the decision-making calculus in favor of inclusion and accommodation 
of the opposition. Furthermore, aid that supports civilian control may make it more difficult for 
elites to renege on earlier promises of accommodation.108 In contrast, an influx of operational 
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assistance may create a pool of discretionary funds for the regime to use, making it easier for the 
government to pursue a strategy of power consolidation. By allowing the government to use its 
resources to appease the military and other security elites, this aid may even undercut the 
positive effects of governance reform efforts.  
Once set on a particular path, it becomes increasingly difficult to change an institution, 
especially when those in authority benefit from the current structure.109 Thus, as regime 
vulnerability decreases, leaders will have less of an incentive to alter the institutional structure of 
the security sector (Figure 3.1). Institutional assistance might produce marginal improvements in 
governance quality, but it is unlikely that it will significantly change governance practices. 
Similarly, operational assistance may allow poor governance practices to persist, but it is less 
likely to lead to a deterioration in governance quality or undercut security sector reform. 
Hypothesis 5 reflects the conditional effect of regime vulnerability on aid: 
Hypothesis 5. High regime vulnerability should intensify the positive (negative) 
effect of institutional (operational) assistance on governance. 
 
Aid in Action 
 If my theory is correct, the effect of aid will vary not only by type, but by the institutional 
context of the recipient state at the time it is received. Due to the nature of path dependency, 
early aid interventions may have lasting effects that mitigate the impact of future interventions. 
Examining this type of relationship requires the sensitivity to context and contingency that best 
addressed through qualitative analysis. To test this relationship, I employ a method called 
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comparative process tracing to analyze and compare the relationship of three post-conflict states: 
Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Côte d’Ivoire. Together, the experiences of the security sectors of 
these three states illustrate the range of post-conflict outcomes. Although they started with 
similar conditions, the varying levels of institutional and operational assistance they received and 




In the following chapters, I use a method of controlled case comparison proposed by 
Bengtsson and Rounavaara called “comparative process tracing” (CPT). Process tracing is 
uniquely suited as a form of analysis for theories that involve timing, conjunctures, and 
sequences of events, such as the theory I describe above.110 Unlike statistical analyses, process 
tracing attempts to go beyond examining covariation in the independent and dependent variables 
to analyze the impact of causal mechanisms in the unfolding of events.111 CPT relies on the 
assumption that despite the idiosyncrasies and unique historical factors influencing each case, 
there are general and identifiable social mechanisms that influence political outcomes across 
cases. Identifying the influence of these mechanisms within and across cases can lead to a deeper 
understanding than within-case analysis alone.112  
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Bengtsson and Rounavaara propose a two-step approach: the first step examines the 
processes leading from a particular event or input to its outcome, analyzing the process in terms 
of identified mechanisms; the second step compares these processes and the impact of the 
identified mechanisms across cases. CPT assumes only weak path dependence and thinly 
rationalist behavior – processes are not deterministic, and actors make decisions based on 
potentially faulty beliefs, based on the current situation. In sum, CPT is “a theoretically informed 
comparative approach that takes social and political processes seriously, combining elements of 
theory, chronology, and comparison to make general inferences possible.”113  
 
Case Selection 
In choosing cases, I followed a most-similar systems design, looking for states with 
similar post-conflict conditions and variation in the composition of aid they received.114 In other 
words, I was looking for similar cases that received different treatments. Specifically, I focused 
on choosing cases that shared similar values on the control variables I identified in Chapter 2 (i.e. 
form of conflict termination, regime type, level of development, and presence of a peacekeeping 
mission), as well as two other potentially confounding variables.  
In addition to influencing the likelihood of relapse, the type of conflict, form of conflict 
termination, regime type, and level of development may influence the quality of security sector 
governance. Civil wars that end with negotiated settlements with detailed power-sharing 
measures may lead to better security governance by creating a roadmap for governance reforms, 
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especially when the settlement is accompanied with a peacekeeping operation to monitor 
compliance and support reforms.115 In contrast, conflicts that end with a victory by the 
government are more likely to result in repression, as the government has an incentive to use its 
superior military power to put down any remaining threats.116  
Regime type influences security governance by dictating the way the government 
responds to grievances. Regimes with institutionalized channels for groups to pursue their needs, 
such as democracies, have less need of repression. In contrast, states that are unable to provide 
material benefits or political participation are more likely to rely on repression to silence 
dissent.117 Similarly, the state’s level of development will either facilitate or constrain reforms: 
professionalizing the police force is easier when the government can pay officers a living wage 
and provide them with the equipment necessary to do their job. In the following case studies, I 
will examine the impact of aid on governance in light of these competing explanations. Evidence 
that institutional assistance has helped to improve governance and that operational assistance has 
hurt governance will provide support for my theory. 
In addition, I narrowed my scope to consider the nature of conflict and the state’s history 
of repression. States that mobilized along ethnic or other identities may have a harder time 
reconciling grievances or working together in the post-conflict state. Historical politicization of 
identity will likely complicate efforts to integrate forces and build effective command structures. 
In these cases, even a high amount of institutuional assistance may be ineffective in building 
democratic and accountable structures. Similarly, as Heydemann (2018) asserts, states that have 
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relied on repression to silence dissent or have struggled to assert security services across the 
country historically are likely to continue to struggle with those issues, even after civil war. By 
choosing states with similar institutional backgrounds, it is easier to separate the influence of aid 
on governance from their institutional legacy.118  
 I further limited my case 
selection to countries within sub-
Saharan Africa, in order to account for 
any cultural or historical factors that 
may region-specific. The choice of 
sub-Saharan Africa as opposed to 
Southeast Asia or South America, for 
example, was guided by two empirical 
trends. First, sub-Saharan Africa has 
witnessed an especially high 
prevalence of civil war. 14 of the 26 
states considered in this study are 
located in Africa; 10 of those states 
have relapsed into conflict. (Figure 
3.2) Second, African states have 
received large inflows of security 
assistance. As Figure 2 illustrates, the 
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proportion of institutional assistance intended for Africa is significant.  While cross-national data 
regarding operational assistance is unavailable, reports indicate that Western states are sending 
increasing amounts of traditional military aid to African  states who are seen as potential partners 
in the Global War on Terror.119 Importantly, though some countries within Africa are seen as 
having more strategic value than others, the region is generally assigned less of a priority by the 
West and other important donors like Russia and China.120 Because of this, aid flows have 
generally been more stable. 
 The prevalence of conflict and security assistance makes Africa a valuable region to 
study in its own right, but there is nothing about my theory that suggests the relationships I posit 
are geographically limited. Moreover, the focus of comparative process tracing on identifying 
causal mechanisms across cases bolsters the external validity of my findings. 
Cases: Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Côte d’Ivoire 
Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Côte d’Ivoire share similar social divisions, institutional 
histories, levels of development, and conflict profiles, while differing on the composition of 
security assistance received. In Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Côte d’Ivoire, colonial independence 
was followed by decades of authoritarian rule, in which the military and police were highly 
politicized and repressive. The regimes of each state pursued strategies of elite cooptation and 
mass marginalization, which produced deep resentment among groups over unequal access to 
land and wealth. These divisions created deep regional and ethnic divisions. In Sierra Leone, the 
prioritization of the Creole population in Freetown produced a deep division among the Western 
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Creole and the indigenous people who inhabited the rest of the country. In Côte d’Ivoire, the 
government politicized latent divisions when it instituted a policy of Ivoirité, marginalizing the 
“foreigners” of the North. In Burundi, the colonial and post-independence governments’ 
preference for the Bururi-based Tutsis hardened ethnic and regional cleavages between the Hutu 
and Tutsi, the North and the South. It is important to note that the depth and severity of these 
identity differences were weaker in Sierra Leone than Côte d’Ivoire and Burundi.  Still, the 
regional and ethnic cleavages mobilized before conflict came to play an important role in the 
onset and conduct of each war, and continued to shape the ability of each state to initiate and 
consolidate security sector reforms. 
Despite its abundance in diamonds, the majority of Sierra Leoneans rely on subsistence 
agriculture to survive. By the end of the civil war, the majority of the population lived in extreme 
poverty. Similarly, Burundi has consistently ranked among the least developed nations in the 
world, with citizens receiving little assistance from their government. Although it was once an 
economic hub in the region, Côte d’Ivoire began an economic downturn in the mid-1980s that 
was exacerbated by the conflict; by the time war ended, more than 50% of the population lived in 
poverty.  
The rebel movements in all three states fought for government control, relying on 
widespread dissatisfaction with the regime to gain popular support. After their first failed peace 
agreements, the UN authorized peacekeeping operations to work in conjunction with regional 
forces. The fighting that occurred in Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Côte d’Ivoire produced 
widescale human rights abuses perpetuated by both government forces and rebels, creating deep 
distrust of state forces by local populations. Finally, by the end of their wars, the political and 




across the country, the security sector politicized and fragmented.  Table 3.4 at the end of the 
chapter summarizes the major similarities and differences between cases. 
The UK intervention in Sierra Leone began in 1999, after the signing of the peace 
agreement that would come to serve as the backbone of the post-conflict government. Even 
though fighting continued, British advisors began working with the Sierra Leonean government, 
disbursing high levels of institutional assistance to support an expanding mission. This period 
was characterized by high regime vulnerability – with impending presidential elections and a 
range of options open for post-war security arrangements, the institutional trajectory of Sierra 
Leone was far from certain. Sierra Leone received relatively little operational assistance in the 
years following war, reaching a high of $14 million in 2014, twelve years after the war had 
ended. 
In the time period under consideration, Côte d’Ivoire experienced two conflicts and two 
peace spells. When the First Ivorian War ended (2007), donor intervention was piecemeal and 
delayed. Mistrustful of the incumbent administration, donors often delayed disbursements of 
promised institutional assistance. France, Côte d’Ivoire’s main partner, focused predominantly 
on the operational capacity of the Ivorian military. Without robust domestic or international 
support, the newly established security sector infrastructure struggled to complete its mandate, 
and security sector reforms stalled. When the Second Ivorian War broke out in 2010, the new 
institutions were not strong enough to quell escalating violence. Upon its resolution in 2011, the 
international community vowed not to repeat their mistake and pledged to support the new 
government established by the victor, Alassane Ouattara. Although the international community 




military and political victory secured by Ouattara left little room for international influence; put 
differently, regime vulnerability was low.  
Unlike the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone, the Netherlands came late to promoting 
reform in Burundi. After putting off discussions for several years, the Dutch government did not 
decide on a reform program until three years after the first elections had been held. While the 
window for sector-wide reforms had closed, the resolution of hostilities created a need for policy 
change within the military. Although the SSR program initiated by the Dutch shortly after led to 
real improvements in the professionalism of the military, its effectiveness was undercut by the 
flows of operational assistance accessed by the Burundian government for participation in 
peacekeeping missions at that time. As the years progressed, operational assistance increased 
dramatically. Burundi received significantly more operational assistance than Sierra Leone, 
attracting large flows of operational assistance from the United States for peacekeeping 
preparations and counterterror activities even as conflict continued.  
Based on the theory presented in this chapter, the different combinations of security 
assistance and levels of regime vulnerability should lead to a range of outcomes in security 
sector governance. Table 3.3 summarizes the aid profile of each case and its predicted outcome. 
 
Confounding Factors 
Choosing similar systems helps to isolate and identify the effect of security assistance on 
security sector governance. However, it is impossible to fully “control” for all confounding 
factors. While there are many similarities in the institutional development of each state, there are 




instance, the strong relationship between Sierra Leone and its main donor, the U.K., facilitated 
the deep  




































Impact Low Operational 
Assistance Low 
 
cooperation that they enjoyed during the post-conflict period. In contrast, significant friction 
between Côte d’Ivoire and France likely hampered similar cooperative efforts. 
Further, this research design is unable to address the fundamental concern of endogeneity 
that characterizes all studies of aid. As discussed above, donors are strategic in how they provide 
aid. Donors that are more concerned with misuse of their aid funds may prioritize aid modalities 
that are less fungible to try and mitigate these effects. Similarly—and more problematically for 
this study—donors may choose to provide more institutional assistance to states that they believe 
are more likely to implement governance reforms. If this is the case, institutional aid may 
support reforms, but it will have no independent effect.  
It may also be that it is regime vulnerability driving states to adopt governance reforms, 




are in a position of weakness, or vulnerable. In contrast, states that face low vulnerability may 
not feel the need to include the opposition. If this is the case and it is regime vulnerability that 
drives selection into governance reforms, then aid does not have the direct effect I theorize 
above. 
In the following chapters, I strive to show that aid does, in fact, have an independent 
effect on security sector governance and on relapse. Still, it is important to acknowledge at the 
outset that these concerns remain. 
 
Data Collection 
The data for these case studies comes from a combination of primary and secondary 
sources, including original interview data gathered during fieldwork conducted in Freetown, 
Sierra Leone (June 2018 and June 2019) and Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire (July 2019). Between both 
rounds of fieldwork, I conducted 35 interviews with officers of donor organizations, former and 
current government and military officials, NGO administrators, and civil society representatives. 
The rest of the data informing these case studies was drawn from a comprehensive review of 
technical reports published by international institutions, donor offices, implementing agencies, 
local and international civil society reports, contemporary newspaper articles, and academic 
publications. 
All data on institutional assistance is taken from the OECD-CRS Database.121 To create a 
profile of operational assistance, I supplemented data from the Security Assistance Monitor, 
which tracks US security aid programs, with open source information regarding flows from non-
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US donors.122 In Burundi, a large portion of operational assistance came from aid to support 
Burundian participation in peacekeeping missions. Data on Burundian peacekeeping 
contributions is computed from information provided by AMISOM, the Burundian government, 
and news articles.123 To increase comparability, all aid flows have been converted to USD 2016 
rates.   
 
Conclusion 
In Chapter 2, I show that there is an empirical connection between security sector 
governance and conflict relapse: states that engage in security sector reform, prioritize civilian 
control, and respect the human rights of their citizens are less likely to relapse into conflict. In 
this chapter, I argue that the security assistance provided by donors to post-conflict states has 
variable effects on governance; further, I suggest that these effects are conditioned by the timing 
of the aid’s disbursement. The following chapters examine the impact of security assistance on 
post-conflict governance in Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, and Sierra Leone. 
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Table 3.4: Summary Comparison of Case Backgrounds 
  Sierra Leone  Côte d’Ivoire  Burundi 
Historical Context  • West Africa  
• Colonial Heritage: 
British colony   
• West Africa  
• Colonial Heritage: 
French colony   
• Central Africa 
• Colonial Heritage: 
Belgian Colony 
 
Major Cleavage  • North – South   
• Freetown – 
periphery   
• North-South  
• Autochthons – 
“foreigners”   
• Ethnic: Hutu-Tutsi 
• North-South 
Economic Profile  Majority of the population 
is employed in subsistence 
agriculture, mining;    
Biggest revenues come 
from export of diamonds  
Majority of the population is 
employed in agriculture;  
Heavily reliant on cocoa and 
coffee exports  
Majority of the population 
is employed in subsistence 
agriculture 
Political History  Long history of autocratic 








Yes Yes Yes 
Nature of Conflict  Government Control  
  
Based in land grievances, 
regional tensions, 
frustration over corruption   
Government Control  
  
Based in land grievances, 
regional tensions, frustration 
over corruption, policy of 
Ivoirité   
Government Control 
 
Based in ethnic grievances; 
exacerbated by regional 
divide prioritizing Tutsi 





30,000 – 50,000 killed 
  
  
2002-2007; 2011  
  
First Ivoirian Civil War:  
• 4,000 – 
10,000 killed  
Second Ivoirian Civil War:  
• 3,000 killed  
1993-2009 
 








First Ivorian War: 
Negotiated Settlement 
Second Ivorian War: 




Presence of a 
Peacekeeping 
Mission 
United Nations Mission in 
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) 
United Nations Operation in 
Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), 
French Operation Licorne  
United Nations Operation 
in Burundi (ONUB), UN 
Integrated Office in 
Burundi (BINUB)  
Post-Conflict 
Regime Type 
Democracy First Ivorian War: 
transitional government 







AID AND GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FIRST AND SECOND IVORIAN WARS 
 
 In 2002, tensions between the military and government of Côte d’Ivoire erupted, as a 
failed coup attempt escalated into a rebellion that would keep the country locked in a civil 
conflict that would persist for five years. After five years of conflict, the parties to the civil war 
negotiated a peace agreement and established an integrated transitional government in 2007. 
However, this agreement proved unable to address the underlying causes of conflict. Three years 
later, a political crisis broke out over national elections and the country relapsed into a short but 
intense military conflict. Since the resolution of the 2011 post-electoral crisis,124 Côte d’Ivoire 
has remained at peace as the government has worked with the international community to 
implement a series of political and security sector reforms.  
 Donors provided very different security assistance packages to Côte d’Ivoire following 
the First and Second Ivorian Wars. Although total aid received was similar across both periods, 
the breakdown of institutional and operational assistance varied dramatically (see Figure 4.1). 
The end of fighting and creation of a transitional government in Côte d’Ivoire opened a window 
of opportunity for institutional change. After the first conflict, donors devoted the majority of 
institutional assistance towards ex-combatant reintegration; the security forces received mostly 
operational assistance. Without significant support for the SSR initiatives initiated by the 
transitional government, force integration and reform faltered. After the second conflict, donors 
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civil war. In this chapter, I follow the definitions for civil war and conflict relapse established in Chapter 2 and 
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changed their approach, giving high levels of institutional assistance and very low levels of 
operational assistance. However, the window of regime vulnerability that opened during the 
preparation for elections closed upon Alassane Ouattara’s military defeat over incumbent 
President Laurent Gbagbo. Thus, despite high levels of institutional assistance, reforms have 
been shallow. Winning a sweeping electoral and military victory, President Alassane Ouattara 
has enjoyed a “victor’s peace” – facing a weak opposition, Ouattara has focused instead on 
accommodating the divisions within his own party, favoring his network of former rebels rather 
than pursuing serious reforms. 
 This chapter compares the impact of security assistance on governance following the 
First and Second Ivorian Wars. First, I briefly outline the history of Côte d’Ivoire leading up to 
the outbreak of conflict in 2002 and the civil war that ensued. Next, I discuss the security 
assistance profile and institutional context of the country’s first peace spell. I argue that despite 




the window for institutional change, donors did not provide adequate assistance to support the 
security sector. Without the funding they needed to fulfill their mandate, security sector reforms 
stalled, and the country relapsed into conflict. The second half of the chapter examines the 
Second Ivorian War and post-conflict reforms under Ouattara. The fourth section analyzes the 
impact of security assistance following the Second Ivorian War and the gains to security sector 
governance made by President Ouattara. Finally, I conclude with a discussion comparing the two 
peace spells.  
 
Background 
Dubbed the “Ivorian Miracle”, 
Côte d’Ivoire shone as a model of 
economic growth and stability upon 
gaining independence from France in 
1960. Its success and its eventual descent 
into crisis can be traced back to a delicate 
political and economic balance cultivated 
by its long-time ruler, Félix Houphouët-
Boigny.  
Côte d’Ivoire was officially 
colonized by the French in 1893 as part of 
the scramble for Africa. Lacking the 
extractable resources of many of its neighbors, the governors of Côte d’Ivoire focused on 




cultivating crops for export, particularly cocoa, coffee, and rubber. Labor migration was 
promoted through a series of policies enacted by the colonial government and continued under 
Houphouët-Boigny when the country gained independence in 1960. As export production 
continued to grow, Houphouët-Boigny began to encourage not only internal migration to the 
cocoa plantations of the southwest, but immigration from neighboring countries, proclaiming 
“the land belongs to those who make it productive.”125 Migrants from the north and neighboring 
countries came in large numbers, coming to constitute a significant portion of the population – 
by 1998, the number of ‘foreigners’ totaled 25% of the Ivorian population (over 4 million 
people).126  
In the decades that followed, Houphouët-Boigny used his considerable executive power 
to guide economic policy and promote export-led growth, achieving an annual growth rate of 
almost 7.5 percent from 1960 to 1982.127 Like many other states in the region, Houphouët-
Boigny and his political party—the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (Parti Démocratique de la 
Côte d’Ivoire, PDCI) constructed a large state bureaucracy and system of state-owned enterprises 
to maintain political dominance. Access to these positions was carefully cultivated by 
Houphouët-Boigny to balance ethnic and political rivalries.128  
The politico-military history of Côte d’Ivoire shows a persistent, low-level battle between 
the military and the government for control. In the years following independence, the 
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government faced multiple coups and rebellions from high-ranking officers in the army seeking 
greater power. Significantly, these officers were not interested in overthrowing the existing 
government – just increasing their position in it.  Houphouët-Boigny worked to earn the 
allegiance of the army throughout his tenure, first by offering them high salaries and prestige, 
and eventually, by expanding their role in the government. The military came to be one of the 
best paid in West Africa, but worst equipped, a sign of the government’s efforts to weaken the 
institution. This started to change with the appointment of Alassane Ouattara, a Western-
educated economist from the North of the country, to Prime Minister. Facing pressure from 
international financial institutions, Ouattara gradually replaced unqualified military officers with 
technocrats to try and increase the profitability of state-owned enterprises. As the military began 
to lose its place in the state machine, the government began to negotiate a new role for officers 
and soldiers, directing them towards the maintenance of internal peace. Unlike the police, who 
were poorly trained and poorly equipped, the army became an effective force in the repression of 
opposition and political dissent.129  
In the 1980s, a drop in global cocoa prices initiated an economic crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. 
Houphouët-Boigny turned to the international financial institutions for help, but the structural 
adjustment programs so common at the time stipulated the dismantlement of the large state 
apparatus Houphouët-Boigny had built. Struggling under the weight of the national debt and stiff 
international insistence that the state privatize, Houphouet-Boigny was unable to adopt his usual 
tactic for diverting opposition – incorporation into the state machine.  
 





The economic contraction exacerbated tensions between the north and south, natives and 
foreign residents. When the economy started to sour, many northerners—natives and foreign 
residents—moved to the south looking for agricultural work.130 The army was not immune to the 
economic pressures: as the economic crisis grew, positions in the army became scarcer and more 
and more youth competed for them. As this happened, recruitment became less about merit and 
more about personal or political gain. The government pushed for recruitment as a tool for 
cooptation of potential opposition, while officers saw greater opportunities to exact bribes for 
entry into one of the few stable career paths that remained.131 As domestic tensions rose in 
response to the unfolding economic crisis, Houphouët-Boigny caved to popular pressures to 
democratize.132  
In 1993, Houphouët-Boigny died, fracturing the party he had led for over thirty years. 
Henri Konan Bédié, the president of the National Assembly, took up the mantle of PDCI 
leadership. Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara assumed leadership of a new party—the Rally for 
Republicans (Rassemblement des Républicains, RDR)—and established a platform advocating 
for those dissatisfied with the PCDI and its treatment of northerners. Countering these 
establishment candidates, Laurent Gbagbo of the new Ivorian Popular Front (Front Populaire 
Ivoirien, FPI) emerged as a fringe candidate.133 Concerned about Ouattara’s growing support, 
Bédié invented a concept he called “ivoirité” and made it a condition of holding office. Ivoirité–
being “truly Ivorian”—required that one be born of two Ivorian parents, which Ouattara was not. 
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In response to this clear manipulation of the electoral process, the RDR boycotted the election, 
essentially handing Bédié the election.134  
When Bédié took power, he abandoned the ethnically balanced system of Houphouët-
Boigny, stacking the government with individuals from his own ethnic group and dramatically 
tilting the government in favor of the South. Bédié extended this policy to the military, rupturing 
the delicate balance that had been carefully cultivated by Houphouët-Boigny. At the same time, 
tensions among the officer corps began to simmer, as financial pressures pushed the government 
to cut military spending.135 Discontent within the army reached a high in 1999, when a group of 
dissatisfied military leaders selected General Robert Gueï to mediate a negotiation with Bédié. 
When Bédié refused their demands, they carried out a military coup, installing Gueï to rule the 
country until elections could be held in 2000.  
In an effort to tilt the election in his favor, Gueï continued many of the same human 
rights abuses committed by Bédié, using the military and police to repress potential opposition 
and the courts to tilt the election in his favor. Before the votes could be counted, Gueï declared 
himself the winner of the election. As the only real contender for the presidency not excluded by 
Gueï’s repressive tactics, Gbagbo declared himself the real winner of the election and called for a 
unified opposition among the FPI, RDR, and PDCI; together, the three groups pushed Gueï out 
of the country.136  
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Once in office, Gbagbo quickly worked to consolidate power, instituting repressive 
security measures of his own to ensure that the legislative elections would favor his party. At the 
same time, he began purging the military, police, and civil service and replacing them with 
fellow members of the Bété ethnic group. For further protection, Gbagbo raised personal militias 
for himself and his wife.137  
In the space of three years (1999 – 2002), Côte d’Ivoire had experienced two coup 
d’états. The ethnic balance so carefully cultivated by Houphouët-Boigny had been abandoned, as 
technocrats were replaced with co-ethnic loyalists. The security sector had lost any semblance of 
professionalism – the army fractured and politicized, the police and intelligence system 
transformed into a tool for government repression. 
 
The First Ivorian War Begins 
The First Ivorian War began in 2002, when a group of Muslim former army officers 
advanced from the border of Burkina Faso to take control of the capital and overthrow the 
Gbagbo government. Their advance was stopped by a group of soldiers loyal to Gbagbo; rather 
than de-escalation, however, this encounter only intensified tensions, and the coup plotters 
quickly adopted a more extreme approach: rebellion. Following the failed coup attempt, the 
group quickly took control of two major northern cities – Bouaké and Korhogo. Guillaume Soro 
assumed leadership of the growing rebellion and expanded its military mandate to a political one. 
The war opened a Western front in late November 2002 with the emergence of two new 
 





insurgent groups along the Liberian border. With their help, the rebels came to control the 
northern half of the country. The three groups combined, creating the New Forces (Forces 
Nouvelles, FN).138  
The government’s response to the incipient rebellion was swift and severe. As the rebels 
moved to consolidate their power in the north, the Gbagbo government rallied all its available 
forces, directing both formal state organizations and non-state forces loyal to the regime to target 
all who opposed him. Labeling the rebels “foreigners,” his allies commenced a campaign of 
political repression against all who shared the same ethnicity or religion of the MPCI, raiding 
their neighborhoods, arresting and killing dozens of civilians.139 In addition, Gbagbo mobilized 
groups of militant youth, some of whom formed urban militias.140  
The proliferation of armed groups, widespread commission of atrocities, and influx of 
demobilized fighters from neighboring Sierra Leone and Liberia pushed the international 
community to intervene. France acted first, sending 4,000 troops in a new operation, known as 
Opération Licorne, to bolster its permanent presence, and was quickly followed by the Economic 
Union of West African States, which sent troops as part of the ECOWAS Mission in Côte 
d’Ivoire (ECOMICI). In February 2004, the UN joined the French and ECOWAS, authorizing 
the creation of the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). When the government and 
the FN continued fighting, the UN Security Council authorized an arms embargo over the 
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country, requiring that all states “prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Côte 
d’Ivoire, from their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms 
or any related materiel, in particular military aircraft and equipment, whether or not originating 
in their territories, as well as the provision of any assistance, advice or training related to military 
activities.” This embargo did not extend to training or assistance related to humanitarian 
activities or the restructuring of the security forces.141 In other words, the embargo outlawed the 
provision of almost all operational assistance, restricting security assistance to institutional 
support. 
Despite the speed with which France dispatched troops to Côte d’Ivoire in the early days 
of the conflict, French willingness to intervene in the Ivorian conflict fell short of what was 
necessary to find a real solution to the problem.142 Over the next five years, the international 
organized four rounds of mediated peace negotiations, each of which failed as low-level fighting 
continued.143 During this time, Côte d’Ivoire remained suspended between peace and war. 
International forces helped to retain a buffer between the North and the South, dividing the 
country in two. Violence in the West continued, largely through the attacks of the highway 
bandits that had been allowed to operate unhindered.144  
 As fighting continued, the FN established an independent system of governance in the 
North, dividing the region into ten zones, each under the control of an appointed commandant de 
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zone, or “com’zone.” Each com’zone controlled a unit of troops charged with providing some 
degree of order and collecting taxes, largely through the collection of roadside fines and duties 
brought into the region. While the majority of funds went to the FN, com’zones were allowed to 
keep a percentage of their revenues as payment. Cut off from government support, many police 
officers located in the north of the country quickly joined with the rebel forces, using what little 
resources they still had to impose FN rule. This system encouraged widespread corruption and 
extortion of civilians by governing authorities, who were now encouraged by their leadership to 
do so. For those suspected of being sympathetic to the government, treatment was worse. As the 
government and rebels gained and lost control of towns, they executed scores of civilians.  
The number and side of state security forces swelled during the conflict, as Gbagbo 
mobilized forces to fight on his behalf. In addition to the army, police, and gendarmerie, Gbagbo 
created the Security Operations Command Center (Centre de Commandement des Opérations de 
Sécurité, CECOS), a well-equipped elite unit with the main purpose of defending Abidjan from a 
coup attempt. At the same time, Gbagbo fortified the existing special forces units like the Anti-
Riot Brigade (Brigade Anti-Emuete), Presidential Guard (Guard Présidentielle), Presidential 
Security Group (Groupement de Sécurité Présidentielle), and the Republican Guard (Guard 
Républicaine). All of these groups were well-armed and stacked with troops from ethnic groups 
loyal to Gbagbo, ensuring their loyalty as well as their potency. As an added layer of security, 
Gbagbo relied heavily on local militias loyal to the government.145  
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By 2007, as many as 10,000 people were killed; nearly one million had been displaced.146 
With few signs of military progress, the two sides came together in Ouagadougou to negotiate a 
new peace agreement, this time without international mediation. Under the facilitation of Blaise 
Compaoré of Burkina Faso and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, the government and rebels came 
to an agreement. The resulting Ouagadougou Peace Agreement included many of the provisions 
stipulated in previous agreements and set the stage for a transition to peace by establishing the 
zone of confidence and creating a transitional government with FN leader Guillaume Soro as 
Prime Minister.147 The agreement also stipulated the importance of SSR, creating a “special 
mechanism” to determine the new structure and organization of the security sector and an 
Integrated Command Center (Centre de Commandement Integrée, CCI) to unify government and 
FN forces. 
 
The Interwar Period: Peace Stalls, Donors Equivocate 
The Ouagadougou Agreement brought an end to the fighting, but it was ultimately 
unsuccessful in helping Côte d’Ivoire come to a sustainable peace. For three years after the 
fighting had ended, the two parties made little progress in reuniting the north and south under 
unified leadership, integrating rebel and government forces, or disarming and demobilizing the 
oversized security apparatus. While the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement stipulated the need for 
security sector reform, its drafters left the details of this process vague, choosing to put off the 
contentious debate for later to increase its chances of acceptance. In reality, the vagueness of the 
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agreement may have been its undoing: without an agreed upon framework guiding SSR and 
DDR, the process was seen as politicized and was rejected by nearly all parties involved. When 
elections were finally held in 2010, Gbagbo lost. Rather than cede power, Gbagbo remained in 
office, rallying the security forces loyal to him to protect his rule. With the full backing of the 
international community, Ouattara rallied the army to his side, declaring a new joint force of 
government and FN soldiers: the Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (Forces Républicains de 
Côte d’Ivoire, FRCI).  Within months, the tense political standoff escalated, and the country 
relapsed into civil war.  
Aid Profile: First Peace  
Regime Vulnerability 
 The signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement opened a window of opportunity for real 
institutional change in Côte d’Ivoire. The ability of the international community to take 
advantage of that window, however, is unclear. Unlike previous agreements, the Ouagadougou 
Agreement weakened the mandate of the international community. In addition, observers have 
questioned the commitment of President Gbagbo to real change. A rebel leader interviewed by 
the International Crisis Group in 2007 argued that a power-sharing agreement that left him as 
president was not a concession or sign of cooperation – it was a political victory.148 
 Despite these limitations, the introduction of the FN into the government and creation of 
FN leaders embraced the post-Ouagadougou arrangements. Fofana (2011) argues that the time 
between the signing of the Ouagadougou Accords and the elections witnessed a transformation 
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of the rebel leadership “to the point of making you forget that it had chosen the path of violence 
to come to power.”149 While the international community was limited in its ability to influence 
the transitional government, it maintained a strong role in the security sector. By all accounts, the 
CCI remained committed to its mandate. Its failures came mostly from a lack of resources, not 
from a lack of will by its leadership.  
The introduction of new actors and new institutions into the security sector created a high 
degree of vulnerability in the regime and opened the potential set of institutional trajectories in 
Côte d’Ivoire. Unfortunately, donors did not capitalize on this until it was too late: the first two 
years of peace saw a relatively low ratio of institutional assistance provided to the Ivorian 
security sector relative to the operational assistance it received. The institutional assistance 
provided went mostly towards the reintegration of ex-combatants. By the international 
community mobilized more resources for security sector reform, they had lost the time advantage 
they once had: although significant progress was made towards demobilization and integration in 
the months leading up to the elections, major gaps still remained. 
 
Institutional Assistance 
The institutional assistance provided to Côte d’Ivoire by bilateral and multilateral donors 
focused on two main projects: funding reintegration opportunities and supporting civilian 
policing throughout the country. With most of French aid going towards training for the military, 
the most significant source of institutional assistance in the interwar period came from the 
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International Development Agency of the World Bank, which mobilized substantial resources to 
provide support for the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and child 
soldiers.150  
Near the end of the peace spell, the UN intensified its efforts. In 2009, the UN initiated a 
capacity-building project with the working group established by the government to facilitate the 
reform and restructuring of the national army. Through a combination of technical and financial 
support, UNOCI facilitators brought military leaders of both sides together to build confidence 
and foster debates on integration methods. This was the largest SSR project undertaken by the 
UN to this point: it led to successful debates between former rivals and guided important 
discussions about military reform. Unfortunately, these efforts were insufficient; as Boutellis 
(2011) suggests, the intervention was “too little too late.”151 
 
Operational Assistance 
When fighting first ended in 2007, France initiated a security sector reform project with 
the transitional government led by Gbagbo. However, the proportion of this assistance that 
actually went towards institutional reform was very small. The majority of assistance provided 
during this time was focused instead on improving the maritime and air capabilities of the 
Ivorian armed forces. A good example of this is the SSR Support in the Gulf of 
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Guinea (l’Appui à la réforme du secteur de la sécurité dans le golfe de Guinée) 
program.152 Although the French describe these programs as supporting security sector reform, 
their narrow focus on tactical and operational training suggests they are better considered 
operational assistance.153 In addition to this assistance from France, Côte d’Ivoire received some 
operational assistance from the US. The majority of this assistance went towards providing non-
lethal equipment for the military and police as well as some training seminars.154  
There is considerable evidence that foreign states breached the sanctions regime and 
provided military training and materiel to the government and FN. Specifically, the UN Group of 
Experts monitoring the arms embargo found evidence that the Ivorian government had been 
sending troops to participate in training sessions in Morocco and that the FN had smuggled 
weapons and ammunition into the country. However, there is no evidence that this support was 
provided as security assistance. Rather, considering the large extrabudgetary outlays of the 
federal government and the resource revenue available to the FN, it is more likely that these 
services were purchased.155 
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The figures for operational assistance in Figure 2 reflect this aid, along with the relatively 
small flows of operational assistance from the US during that time. They do not include French 
defense expenditures made to continue Operation Licorne. The French only publish data on a 
small percentage of the security assistance they provide globally. However, a thorough review of 
diplomatic agreements, press releases, newspaper articles, and secondary sources suggests that 
these figures are likely representative of operational assistance given at the time. A review of the 
reports and statements by the UN Group of Experts monitoring Côte d’Ivoire and tracking 
military assistance bolsters my confidence in these estimates.156  
 The First Ivorian War ended with a high degree of uncertainty about the future. Although 
still in power, the Gbagbo regime had not secured a military victory, and was facing domestic 
and international pressure to organize an election, in which he would face his opponent Alassane 
Ouattara. The combination of these factors created a high degree of regime vulnerability in Côte 
d’Ivoire. However, as discussed above, donors did not respond with a strong package of security 
assistance – either institutional or operational. Without significant international assistance, my 
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theory would predict little effect on governance until the end of the period in question, when 
donors increased their aid to help prepare for the elections. 
 My theory does not predict how actors will behave in the absence of aid, beyond the 
assumption that actors will do what they need to ensure their political survival. Thus, I do not 
have any a priori assumptions regarding the actions of Gbagbo and Ouattara in this context. 
However, the relative lack of aid in this case allows us to gauge a baseline sense of the 
relationship between security sector governance and conflict relapse. If my theory is correct, 
actions to integrate the security forces and demobilize and disarm combatants will increase the 
likelihood of peace. In contrast, promises of reform by the Gbagbo administration that are not 
followed by concrete actions to include the FN will lower the FN’s trust and raise the risk of 
relapse. 
 
Security Sector Reform under Ouagadougou 
 The Ouagadougou Agreement defined security sector reform in narrow terms: military 
and police integration, disarmament, and dismantling of non-state militia groups.157 The deeper 
questions regarding the structure of the security sector, roles of the internal security forces, and 
security policy were put off until after the election. Questions regarding the lack of 
accountability or oversight within the security sector, professional behavior of its forces, and 
logistical capacity were also ignored.158 The OPA also offered little guidance on military 
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integration. Although it stipulated the creation of the CCI, it did not address the issue of rank 
harmonization, even though parties at the time of signing recognized the issue it would pose to 
integration.  
Military and Police Reform 
Despite these ambiguities, the process of military and police reform and integration 
began two weeks after the OPA was signed with the establishment of the Integrated Command 
Center (Centre de Commandement Integré, CCI).159 From the outset, the CCI received 
institutional support from the UNOCI and Operation Licorne. Together with their international 
advisors, CCI leadership decided upon the structure and functions of the unit. In addition to 
building a new, integrated military force, the Chiefs of Staff made a plan to integrate 4,000 FN 
troops into the police and gendarmerie. Peacekeeping troops arrived at the newly established 
headquarters to provide security for the new unit.160 By 2008, 544 out of the designated 568 
personnel had been integrated into the CCI from the FN and FDS. 3,400 FN troops were 
integrated into the police and gendarmerie. Progress quickly stalled, however, as CCI leadership 
struggled to access the funding that they needed from the government and international donors. 
Pressed for assistance, the French ambassador at the time insisted that available funding would 
only be disbursed when the CCI began undertaking “practical operations.”161 
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By 2009, only 500 of the intended 8,000 CCI troops had been deployed across the 
country. Of these, only a handful comprised former FN troops.162 By April 2010, only 1,053 out 
of an authorized 8,000 personnel had been assigned to the CCI’s mixed gendarmerie and police 
units. Only eleven of the planned 23 mixed brigades had been established. More problematically, 
former FDS personnel continued to receive special treatment. Forces Nouvelles leadership noted 
that government was only providing salaries to former government personnel.163  
The actions of President Gbagbo further undermined the legitimacy and progress of 
integration. As the CCI pleaded with the government for more funding to continue with 
integration, Gbagbo proceeded to promote a series of loyalist officers to fill highly strategic posts 
in the security sector. In addition to the military, the Gbagbo administration took no steps to 
downsize or demilitarize the police and gendarmerie, which had swelled to a combined size of 
33,000 during the conflict.164  
Although reports suggest that the FN entered the post-conflict space with good intentions, 
Gbagbo’s clear rejection of the tenets of the Ouagadougou Agreement quickly convinced the 
rebels to take steps to protect themselves. The FN undertook similar actions to retain their 
strategic advantages. Despite rhetorical commitments to reunify the country, most of the 
institutions of the conflict remained in place, such as the system of checkpoints run by 
government forces along the highways of the country.165 In 2009, com’zones relinquished their 
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administrative authority to the government. Though symbolically significant, this amounted to 
little more than a gesture. Many of the com’zones showed little intention of surrendering their 
position. Even those who participated in the ceremony remained armed with personal militia 
forces and in control of security in their zone.166  
 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration 
 During the course of the seven-year conflict, the number of armed combatants 
proliferated. When the crisis ended, the government faced a daunting demobilization caseload: 
between the FN and militia members, over 75,000 individuals would need to be cantoned.167 CCI 
leadership struggled to move forward with their mandate, lacking needed funding for staff and 
personnel salaries.168 DDR was also complicated by political disagreements between the FN and 
government regarding who was to be integrated and who was to be demobilized.169  
The lack of funding for the CCI was likely a result of political calculations by the 
government. The Ministry of Finance, responsible for the distribution of most government 
funding, was strongly dependent on the executive. A diplomat interviewed by the International 
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Crisis Group stressed the politics of funding: “The presidency, which controls the finance 
ministry, has turned the financing tap on or off to suit its political interests of the moment.”170  
Donor funding for DDR should have helped to make up for these shortfalls, but 
corruption within the Gbagbo administration prevented much of that aid from reaching its 
intended beneficiaries. The National Program of Reinsertion and Community Rehabilitation 
(Programme national de réinsertion et de rehabilitation Communautaire, PNRRC) is one clear 
example of this, accepting immense sums of donor funds while producing no results on the 
ground. The corruption grew to be so bad that the World Bank withdrew its funds from the 
PNRRC and directing them through its own financial management firm.171  
In addition, observers to the beginning stages of DDR noted a major gap between public 
statements of progress and actual reforms. For example, in contrast to statements by the 
executive branch that they had finished disarming and dismantling all self-defense groups in the 
west, the actual weapons collected by ONUCI represented a fraction of the arms analysts knew 
to exist in the region. By July 2008, only 86 weapons had been collected from the Forces 
Nouvelles. Of these, only ten worked.172 Similarly, while the government pressed for a reduction 
of peacekeepers and foreign troops in the zone of confidence, it failed to in-fill the area with 
Ivorian police or military forces who would be able to protect the local populations from an 
expected surge in violence.173  
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As Côte d’Ivoire neared elections, donors began to note the lack of progress in SSR as a 
matter of concern for national security. By May 2010, 32,777 FN soldiers and 42,451 militia 
members remained armed, waiting to enter the official DDR program. The Ivorian government 
struggled to pay the promised demobilization allowances to those who had been processed. The 
CCI lacked the resources and capacity to properly run the cantonment sites housing demobilized 
fighters. The UNOCI recognized this and made a plea for international support to speed progress. 
Lack of assistance would not only compromise goal attainment, but it could serve as pretext for 
those benefiting from the current system to forestall progress. In addition to DDR, the UN noted 
the importance of continuing progress with military integration and SSR before elections: even 
though the OPA limited the focus of pre-election SSR activities, “local and international partners 
indicated the significant impact that security sector reform could have, even before the elections, 
in restoring confidence, consolidating achievements, strengthening the rule of law, and 
contributing to the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.”174 Failure to address the 
proliferation of armed fighters, militant youth groups, and insecurity in the West, they cautioned, 
“could fuel any violence that may erupt as a result of a political stalemate.”175  
Progress was made following this plea for assistance: by November 2010, 17,601 
combatants and 17,301 militia members had been demobilized. However, few weapons had been 
surrendered; of the weapons collected, many were unserviceable.176 The problem of weapons 
collection was exacerbated by a thriving market for illegal small arms and weapons in the Mano 
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River Basin. Despite an arms embargo established by the UN in November 2004, weapons have 
continued to flow through the region.  
Boutellis (2011) credits these failings to both political and technical factors. First, the 
government decided to divide the responsibilities for DDR among three agencies. Rather than 
speeding up the process, this had created confusion and delays. Second, suspected politicization 
of the concurrent military integration process led rebels to distrust the intentions of the 
government; many, in turn, decided to maintain their weapons as an “insurance policy” in case 
the government reneged on its promises.177  
 
Security Sector Failures and the Relapse into Conflict 
Three years after the war ended, Côte d’Ivoire was still divided between two ruling 
groups: the government in the South and the FN in the North. The Ouagadougou Agreement 
postponed all deliberations regarding security policy, leaving the post-war forces without a 
formal institutional framework guiding reform. Both forces remained highly politicized, using 
promotion and rank inflation as tools to gain the political support of the military. At the same 
time, mass recruitment by both sides broke down the chains of command in place at the 
beginning of the war, weakening discipline and the ability of officers to command their 
subordinates.178 Corruption and extortion by the government and rebel security forces had not 
abated since the end of the conflict. In sum, donor efforts had failed to improve the quality of 
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security sector governance in Côte d’Ivoire, despite the opportunity presented by the creation of 
the CCI. 
The first signs of trouble began after the first round of elections in October 2010, 
following the announcement of Gbagbo and Ouattara as the winners of the first round of 
elections.179 Violence broke out in the streets among partisans. Riots that broke out in pro-
Ouattara neighborhoods often targeted FDS soldiers suspected of loyalty to Gbagbo. Despite the 
large presence of the state security forces in the region, however, neighboring soldiers did not 
intervene to help, signaling to some observers a fracture between soldiers loyal to Gbagbo, and 
those loyal to the state.180  
Despite these issues, the run-off election in late November ran smoothly; the UN 
officially declared the process “free and fair.” The Independent Electoral Commission 
announced Alassane Ouattara as the winner, with 54.1 percent of votes. Rather than accept these 
results, Gbagbo dissolved the Commission, claiming irregularities in the voting. Days later, the 
partisan Ivorian Constitutional Council announced new results, handing Gbagbo victory.181  
In the months that followed, Côte d’Ivoire remained locked in a tense political standoff, 
as Ouattara and members of the international community continued to try and reach a diplomatic 
resolution to the crisis. Although Gbagbo remained in the presidential palace, he no longer held 
full control over the country. Shortly after the final election results were announced, Prime 
Minister Guillaume Soro had called for the army to align itself behind Ouattara. While many of 
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the troops recruited by Gbagbo during the first conflict remained loyal to him, many former 
Gbagbo supporters recognized the legitimacy of Ouattara’s claim to the presidency.182 Despite a 
call by Ouattara for peace and an offer to form a "unity government" with Gbagbo, tensions 
continued to rise and sporadic violence broke out across the city.183 
Violence began slowly, primarily against civilians. Pro-Gbagbo forces targeted Muslims, 
northerners, and West Africans suspected of supporting Ouattara. They raided pro-Ouattara 
neighborhoods at night, murdering and capturing civilians, targeted public spaces frequented by 
pro-Ouattara civilians, and set up roadblocks to identify potential Ouattara supporters and harass 
them. Any form of political protest against Gbagbo was forcefully repressed, and virulent, 
ethnically-charged broadcasts in favor of Gbagbo filled state media to rally support against the 
Ouattaristes. As pro-Gbagbo forces waged their campaign of repression in the major urban areas 
of the country, a second strain of violence erupted in the West between the “natives” and 
“foreigners.”184  
Three months into the crisis, Ouattara gave up on diplomatic efforts to end the crisis and 
ordered the elements loyal to him to push back against Gbagbo. In early March, Ouattara 
formalized these forces and announced the creation of the Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire 
(Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire, FRCI). When the violence shifted from repression to 
organized conflict, the international community intervened and France and the UN began an air 
campaign against Gbagbo. On April 11, 2011, Laurent Gbagbo was captured. Fighting officially 
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ended on May 4th with the military defeat of the pro-Gbagbo militias operating in the West. The 
Second Ivorian War resulted in the deaths of at least 3,000 people and the displacement of 
hundreds of thousands more.185  
 
The Role of Security Sector Governance in the Second Ivorian War 
The electoral crisis in Côte d’Ivoire may have happened even if DDR and military 
integration had gone exactly as envisioned in the OPA. Laurent Gbagbo was not willing to 
relinquish power; it appears that his support for national elections was only because he believed 
that he would win them.186 However, his refusal to cede power did not necessitate a military 
escalation of the size it did. The prevalence of militias, armed bandits, rebel fighters, and zealous 
government soldiers across the country created a combustible situation that Gbagbo was able to 
utilize to launch his campaign to maintain the presidency. If the government and international 
community had taken the steps outlined in the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement to disarm and 
demobilize non-government fighters and support the integration process, the crisis might have 
been contained to the political sphere. Instead of indiscriminate killing, the new FRCI and 
police—under the leadership of the CCI—could have refused to comply with Gbagbo’s orders to 
attack, accepting the results offered by the Independent Electoral Commission and verified by 
the UN declaring Ouattara’s victory. 
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 Despite the use of ethnic rhetoric by politicians, ethnographic work suggests that the 
distinction between “true born” Ivorians and “foreigners” was less prevalent in the minds of the 
population, or at least those in the military. One major interviewed by Straus (2012) stressed the 
superficiality of the ethnic divisions in the country: “Ivoirité was a cultural idea used by 
politicians to win elections. It was not in the minds of Ivorians.”187 Rather, for the majority of the 
population, it was resentment of the informal land tenure system that allowed remobilization by 
political and military elites.188  
The form of conflict termination also played a key role. Years of fighting had failed to 
produce a victory for either the government or the rebels. Still, both sides exited the 
Ouagadougou negotiations with reserves of military strength and an institutional structure in 
place to extract resources should fighting resume. These wartime institutions continued to 
operate throughout the interwar period, and the FN continued to extract revenue using its 
com’zone system. The government also benefitted from increased opportunities for patronage 
after the war ended.189  
 To Ivorian observers, however, the most influential factor shaping the trajectory of the 
crisis was the army. One Ivorian security specialist commented: “It’s the army that will 
determine the real winner between Gbagbo and Ouattara.”190 When the crisis finally ended, the 
international community put a heavy emphasis on reforming the security sector and launching an 
effective DDR. This was no easy task: the number of combatants had ballooned during the 
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second conflict, the state’s security forces were weak, fractured, and highly politicized, and state 
authority was still constrained to the south. Following the UN’s assessment mission in the 
country, the Secretary General concluded: “FDS, including the police and the gendarmerie, were 
detrimentally politicized during the crisis and have effectively disintegrated, though some have 
rejoined under the auspices of FRCI. The prison institutions have also essentially collapsed in the 
south and have not been fully operational in the north since 2002. Most of the police, 
gendarmerie, judicial and prisons infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed.”191 After some 
prodding by international partners, Ouattara made SSR and DDR policy priorities. Unlike past 
attempts, however, this time the process would be Ivorian-led. 
 
Security Assistance after the Second Ivorian War 
Regime Vulnerability  
When Ouattara took office, there was little question about the direction of governance in 
Côte d’Ivoire. With the help of the international community, Alassane Ouattara had won a clear 
military victory over the government. Because of his history working in the IMF, Ouattara had 
the trust and support of the international community. With elections behind him, Ouattara faced 
near total control of the government he was to inherit. However, Ouattara’s governing choices 
were constrained by political pressures from within his party. In the immediate aftermath of the 
conflict, Ouattara had to make good on wartime promises to reward his supporters. As Piccolino 
(2018) puts it, Ouattara had to “pay off” his allies: “Senior former FN military leaders were 
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reintegrated into the new national army. The reunification of the army, the dismantlement of the 
FN administration and the liberation of public and private buildings occupied by their troops 
were undertaken slowly… the com’zones also exerted a strong control over the DDR process.”192 
While Gbagbo’s forces remained in the security sector, the military and electoral victory 
won by Ouattara left him in a very different place than his predecessor in the first post-war 
period. Ouattara faced pressures within his own party, but the weakened position of the 
opposition reduced the credibility of a potential coup. Regime vulnerability was low. 
 
Institutional Assistance 
In the immediate aftermath of the second Ivorian war, a number of bilateral and 
multilateral development partners pledged to assist in the recovery. The country’s most 
significant partners for security sector reform were France, Japan, the United States, the World 
Bank, the UN, and the EU. In recognition of the precarious security environment, the French 
retained a large military presence in the country. Along with its direct military support, French 
forces provided training and assisted with DDR activities. France also provided financial, 
technical, and capacity-building assistance to the FRCI and the MoD. While the process of 
military integration was determined and directed by the Ivorian leadership, they were assisted by 
a group of international advisors, including French General Claude Réglat, Colonel Major 
Marc Paitier, and two officers from the UN and US.193 France also maintained a group of 
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advisors to support the Commandant of the Abidjan Gendarmerie School (École de 
gendarmerie d'Abidjan), and the Director of National Intelligence.194 France’s intervention in 
Côte d’Ivoire was strongly influenced by its complicated historical relationship with the partner. 
While France remained the main bilateral donor in Côte d’Ivoire, it refrained from exercising the 
leadership played by other lead partners, such as the US in Liberia or the UK in Sierra Leone. 
In addition to France, the largest bilateral donors to support SSR were the United States 
and Japan. In the first five years after the Second Ivorian War ended, Japan provided nearly $8 
million to support disarmament and the destruction of small arms and weapons.195 The second 
wave of Japanese assistance supported the reform and professionalization of the Ivorian national 
police. The majority of this aid was focused on police training and support to the criminal justice 
system more broadly.196 The US worked largely outside of the Ivorian government, supplying 
the majority of its institutional assistance to support reintegration. 
The major multilateral institutions—the EU, World Bank, and the UN—financed the 
most pressing needs of the country, including DDR. The World Bank continued its funding of 
reintegration training and compensation. The UN and its agencies organized the largest security 
sector reform program The UN set two specific objectives: (1) Reinforce the capacity of the 
security institutions and local administrations to help them begin to function again; and (2) 
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Bolster the processes of reconciliation and cohesion at the national and social levels and support 
the return of displaced persons.197  
With France taking a reduced role, the UN became the primary partner assisting Côte 
d’Ivoire in SSR. In 2013, Security Council Resolution 2112 authorized UNOCI to assist with 
DDR, support the implementation of the reform strategy devised by the government, and provide 
advice on the restructuring and organization of the military. Its primary role, however, would be 
to assist in the reform and professionalization of the police force.198 The majority of UN 
assistance was delivered as technical assistance, providing counsel to the Government and 
specific institutions within the security sector.199  
The programs implemented by the UN and EU included a twin focus on governance 
promotion and supporting local ownership. Donors pushed the government of Côte d’Ivoire to 
design and initiate policies that they could support. This constituted a major shift from the 
approach taken by the international community in the earlier SSR interventions, which were 
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In April 2012, the United Nations Security Council lifted many of the restrictions on 
military assistance to Côte d’Ivoire. While states were still barred from providing most weapons, 
donors were now allowed to provide non-lethal weapons and equipment necessary to support 
SSR.200 In 2016 the embargo was lifted entirely.201 Although the UN lifted restrictions against 
training and the provision of non-lethal assistance in 2013, operational assistance to Côte 
d’Ivoire has remained low. A review of documentation by the UN Group of Experts monitoring 
the embargo, news reports, and publications by watchdog organizations reveals little evidence of 
arms or equipment donations by foreign states.202 In addition, there is little evidence of training 
or other operational assistance by donors other than what is published by the OECD or US. 
 The beginning of post-conflict reconstruction after the Second Ivorian War looked very 
different than it did following the First. Unlike Gbagbo, Ouattara took office facing low regime 
vulnerability. My theory would predict that the relative certainty of his position would reduce his 
need to accommodate the opposition or listen to international partners. Thus, athough Ouattara 
received much greater institutional assistance during this time, I expect this assistance to have 
only a small effect on governance. Since most of this assistance was focused on DDR and the 
police, I expect that any improvements in security sector governance will be relatively 
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constrained to the police and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former 
combatants. Since Côte d’Ivoire received relatively little operational assistance during this time, 
I do not expect that security sector governance will worsen during this time. 
 
Security Sector Reform After the Second Ivorian War 
SSR began in earnest with the appointment of a Security Sector Reform Working Group 
(Groupe de travail sur la RSS, GT-RSS) by President Ouattara in 2013. Although the 
government often stated the importance of SSR and DDR for peace, the development of a 
national plan was to a significant degree a response to pressure from the UN, which had 
consistently pressed for SSR since the electoral crisis ended through Resolutions 2000, 2045, and 
2062.203  
The National Strategy for Security Sector Reform they designed articulated six pillars of 
reforms: (1) National Security, (2) Post-conflict Reconstruction, (3) Democratic Control, (4) 
Economic Governance, (5) Human and Social Dimension, and (6) Human Rights and 
International Relations.204 The GT-RSS designed a technocratic approach to the security sector, 
focusing on security institution building, capacity building through training and equipment, the 
creation of strategies, policies, and documents, and a large communication campaign. In contrast 
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to the “transformational” approach to SSR in Sierra Leone, the Ivorians produced a plan that was 
“above all, administrative and bureaucratic.”205 The key to this approach was training. The 
government rallied international support for training efforts, assuming that politicization and 
professionalization would improve in time.206  
 
Disarmament, Demobilization, Resocialization, and Reintegration 
The Ivorian government created the Authority for the Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration of Ex-Combatants (Autorité pour le Désarmement, la Démobilisation et la 
Réinsertion des Ex-combattants, ADDR) to lead DDR and community rehabilitation.207 When 
the conflict first ended, combatant estimates varied dramatically; before DDR could begin, the 
government and its partners would have to complete the enormous task of identifying the 
population of soldiers, dozos, and militia fighters to be demobilized.208 By 2012, the government 
announced a caseload of 60,000 to be demobilized, including 23,000 soldiers added to the FRCI 
during the crisis.  
Institutional Assistance 
As a demonstration of its commitment to DDR, the government also pledged to fund the 
majority of the process itself, with the financial assistance of the EU and African Union.209 In 
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addition to funding reintegration packages, international donors provided technical expertise to 
aid the ADDR and experts to facilitate the demobilization process. 
In response to the massive human and civil rights abuses committed throughout the 
conflict, policymakers deemed it important to include a “Resocialization” phase in DDR, to 
reorient former combatants to life in a peaceful society. This phase included group exercises run 
by UN and International Red Cross experts on participating in civic affairs and family life, 
individual therapy sessions, and seminars to educate former combatants on the opportunities that 
were available to them. The government was also pragmatic about finding employment 
opportunities for ex-combatants, looking to the informal economy when necessary.210  
Outcomes 
In contrast to my theoretical expectations, it is not clear that institutional assistance led to 
any improvement in outcomes in DDR. As DDR progressed, civil society activists and civilians 
registered growing concerns that only Ouattara supporters were receiving reintegration benefits 
from the government after demobilization. Although overall numbers of participation in 
demobilization were high, participation and distribution of benefits was uneven: at the height of 
the DDR program in 2014, the ratio of ex-combatants who had fought on the side of President 
Gbagbo had yet to exceed 13 percent. There were also concerns as a significant number of 
people who had not been incorporated into the initial registries for DDR had been added 
retroactively.211  
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The progress in demobilization masked a second failing in the overall progress of DDR: 
disarmament. As the DDR program moved forward, the number of arms collected remained far 
below the desired ratio of one weapon per combatant. In a region already beset by insecurity and 
porous borders, the proliferation of small arms around the country left the country in a vulnerable 
to a resurgence of violence. Some observers note that a large percentage of those who retained 
their arms were part of a network of former FN combatants who were never formally integrated 
into the rebel movement. These fighters have posed a particularly strong threat to the country: 
not only are they armed, they are organized, taking commands from the com’zone networks that 
have remained in place across much of the north.212  
By the presidential elections of June 2015, 52,000 ex-combatants had been formally 
reintegrated into Ivorian society. However, progress quickly stalled: for Ouattara, the success of 
the elections signified that the country was secure; he turned his attention to the economy. Bruno 
Clement Bollé, who had been an integral part of the DDR process described this shift: “From a 
complete focus on security and extreme vigilance on matters of security, all these issues were left 
behind… The 52,000 who took part before the end of June 2015 received careful attention and 
oversight. This was less the case for the remaining 18,000. These ex-combatants are still very 
much under the influence of their former leaders. They may still be able to cause problems, and 
those who want to stir up trouble could exploit that.”213  
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The greatest innovation of the GT-RSS’s strategy was the creation of the National 
Security Council (Conseil National de Sécurité, CNS), a national security council modeled after 
the NSC in the United States and the Office for National Security in Sierra Leone. The CNS was 
specifically mandated with coordinating internal and external security; determining national 
priorities for security sector reform; and monitoring and coordinating action between different 
security ministries.214  
Several other important institutional changes were made during this time. To replace the 
highly politicized intelligence agency established by President Gbagbo during the first civil war 
in 2005, Ouattara established the National Intelligence Council (Conseil National du 
Renseignement, CNR) in 2014.215 In addition, Gbagbo pledged to undertake serious reforms to 
the Ministry of Defense, beginning with the creation of a national security strategy. 
Institutional Assistance 
From its inception, the CNS received technical assistance from the UNOCI, France, and 
the US to support civilian oversight and accountability within the institution. Experts from the 
UNOCI offered training seminars to several committees in the National Assembly to bolster their 
ability to exercise oversight over the security sector.216 These projects focused on the both 
strengthening the technical expertise of members of the CNS as well as supporting non-state 
 
214 “Décret n° 2012-786 du 8 août 2012 portant création, organisation et fonctionnement du Conseil national de 
Sécurité, en abrégé C.N.S,” Journal Officiel de la République de Côte d’Ivoire, October 11, 2012, 925. 
215 “L’Agence de Stratégie et d’intelligence (Ansi) Délocalisée Au Palais de Ouattara,” ConnectionIvoirienne.Net, 
June 12, 2014. 
216 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Thirty-Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 






actors to monitor the security sector on the principles of democratic governance, including 
civilian control, respect for human rights, financial responsibility, domestic security, and respect 
for the rule of law. 
France and the US installed advisors to provide technical expertise to the nascent 
institution.217 The UNOCI also provided assistance to the National Assembly Defense and 
Security Commission to increase democratic oversight within the military and clarify conditions 
for mobilization and intervention in law enforcement and rescue operations.218 Other multilateral 
institutions offered similar support. For example, the African Development Bank hosted a series 
of workshops in 2016 focused on improving defense expenditure management.219  
Outcomes 
The institutional assistance provided by donors made little impact on security institution 
building. Aline Leboeuf argues that the reliance of the government on oral communication 
allowed a gap to emerge between what was being said and what was actually being achieved. 
Large gaps emerged between official progress and the reality on the ground. She quotes a French 
advisor who describes the CNS as a large machine “running on empty” – while there were many 
seminars, there was little execution.220  
Assistance has at times been hindered by a lack of coordination among donors. An 
analyst for Transparency International described the anti-corruption programming in Côte 
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d’Ivoire as “ad hoc” and “sporadic.” When the government of Côte d’Ivoire submitted its first 
self-evaluation to the Open Government Partnership, it made no reference to these trainings, 




The process of the second Ivorian war had broken down what little institutional capacity 
existed in Côte d'Ivoire. Minister of Defense Koffi argued that security infrastructure, equipment, 
and even the operational capacity of the military had been “reduced to nothing”.222 Years of 
vicious conflict had broken the social compact between the army and the population. The 
military would need to be rebuilt as well as integrated. Relations between the military and 
society repaired.223  
Ouattara abandoned the CCI, making the newly created army the site of all military 
integration, incorporating FDS and FN troops, as well as the soldiers recruited directly into the 
force during the crisis. In a speech to the nation, Ouattara declared that this new army would be a 
powerful instrument of national cohesion in service of civics, tolerance, transparency, and 
national integration: “Our army should equally be a tool at the service of development, at the 
service of the people, at the service of the Republic.”224  
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Like much of the rest of SSR, Ivorians dictated the process of military reform, with some 
assistance from French General Claude Réglat, as well as by Colonel Major Marc Paitier and two 
officers from the UN and US.225 When the crisis ended, the government set the new army at 
22,000 soldiers, a mix of former FN combatants, former FDS soldiers, and the new soldiers 
recruited to the FRCI by Ouattara in 2010. During this process, much of the burden of integration 
fell on these new FRCI soldiers, who were tasked with building connections and keeping the 
peace between the former rivals.226 The combatants who remained would be demobilized.  
After the post-electoral crisis, Ouattara instituted a “co-command” structure, in which 
posts would be shared by FAFN and FDS forces. In theory, this would facilitate cohesion among 
the ranks and encourage lower-ranking soldiers to respect the leadership of the other side. In 
reality, however, this system did little to improve inter-group relations, creating instead a parallel 
command structure.227 
In 2016, the government passed new legislation regarding the organization of the armed 
forces. Law n° 2016-414 outlined the major divisions within the armed forces and created a unit 
for coordination between the various commands. Most importantly, it stressed the role of the 
army in assisting in the maintenance of internal security.228 Shortly after, the government issued a 
military planning document, outlining a program for reforms between 2016 and 2020. In addition 
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to improving the operational capacity of the armed forces, the document stresses the importance 
of improving the autonomy and capacity of defense institutions to conduct professional 
intelligence operations, generate strategic reflections, and manage expenditures.229  
One of the most visible restructuring efforts made by President Ouattara was to dismantle 
the Security Operations Command Center (Centre de commandement des operations de sécurité, 
CECOS), known as an arm of state repression under Gbagbo. However, Gbagbo’s praetorian 
guard—the Republican Guard (Garde Républicaine)—was left in place and put under the 
direction of Issiaka Ouattara (“Wattao”), a close ally of President Ouattara and famous war 
criminal.230  Additionally, Ouattara established several new autonomous units. In 2011, Ouattara 
created the Special Forces (Forces Spéciales, FS), who received training and assistance from 
Morocco, China, Egypt, and the U.S.; and two police units. Later, in 2013, Ouattara created a 
joint police-military unit called the Operational Decision Coordinating Center (Centre de 
coordination des decisions opérationelles, CCDO).231   
Operational Assistance 
The majority of the operational assistance that was provided came through the provision 
of training and equipment through the Operation Licorne and the US Peacekeeping Operations 
Fund.232 Faced with integrating and mobilizing a new army, donors and the government set 
training as a high priority, seeing it as necessary to equalize troops with widely varying 
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experience levels.233 Ivorian soldiers received training from a number of sources. All soldiers 
without basic training attended a course offered by the French through the Licorne forces in 
country and later from the Éléments français en Côte d’Ivoire (EFCI), which eventually replaced 
Licorne. Preparation for participation in peacekeeping missions formed another avenue for 
training. This instruction focused on all areas necessary for the functioning of an army, including 
training technicians and pilots.234 For most FN and FRCI recruits, this training was their first 
formal training experience. For former FDS soldiers, this training served as a refresher course. 
Regardless of the amount of knowledge gained through these sessions, government officials and 
donors both hoped they could contribute to socialization among the newly integrated forces. 
Traditional operational assistance has remained low, even after the lifting of the UN embargo. 
Outcomes 
As expected by my theory, the institutional assistance provided by international donors 
did little to improve the professionalization of the military. Despite the positive rhetoric of the 
Ouattara administration, the creation of new elite military units signaled continuity of policy, 
rather than change. An advisor to the government at the time described the new CCDO as “a 
Malinké replica of the Bété CECOS of the Gbgabo period.”235 Like Gbagbo, Ouattara created 
these autonomous institutions as an alternative to the weak national army. Like Gbagbo, Ouattara 
kept these new institutions outside the formal army system and placed them directly under his 
command. These elite security units today receive more attention from the government than the 
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conventional army, leaving them better trained and better equipped. One advisor to the security 
sector argued that these units balance against each other, making sector-wide reform difficult.236 
Early into the reform process, a series of events revealed a high level of politicization and 
discontent within the military, suggesting that reform was not progressing as quickly as it 
seemed. After a series of attacks by pro-Gbagbo militants in the West of the country between 
2012 and 2014, Ouattara took another opportunity to consolidate power in the hands of his 
former rebel network.237 Despite their numerical weakness, FN structures continue to dominate 
within the armed forces. "We have in reality two armies who do not always respect the chain of 
command and who regularly give proof of their lack of discipline and cohesion," explained one 
member of the National Security Council.238 Among both troops and officers, loyalty comes first 
to your party, second to the state.  
These divisions have been allowed to continue due to policy choices by the government. 
As DDR progressed and the security situation improved, the government’s priorities shifted. 
Without an immediate threat of conflict or insurrection, the administration’s dedication to 
retraining quickly waned. It remains unclear how many soldiers actually attended the established 
training centers.239 Without a comprehensive plan for instruction and professionalization, 
selection for training events has become politicized: allocation of training opportunities is often 
based on personal ties rather than merit.240 Similarly, a review of the security sector found that 
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former FN soldiers are consistently given preference for the allocation of new equipment 
provided by donors.241 
The government has done little to promote integration within their ranks. One Crisis 
Group report found that former FN soldiers are consistently insubordinate to senior officers who 
fought for the FDS before the electoral crisis, refusing to obey orders or convey respect through 
practices like saluting.242 French advisor Bollée noted this as well, arguing that beyond official 
statements promoting reconciliation and integration, “there was never even the slightest hint of 
rapprochement between the factions inside the army.” Members of the military who were 
thought to support Gbagbo were sidelined, sometimes denied even the employment they had 
been promised.243  
The problems within the military have manifested in a series of mutinies since the 2011 
crisis. In 2014, former FN soldiers now integrated into the FRCI poured into the streets of 
Abidjan demanding the back pay promised by both Gbagbo and Ouattara, but never paid. 
Although the government responded rapidly to the protests, they sparked doubts among 
observers of the progress of security sector reform in Côte d’Ivoire. Rinaldo Depagne, the West 
Africa project director for International Crisis Group, commented: “The army has always been 
the weak point and it really surprises me they didn’t learn the lessons of the past.”244  
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When mutinies broke out again in January and May 2017 it had become clear that the 
government had not taken steps to adequately address the issues plaguing the military. Chief 
among these issues was the size of the military. 90% of the Ministry of Defense’s budget was 
devoted to paying salaries and still, some soldiers felt they had not been properly compensated. 
The 2017 mutinies also revealed issues in the DDR program. To that point, most observers had 
viewed DDR to be a success.245 The ease with which soldiers picked up weapons not authorized 
by the FRCI shattered that illusion and highlighted the programs failures in disarmament.246   
The Ivorian government has recently taken steps to downsize the army. Their delay in 
doing so is likely due to political considerations of the Ouattara regime and the delicate balance 
of power within his political coalition. In other countries, the presence of international advisors 
has made it easier for domestic politicians to undertake necessary, but politically difficult 
reforms. In addition to creating pressure for these reforms, international involvement offers a 
useful justification for domestic politicians. This type of pressure was missing in Côte d’Ivoire, 
where French advisors to the military were focused more on improving effectiveness than 
sensitive issues like personnel. 
 
Police Reform 
Internal security in Côte d’Ivoire is divided between the gendarmerie and the police. The 
gendarmerie is a paramilitary force created to guard public safety, maintain order, and enforce 
laws in order to “protect institutions, people, and goods.” Typically, the gendarmerie is generally 
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involved in civil policing and territorial defense and may be called upon for other security 
needs.247 In contrast, the police is charged with the maintenance of public security throughout the 
country, particularly in the cities. Force integration into the police was not continued after the 
Second Ivorian War. Thus, the police and gendarmerie faced few of the issues of cohesion that 
plagued the military. The greatest issues facing the police were a lack of training and equipment 
and, more importantly, a lack of trust by the population.248 
Despite concerns that the police and gendarmerie would not be able to work together 
after the crisis has ended, the Ouattara government chose to maintain the existing institutional 
infrastructure of the police.  Reform efforts focused primarily on the military, the police and 
gendarmerie were to be re-equipped and re-deployed.249 Rather than use resources to improve a 
potentially pro-Gbagbo institution, Ouattara sidelined the police and gendarmerie. This policy 
choice has hampered donor assistance to the police, with implications for the quality of 
governance and the level of domestic stability. 
Institutional Assistance 
Support for police reform was provided primarily by multilateral institutions. Before the 
GT-RSS completed its plan for security sector reform, the UNOCI began working with the 
Ministry of the Interior to help formulate new plans for the organization, structure, and 
jurisdiction of the police.250 The UNOCI provided training to 278 police officers and 118 
gendarmes on the subjects of human rights, ethics, local policing, accident reporting, sexual and 
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gender-based violence, and the rights of children.251 In 2014, the UNDP began implementing a 
series of human rights trainings for the police at the École Nationale de Police d’Abidjan, 
financed by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency. The program provided just under $2 
million between 2014 and 2016 to train officers from across the country in management, ethics, 
gender issues, and dealing with vulnerable groups. These trainings also included more traditional 
issues, such as maintaining order, crime scene management, and fighting organized crime.252 To 
facilitate longer-term reforms, France sent technical experts to assist the National Police in 
improving training programs.253  
Police reform in Côte d’Ivoire focused more on mandate than institutional structure. In 
2015, the government announced the creation of a municipal police force with a decentralized 
leadership structure to better serve the needs of communities.254 This was an important step for 
the state to extend and improve its services across the country: up to this point, local security had 
been provided informally.255  
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Operational assistance to the police has been provided primarily through the UNOCI, 
France, and Germany. In the early days of peace, the UNOCI quickly deployed funding to 
rebuild the physical infrastructure of the police. The UNOCI re-equipped and rehabilitated 6 
prefectures, 14 sous-prefectures, 3 police stations, 4 police brigades in the West, the police 
district of Adjamé and provided the Abidjan police prefecture with a new radio system. France 
authorized multiple rounds of equipment donations to the police and gendarmerie, providing 
items ranging from uniforms to vehicles. The most significant provision of French assistance to 
Ivorian internal security, however, was through training. In addition to providing training 
opportunities at French schools, France provided seminars at the National Police Academy 
(l’École nationale de police à Cocody).256 Germany also intervened to help develop the Ivorian 
police and gendarmerie. Beginning in 2008, the German Development Agency (GIZ) has 
channeled assistance to reinforce the capabilities of the Ivorian Police. This assistance has 
included equipment provisions, training in countering drug trafficking, as well as training in 
basic policing skills.257 As in other reform projects, Ivorian authorities have shown a great 
interest in pursuing reform and shaping the process to fit Ivorian needs. In terms of police 
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Police reform efforts by donors appear to have had some positive results. UN crime 
statistics for Côte d’Ivoire show a marked decrease in armed robbery and homicide between 
2012 and 2015, suggesting not only a reduction in instability, but an improvement in the 
effectiveness of the police and gendarmes. Reports of rape during this time increased 
dramatically; however, experts attribute this to the proliferation of sensitization trainings across 
the country to the population and security forces, leading to an increase in reporting as opposed 
to an increase in the actual incidence of crime.259 However, as expected, these improvements 
have been small. Public trust in the police remained strained due to a perceived “lack of integrity 
and accountability, use of excessive force, torture and ill-treatment in the maintenance of law and 
order” and low rates of disciplinary action taken against offending officers.260  
Despite the operational assistance it received, the national police have remained 
significantly understaffed and lack the capacity to perform vital functions like intelligence 
collection. By 2014, the police and gendarmerie were still only equipped and operational in three 
major cities – Abidjan, Bouaké, and Daloa.261 Further, it was estimated that there were only 
7,149 pistols across the force, a ratio of 3 officers to one gun. Needs for training were just as 
great: by 2016, training for all officers at each level was still being conducted at the École 
Nationale de Police in Abidjan, which had been constructed at independence to service a 
maximum of 300 officers.262  
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Unlike the integration plans set forth by the CCI, force integration under Ouattara was 
largely confined to the military, leaving the police and gendarmerie relatively untouched.263 
Fearing latent pro-Gbagbo sentiments, the government has consistently marginalized the police 
and gendarmerie and instead has authorized the military to perform domestic security functions, 
often at the expense of the rule of law. 264  
One of the most significant sources of insecurity during the decade-long conflict was the 
proliferation of “checkpoints” along the highway manned by armed individuals looking to extort 
money from members of the community. These highway bandits were often allowed to operate 
with impunity; at times, they were even perceived to be working with the police. When the 
conflict ended and the government turned its eye to police reform, addressing the issue of 
highway extortion was made a high priority. In one of its first acts of reform, the government 
created an Anti-Racket Unit within the police, which would operate as an undercover unit to 
detect and investigate corrupt police and security officials participating in extortion. However, 
since its creation, the unit has been severely hampered by inconsistent funding from the 
government. Although funding was restored in 2014, the group’s initial inefficacy seriously 
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damaged its reputation and authority. Unable to effectively deter officers from demanding bribes, 
the unit has become a lame duck.265 
 
Assessing Security Sector Governance After the Second Ivorian War 
By 2014, Côte d’Ivoire had made substantial progress towards meeting its urgent goals: 
the government had successfully defined a national policy for defense, passed legislation 
regarding the creation of the CNS, and provided the equipment necessary to make the police, 
gendarmerie, and Special Forces operational. The government also passed several policies and 
pieces of legislation to guide DDR and address cross-border flows, as well as initiated action 
towards improving economic governance through the security sector. The country had made 
significantly less progress towards its short-term goals. While the government did begin some 
reforms towards the restructuring of the armed forces and police, it made no progress towards 
depoliticization or installing democratic governance in the security institutions.266  
Despite the efforts taken by the Ouattara administration to restore state authority across 
the country, com’zones continue to exert authority in the north, challenging the primacy of the 
state and the stability of the region. It is unclear whether these efforts have failed due to a lack of 
state capacity or political will to shut down the security and economic networks operated by 
 
265 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Côte d’Ivoire: Extortion by Security Forces,” Human Rights Watch, July 29, 
2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/29/cote-divoire-extortion-security-forces. 
266 Conseil National de Sécurité, “Tableau de Bord Des Réformes Par Priorité,” Réforme de Secteur de Sécurité 






Ouattara’s wartime allies.267 The continued operation of these parallel governance structures 
threatens the government’s ability to enforce policies and exert its power throughout the country.  
Insecurity has reigned across much of the country, as the highway bandits who had 
become so prevalent throughout the conflict continued to operate roadblocks across the country, 
particularly the in the West. To many observers, this represented a failure of DDR: “We know 
that the majority of the highway attackers are former fighters. Their impatience and the 
difficulties faced by the DDR to take them on board are the reasons for this situation,” said Pierre 
Kouamé Adjoumani, the interim head of the Ivoirian Human Rights League.268  
Beyond failures of state capacity, donors have been unable to effectuate significant 
improvements in governance. In the following discussion, I outline the Côte d’Ivoire’s progress 
along the five major dimensions of security sector governance: (1) the existence of a formal 
institutional framework, (2) civilian control, (3) transparent and accountable management, (4) 
capacity, and (5) respect for human rights and the rule of law. 
Formal Institutional Framework. In the years following the crisis, the Ouattara 
administration established a host of new legislation outlining the roles and responsibilities of the 
security sector. However, in practice, the Ivorian security sector rarely respects the parameters 
established by the legal framework. The military is overused, sent to participate in domestic 
affairs. Both the military and the police are seen by observers as being highly political bodies. 
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Accountability is further hampered by a lack of formal doctrine or institutionalized training 
addressing corruption for members of the military or police.269 
Civilian Control. Civilian control over the Ivorian armed forces remains low and is 
consistently identified as a source of insecurity by security experts. The Ouattara administration 
has consistently promoted former rebel leaders to high command posts as well as lucrative 
civilian positions, perpetuating the historical trend of military involvement in political affairs. 
Ousmane Coulibaly, an FRCI leader with the nickname “Bin Laden” is exemplary of this issue. 
After serving as a leader of a notoriously brutal unit during the civil war, Coulibaly oversaw 
troops in the Yopougon area who committed egregious human rights abuses during the second 
conflict, including summary executions, torture, and arbitrary detentions. Rather than being 
sanctioned for his part in this abuse, Coulibaly was promoted to a lucrative position within the 
government while continuing to serve as a commander.270 In addition to holding important posts 
at the national level, many of these former rebel commanders have strong economic and personal 
networks at the local level bolstering their financial and social capital. As Martin et al. explain, 
“These linkages complicate Côte d’Ivoire’s post-war peacebuilding project because they 
empower commanders to challenge the authority of the ruling government and undermine the 
cohesiveness of the armed forces, yet at the same time make these actors indispensable for 
maintaining short-term stability.”271 
 
269 Transparency International, “Government Defence Integrity Index 2020: Côte d’Ivoire,” Transparency 
International Defence & Security, 2020, https://ti-defence.org/gdi/countries/cote-divoire/. 
270 Wells, “‘A Long Way from Reconciliation’: Abusive Military Crackdown in Response to Security Threats in 
Côte d’Ivoire,” 49–50. 
271 Philip Martin, Giulia Piccolino, and Jeremy Speight, “Rebel Networks’ Deep Roots Cause Concerns for Côte 





Civilian oversight of security issues is minimal. Although the National Assembly and 
civil society were kept apprised of developments in the security sector reform process, oversight 
remains low.272 Legally, the Committee for Security and Defense in the National Assembly has 
the right to oversight, but it rarely exercises this authority. Further, there is little evidence that the 
executive has taken any of the Committee’s policy recommendations into account when 
formulating defense policy.273 The absence of legislative oversight hinders the establishment of 
accountability within the military and the security sector more broadly, particularly in light of the 
politicized relationship between Ouattara and the security forces.  
Transparent and Accountable Management. Despite a host of new legislation defining 
the structure and management of the security sector, security policy decisions often do not 
adhere to formal criteria. There is very little transparency regarding the decision-making process. 
For example, information regarding high-level appointments within the military is only 
published after the appointment has been made.274 With the support of the UNOCI, the CNS has 
increased its communication with civil society and the media. However, this communication is 
consistently one-sided – instead of beginning a dialogue with domestic actors, the CNS has used 
the seminars and other UN-funded meetings to propagate the government’s message.275 
Corruption remains an issue across the security sector. Despite the creation of an Anti-
Racket Unit composed of police, gendarmes, and members of the military, enforcement has been 
complicated by the prevalence of unofficial fighters operating alongside government forces. 
Operating outside of the official system, these fighters are not subject to the disciplinary 
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mechanisms built into the FRCI that could punish extortion. Even if they were, however, military 
commanders have been loath to impose any sanctions on these fighters, who were never fully 
demobilized nor fully integrated into the army, but continue to work in the name of the state.276 
These fighters and the abuses they perpetrate undermine the legitimacy of the security sector. 
They are a direct result of an incomplete DDR process. 
Within the military, the existence of parallel command structures in the military weakens 
the ability of leadership to hold lower ranks accountable. The national police are not subject to 
the same degree of internal divisions; however, authority in the police is overly centralized, to 
the point that it hinders command and control across the organization. Similarly, the gendarmerie 
suffers from a command structure that is so centralized and hierarchical that it impedes lower-
ranking officers from directing their subordinates.277 
Capacity. Operational capacity of all bodies outside the army remained low until recent 
years, due in large part to an arms embargo placed on the country by the UN in the early days of 
the conflict. By 2016, the air force still had “no combat capability and a very limited capacity for 
transport,” despite of the French efforts to build up the mechanical and technical capacity of the 
air force.278 The politicization of the military threatens its ability to perform as well as 
challenging accountability and professionalization. Divided loyalties of the troops have 
significantly weakened command structures within the military, threatening its ability to respond 
should a crisis emerge. Worse, many experts fear that the fault lines in the military may 
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contribute to a relapse into conflict following the elections of 2020.279 The decrease in crime 
across the country suggests an improvement in the capacity of the police; however, these 
improvements are offset by the persistence of networks of highway bandits and networks of 
extortion. 
Respect for Human Rights and the Rule of Law. The Ivorian security sector remains 
mired in a culture of impunity, allowed to persist since the end of the war. Although the Ouattara 
administration has instituted a truth and reconciliation commission and inquiry into the war 
crimes committed during the conflict, the prosecution of such crimes is highly political. A report 
by the International Center for Transitional Justice revealed that, despite evidence of abuses by 
pro-Ouattara forces, the state prosecutor has only proceeded with trials against Gbagbo 
supporters.280 This one-sided justice has created a permissive environment for human rights 
abuses and continued violations of the rule of law. Since the end of the 2011 conflict, various 
watchdog organizations have documented human rights abuses by the military, police, and 
intelligence services. In addition to arbitrary arrest and torture, the government has used the 
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Following the First Ivorian War, donors were slow to act. Despite an opening in the 
political sphere caused by high regime vulnerability and the creation of the CCI, donors hesitated 
to fund a government that they viewed as unwilling to act. Their fears were well-founded: both 
the Gbagbo administration and the FN system profited from the post-conflict system, creating 
large opportunity for corruption and disincentives for reform. However, their reluctance to 
provide funds for the CCI created serious delays in DDR and military integration. The 
importance of these funds for advancing both causes became clear in the dramatic progress that 
was made in the months leading up to the 2010 elections. Unfortunately, this assistance was 
ultimately insufficient: when the election crisis broke out, President Gbagbo could call upon a 
divided army and community of armed combatants to protect him, taking a political crisis and 
escalating it to the point of a renewed civil war. 
When the 2011 post-electoral crisis finally ended in 2011, Côte d’Ivoire seemed poised to 
make a remarkable recovery. However, in contrast to the strong economic recovery, progress in 
rebuilding the security sector stalled. Despite greater flows of institutional assistance, donors 
have been unable to effect deep security sector reforms. Following his electoral and military 
victory, Ouattara had near total control over the government and security sector, leaving little 
room for donor influence. Feeling the need to compensate his wartime allies, Ouattara has 
focused more on fighting the fires within his own party than accommodating the opposition. 
While pressure from donors and institutional assistance help push for the creation of SSR policy 




Since the end of the crisis, the army has launched three major coups. Ivorian security 
experts have serious doubts about the true success of DDR.282 One advisor to the process 
described SSR as “botched.”283 Worse, as preparations are mounted for the 2020 presidential 
election, civil society leaders and civilians fear a second relapse into conflict.284  
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SECURITY GOVERNANCE FAILURES IN BURUNDI 
 
After decades of cyclic violence, Burundi plunged into a civil war in 1993 that would 
endure for over 15 years and claim the lives of over 300,000 people. At the heart of this conflict 
was a long history of ethnic marginalization and political exclusion. The Hutu population, 
comprising nearly 85% of the total population, sought representation in all domains of 
government; the most fervent objective, however, was control over the security sector and an end 
to the “armée mono-ethnique” that had dominated the post-independence era. Although fighting 
continued until 2009, security sector reform efforts began in Burundi in 2004, when the Tutsi-led 
transitional government reached an agreement with the largest Hutu rebel group – the National 
Council for the Defense of Democracy—Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). 
The agreement they signed was built on the principle of power-sharing and formed the backbone 
of peace and reconstruction efforts. Donors matched their enthusiasm for peace with sizeable aid 
allocations. However, donor efforts were scattered. Although donors had secured a commitment 
from the transitional government to implement sector-wide reforms, continued fighting led 
donors to postpone policy talks.  
When donors returned to the table, they had missed their chance. Pierre Nkurunziza of 
the CNDD-FDD was two years into his term as president and had already begun his program of 
power consolidation. Worse, donor intentions began to falter as the conflict dragged on. When 
conflict continued even after the holding of democratic elections and a ceasefire between the two 




achieved, Burundi grew increasingly attractive as a provider of peacekeeping support and as a 
partner in the fight against international terrorism. 
At the time SSR began, the Burundian security system faced both contextual and 
institutional impediments to reform. Regional unrest and low-level domestic insecurity made it 
difficult to convince communities and ex-combatants to surrender their weapons. In addition, 
major issues remained with state institutions: the Burundian National Police (PNB) remained 
highly unprofessional, access to justice was limited, and the intelligence services were highly 
politicized. Unable to gain the consent of Nkurunziza for widescale reforms, the Netherlands 
initiated an innovative reform program focused on the military. Their program yielded 
significant improvements in the professionalism and capacity of the military, as evidenced by 
laudable performance in peacekeeping missions and improved relations with the Burundian 
population. However, improvements in the military were not enough to prevent the appropriation 
of the internal security institutions by the executive. In 2015, Pierre Nkurunziza announced his 
intention to run for an unconstitutional third term, with the full support of the police and 
intelligence services, who implemented increasingly repressive measures to stifle dissent. The 
military, politically neutral at the outbreak of violence, soon gave way to latent tensions, and the 
country relapsed into a second conflict, which continues to this day. 
 This chapter examines the impact of security assistance on security sector governance in 
post-war Burundi and considers the role that played in the country’s relapse into conflict. It 
proceeds in the following sections. First, I provide a brief history of Burundi leading up to the 
conflict, with a focus on how the politicization of the security sector helped fuel the political 
grievances that led to war. Next, I discuss the conduct of the civil war and the moves towards 




a brief outline of the political events leading up to the country’s eventual relapse into conflict. 
The second section discusses the security assistance provided to Burundi and the institutional 
context surrounding its disbursement. I highlight the international response to the signing of the 
Arusha Agreement in 2003: the window of opportunity donors missed in 2004 for sector-wide 
reform, the window that opened for military reform, and the aid they provided once a degree of 
regime stability had been restored. I argue that, although donors provided large amounts of 
institutional assistance to reform the national army, the inflows of operational assistance received 
at that time undercut their reform efforts. In the third section, I discuss the developments that 
occurred in the security sector as a result of the institutional and operational assistance provided 
by donors. I conclude with an assessment of the quality of security sector governance in Burundi 




Burundi is a small, land-locked country in central Africa, bordered by Rwanda and the 
DRC. Like its neighbor, Burundi’s history has been strongly shaped by an enduring power 
struggle between its two main ethnic groups – the Tutsis, who comprise 13-14% of the 
population and have been historically favored by colonial leaders, and the Hutus, who comprise 
around 85%. Since its independence from Belgium in 1962, Burundi has been locked in a series 
of political-military crises as its two main ethnic groups–the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi—
have vied for power. After an attempted coup by a group of Hutu officers, the Tutsi military 




the government and beginning a period of 
military rule in 1966. While the Tutsi had 
enjoyed greater access to resources and 
opportunities under colonialism, this move 
entrenched Tutsi leadership in the government 
and military as an independent state. This group 
of elites moved to further concentrate their 
power, restricting positions of power to those 
Tutsis from the southern province of Bururi. In 
1972, Hutus launched a major insurrection 
against the ruling Tutsi elite, leading to the 
death of 2,000-3,000 Tutsis. In response to 
these attacks, the government responded with 
mass executions of all Hutus who appeared 
threatening to its interests. Between 100,000-
200,000 Hutus are estimated to have died.285  
After another conflict in 1988, President Major Pierre Buyoya faced strong international 
pressure to liberalize. Under his leadership, the government put forth a national unity charter in 
1991, a new constitution in 1992, and prepared for elections in 1993. Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, 
created a new political party called the Front for Democracy in Burundi (Front pour la 
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démocratie au Burundi, FRODEBU) and placed security sector reform at the top of his agenda. 
Ndadaye and FRODEBU handily defeated Buyoya and won a large majority in the national 
assembly as well. Three months into his term, Ndadaye was killed by a group of Tutsi soldiers 
attempting a coup d’état. Although they failed to remove the FRODEBU regime, this attempt 
created a power vacuum in the government that was manipulated by Tutsi politicians looking to 
reaffirm their power. In the weeks that followed, violence spread across the country as Hutus 
perpetrated reprisal attacks against Tutsis and Tutsi security forces tried to intimidate FRODEBU 
supporters.286 As the Tutsi consolidated power in the government, many of the political leaders of 
FRODEBU left their government positions to begin a new movement, establishing the National 
Council for the Defense of Democracy (Conseil nationale pour la defense de la démocratie, 
CNDD), and its armed wing, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (Forces pour la defense 
de la démocratie, FDD). The CNDD-FDD mobilized against the government, rallying Hutu 
supporters in an insurrection.287  
 
Civil War 
Violence quickly escalated into a civil war, involving over a dozen rebel groups fighting 
for control of the government. While Hutus sought to reform all institutions of government and 
level access to resources, the army and police became a clear target for the rebellion: “The 
phrase armée mono-ethnique reflected the sense among those sympathizing with the rebellion 
that for decades, the army and police were mainly instruments of southern Tutsi domination.”288 
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The security sector was a key instrument of power, a conviction reinforced by the assassination 
of the first democratically elected president.289  
After years of fighting failed to produce a decisive military victory, the government of 
Burundi agreed to enter peace negotiations. Due to the number of armed groups, talks were long 
and indecisive – although negotiations began in March 1996, the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement was not signed until August 2000. Even this agreement was not final. 
To reach an agreement, the parties involved had chosen to exclude the two major armed rebel 
groups—the CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL—from the negotiations, working only 
with their more moderate political counterparts. Bringing them into the peace framework 
required separate sets of negotiations with the rebel groups, who protested that the Arusha 
Accords did not adequately address their biggest source of concern, which was army reform. 
Over the next two years, the governments of Gabon and Tanzania pursued talks with the various 
rebel groups, unable to bring the rebels to participate in a unified discussion.  
Finally, on November 16, 2003, the Transitional Government of Burundi and CNDD-
CDD signed and ratified the Global Ceasefire Agreement, bringing the CNDD-FDD under a 
modified version of the Arusha Accords and recognizing the Praetoria Protocols on defense and 
security power-sharing signed earlier in the year, as well as the Forces Technical Agreement 
(FTA), signed on November 2, 2003, which outlined power-sharing in the military. To help 
support the ceasefire and DDR, the African Union and the United Nations authorized 
peacekeeping missions: the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and the United Nations 
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Operation in Burundi (UNOB), respectively.290 This agreement created peace among the 
majority of the parties, with the important exception of the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu 
People (Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu - Forces nationales de liberation, 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL), which would remain a spoiler and source of insecurity for several years to 
come. 
 
Reconstruction Begins, Fighting Continues 
SSR began in earnest once the transitional government and CNDD-FDD had ceased 
hostilities. In accordance with the Arusha Accords and the FTA, the government replaced the 
Tutsi-dominated army with a new organization called the National Defense Forces (Forces de 
Défense National, FDN). A number of institutions were created to facilitate DDR and SSR, 
including the Implementation Monitoring Committee, established to monitor and coordinate the 
implementation of all of the Agreement’s conditions; the Joint Ceasefire Commission, 
established to monitor compliance with the ceasefire and oversee the reform of the army; the 
Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), a mechanism for donors 
to support DDR through financial and technical assistance; and the National Commission on 
Demobilisation, Reinsertion, and Reintegration (NCDRR), the Burundian national institution to 
manage the demobilization and socio-economic reintegration of former troops.  
At the same time, the country moved towards it first elections since the conflict broke 
out, intensifying tensions between the Tutsi government and its Hutu challengers. In June 2005, 
 






the transitional government of Burundi held its first democratic elections since 1993. Like the 
elections of 1993, the presidency was won by a Hutu: Pierre Nkurunziza of the CNDD-FDD. 
The elections were significant for a number of reasons. They represented an end to the 
transitional government established by the Arusha Accords and a beginning to Burundi’s 
transition to being a “post-conflict” state. They also caused a realignment of party politics, 
effectively shifting the dominant cleavage from Hutu-Tutsi, to inter-Hutu, as the CNDD-FDD 
and FRODEBU fought for the majority Hutu vote.291  
However, peace and security did not come with the assumption of office by Nkurunziza 
and the CNDD-FDD. In Bujumbura in 2006, the announcement of a coup plot by former 
government officials kicked off a wave of arrests and a crackdown on civil society. Once 
arrested, the suspects were subject to torture by the National Intelligence Service (Service 
National des Renseignements, SNR) and held in detention.292 In addition, fighting resumed in the 
provinces, as the PALIPEHUTU-FNL continued to wage attacks against the unified government 
forces. Unlike the CNDD-FDD, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL believed that a negotiated settlement 
with the Tutsi required sacrificing too much. Rather than settle for ethnic parity in government 
institutions, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL wanted proportional representation for the ethnic groups 
and believed they could achieve an eventual military victory to secure this. 
Continued fighting may have helped to facilitate a degree of cohesion among the newly 
integrated troops: as long as the war continued, soldiers could focus their efforts against a 
common enemy and distract themselves from the fact that they had recently been fighting against 
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each other. The gains to cohesion notwithstanding, beginning SSR during a conflict may have 
forced sacrifices in the depth of reforms. Focused on defeating the last rebel group, the 
government focused all of its attention on improving the capacity of its security forces. Donors, 
as well, did not push for governance reforms that could come at the expense of operational 
success. Even the Netherlands, Burundi’s primary SSR partner, provided mostly training and 
equipment during this phase. 
As fighting continued, new rounds of negotiations occurred, as the government tried to 
incorporate the PALIPEHUTU-FNL while maintaining the integrity of the Arusha Accords. A 
ceasefire was reached in 2006, but it would take three more years for the fighting to stop. In 
2009, in compliance with government demands, the leadership of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL 
removed the ethnic component of the group’s name and registered as an official political party. 
Disarmament of FNL combatants began in March 2009, and in April, FNL leadership reached an 
agreement with the government that 3,500 FNL elements would be integrated into the FDN.293  
 
Burundi’s Slide Towards Authoritarianism 
In 2010, Burundi held its first post-war elections. Democratic elections were to be held at 
all levels of government: communal, legislative, and presidential. Challenging the victory won 
by the incumbent CNDD-FDD in the communal elections, a group of twelve opposition parties 
came together to form an opposition coalition, including the FNL. Protesting the vote and the 
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international community’s recognition of its results, the new group boycotted the national 
elections, leaving President Nkurunziza to run unopposed and the CNDD-FDD to win a 
sweeping majority in the legislature. Despite the high politicization of the elections, the 
international community ruled them to be sufficiently democratic and, in August 2010, Pierre 
Nkurunziza began his second term as president with the full support of the legislature and a 
highly politicized judiciary.294 Progress towards democratization began to stall during this second 
term: within short order, without a real check on his power, Nkurunziza began to manipulate the 
still fragile institutions of the state, utilizing a fragmented donor presence to maximize 
operational assistance and avoid conditionalities. With institutuional assistance strongly focused 
on the military, Nkurunziza focused on the police and intelligence service to repress opposition 
and protect his regime. 
On September 7, 2014, the president of the CNDD-FDD first announced that President 
Nkurunziza was eligible to run in the 2015 elections: because of the special provisions of the 
Arusha Agreement guiding the 2005 elections, the 2010 presidential elections were the first 
instance of a direct popular vote; thus, Nkurunziza had only run for president once, leaving him 
constitutionally eligible for a second run. Unsurprisingly, this announcement was vigorously 
contested by all opposition parties.295 When this announcement broke, protests broke out across 
the country. The police were ordered to repress these protests, and violence was met with 
 
294 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Operation in Burundi,” Addendum (New York: United Nations, August 14, 2006), 2–4, 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Burundi%20S%202006%20429%20Add1.pdf. 
295 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in 






violence. Official estimates by the PNB report a death toll of 374 civilians and 77 police officers, 




Despite continued fighting, donors began providing institutional assistance upon the 
establishment of the transitional government. Aid came largely from four bilateral donors: 
Belgium, the Netherlands, France and the UK (Figure 5.2). Together with the UN, these donors 
pledged to coordinate support to maximize security governance reforms without duplicating 
efforts. In 2004, they came together with the transitional government of Burundi to put together a 
draft framework for SSR. With fighting ongoing and an unclear future for the transitional 
government, regime vulnerability was high. However, this never came to pass – as fighting 
continued between the CNDD-FDD and government, donors and the government shifted their 
focus from SSR to crisis-management. Despite a desire by Burundi’s main international partners 
to create a plan for deep security sector reforms, the government continued to postpone talks.297  
After winning the 2005 election, the regime of President Nkurunziza has achieved a 
much greater degree of stability. He began to initiate moves to consolidate power. First on his 
agenda was to reduce the power of international actors in dictating internal security reforms. 
Upon taking office, Nkurunziza pressured UNOB to reduce its presence and scale back its 
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activities. Although the DDR and SSR wings remained intact, the ability of the UNOB’s 
replacement—the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB)—to coordinate sector-
wide reforms was limited. Meanwhile, institutional differences between bilateral donors limited 
the interoperability of the different missions in Burundi, compromising their ability to coordinate 
and develop a framework for reform. In 2007, the Government informed BINUB that it no 
longer wanted to develop an overarching strategy for reforming the security sector, preferring to 
pursue “parallel reforms” in the security institutions.298  
Despite this victory, Nkurunziza’s rule was not yet established. Following the power-
sharing agreements of the Arusha Accords, Nkurunziza led a multi-party government, where 
power was shared between the Hutus and the Tutsis. Retaining power thus required maintaining 
the support of the Tutsis and managing the delicate balance between Hutu and Tutsi in the newly 
combined military. 
The electoral victory of the CNDD-FDD and Nkurunziza closed the window of 
opportunity for sector-wide reform in Burundi. As fighting continued, Nkurunziza was able to 
use the war as a justification for heightened military spending and a prioritization of operational 
effectiveness over governance. The end of fighting, however, provided a new, smaller 
opportunity for change, at least within the military.  
Entering a period of peace, the Burundian government no longer had a valid reason to 
maintain the large army it had mobilized to fight the remaining rebels, nor the resources to 
maintain it. To accommodate the FNL and still downsize the force to a manageable size, the 
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government would have to demobilize an additional 7,000 soldiers, most of which would be 
Tutsi. This created a combustible political-military situation between the CNDD-FDD and 
supporters of the government it had replaced. The return of soldiers thus threatened the balance 
of power within the military and put significant pressures on Nkurunziza. It was in this context 
of heightened regime vulnerability that the Netherlands secured an agreement with Nkurunziza 
to integrate and reform the military. 
Comprehensive military reform would begin in 2009; before that happened, the 
Burundian government found a different way to address the political crisis: by sending troops to 
participate in the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the government could justify its 
oversized military to donors and unlock the funds required to maintain it.299 One Western 
diplomat described peacekeeping missions as “a release valve”: “They have a bloated military 




Upon the reduction of the UN’s presence in Burundi, the Netherlands stepped up as 
Burundi’s main international partner. In 2008, the government of the Netherlands worked with 
the Burundian government to establish a Memorandum of Understanding to establish an eight-
year commitment between the governments for a more comprehensive security sector reform 
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program, with governance at its core. The Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector Development 
(SSD) program, officially established in April 2009, was built on three pillars: (1) external 
security, with the Ministry of Defence and the National Defence Force at its center; (2) internal 
security, focusing on the Ministry of Public Security and the Burundi National Police (PNB); and 
(3) governance.301 The Dutch placed a high priority on local ownership. While Dutch officials 
were deeply involved in the strategic design and implementation of the SSD; the majority of staff 
were Burundian.302  
The crafters of the Dutch Security Sector Development (SSD) program chose its specific 
design out of a recognition both of the importance of improving governance to create lasting 
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changes and of the failure of most modern SSR programs to do so.303 This commitment is spelled 
out in the Memorandum of Understanding deliberated between the two parties. This agreement 
outlines the strategic objectives of the program as follows: 
• “Affirmation of the principles of partnership through political dialogue 
• Accountability of the security services to civil authorities 
• Adherence of the security services to civil authorities 
• Adherence of the security services to national and international law 
• Adherence of the security services to the general principles of public expenditure 
• Impartiality on the part of the security services 
• Professionalism of the security services”304  
Unlike other security and development programs, the Dutch focused on a process-
oriented approach to achieving and measuring results. To make this program work, the SSD 
would unfold in four two-year stages, designed to build trust between the Dutch and their 
Burundian counterparts and build the capacity of Burundian officials allowing them to gradually 
assume control of the program.305 The peaks in security governance aid disbursements 
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(represented in Figure 5.2) correspond to the beginning of each phase of the SSD program, when 
funding was disbursed.  
 
Operational Assistance 
While the SSD program was being implemented, the Burundian government began 
receiving operational assistance from other sources. The US emerged as Burundi’s second-
largest partner, providing large inflows of operational assistance beginning in 2011.306 The vast 
majority of this aid was authorized under the Department of Defense’s Train and Equip 
Authority. Through the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) 
program, the US provided basic training to the Burundian military to help prepare it for 
participation in peacekeeping missions. Although the program was intended only for 
peacekeepers, the US agreed to extend this training out to the entire military.307 This training is 
intended primarily to build capacity, focusing on improving skills at all ranks. Between 2009 and 
2015, the U.S. provided over $241 million in non-governance assistance through the ACOTA 
program alone.308 In 2014, the US signed a Status of Forces Agreement with the Government of 
Burundi and pledged $9.5 million in training and assistance to help prepare Burundi to 
participate in the fight against terrorism.309 This new assistance would include specialized 
training in combat operations, communications, and logistics.  
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Burundi’s second greatest source of operational assistance has come from donor 
financing for participation in AU and UN peacekeeping missions. In addition to providing 
funding for soldiers’ salaries, donors have provided the government with equipment, 
ammunition, and logistics.310 Beginning with its first deployment of troops to the AMISOM 
mission in Somalia in 2007, Burundi has maintained a contingent of around 5,000 troops abroad 
(Figure 5.3). Since deployments first began in 2007, the government has deducted $200 from 
each soldier’s monthly pay. With an average of 5,000 troops deployed, these payments have 
generated an estimated $13 million annually for the Burundian government that accrues to 
extrabudgetary accounts.311 This money is in addition to the tens of millions saved annually by 
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the government in salaries and equipment. 
Burundi has also received operational assistance from China. While the conflict 
continued, China supplied light arms and weapons to the government. These arms have gone to 
support the police and SNR but have also filtered to non-state groups like the Imbonerakure.312 
Once conflict officially ended, China began providing larger assistance packages, with the 
majority of assistance provided in support of the FDN. This assistance has been part of a broader 
initiative by China to improve its bilateral relations with the government of Burundi.313 Although 
official data are not available, published donations appear to be a relatively small fraction of 
overall Chinese assistance to Burundi. Between 2010 and 2012, reported operational assistance 
flows totaled around $3 million.314 Most of this aid has been provided through materiel, including 
uniforms, parachutes, and logistical equipment. Total security assistance is likely to be higher 
than these reports suggest; still, these numbers pale in comparison to the security non-
governance aid provided by the United States. The greatest value of Chinese military aid may not 
have been felt until after the 2015 crisis broke out. While nearly all Western states suspended 
development and military aid flows to Burundi when violence escalated, China has continued to 
provide materiel and funding to the Burundian government.315 
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Although secure in his electoral victory, the return of FNL troops in 2007 changed the 
political balance of power in Bujumbura and introduced a new degree of regime vulnerability.316 
This vulnerability increased the likelihood that security assistance would have an effect on 
security sector governance. If my theory is correct, we should see the greatest improvements in 
the sectors that received the highest amount of institutional assistance, i.e. the army. However, 
because institutional assistance was targeted at the military and Burundi began receiving high 
amounts of operational assistance at the same time, we should see a deterioration of governance 
outside of the army.  
 
Consolidating Power, Constraining Reform 
SSR began shortly after the signing of the Arusha Accords, in early 2004, even though 
conflict was ongoing. At the time the SSD began, the Burundian security system faced both 
contextual and institutional impediments to reform. Regional unrest and low-level domestic 
insecurity made it difficult to convince communities and ex-combatants to surrender their 
weapons and commit to DDR. In addition, major issues remained with state institutions: the 
Burundian National Police (Police Nationale du Burundi, PNB) remained highly unprofessional, 
access to justice was limited, and the intelligence services were highly politicized.317 As Burundi 
lacked a comprehensive strategy for security sector reform for the first several years of 
reconstruction, early interventions did not correspond to a cohesive framework for reform. 
Although the introduction of the SSD added some structure to reforms, the majority of assistance 
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has continued to be provided in an ad hoc manner following bilateral negotiations between 
donors and the Burundian government.318  
Without an overarching framework guiding sectoral reforms, donor efforts in Burundi 
concentrated on reforming specific elements of the security sector. While limited, Burundian 
efforts to initiate structural reforms, such as creating a National Security Council and designing 
new legislation to guide security institutions, received support from donors. When the Burundian 
government created the National Security Council (Conseil National de Sécurité, CNS) in 2008, 
it received technical assistance from BINUB. This assistance was continued by BNUB when the 
CNS set out craft its first National Security Strategy in 2012.319 Through the SSD, the Dutch 
provided assistance and expertise to Burundi as it crafted its first defense review in 2010.320 
Although there has been some cooperation between donors, the majority of this assistance has 
been implemented unilaterally. The majority of donor reforms have focused on four programs: 
(1) disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating the combatants not integrated into the new 
institutions, (2) integrating and professionalizing the FDN, (3) reforming and equipping the 
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Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration 
The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of troops in Burundi was to occur in 
two stages. The first stage of DDR would consist of the voluntary disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration of combatants not integrating into the FDN or PNB. The second stage would 
occur over the next two to four years, as the government gradually reduced the size of the 
security forces to bring them to a sustainable size. During this process, all soldiers—including 
those integrating into the new security forces—were cantoned to both help keep tabs on 
combatants and to reduce social tensions and prepare former fighters for the transition into 
civilian life. For those who chose to demobilize, donors offered an immediate reinsertion 
package and subsequent payments for the next ten months to help support living expenses. By 
2006, 19,739 former combatants had been demobilized.321 
Institutional Assistance 
Several donors came together to support DDR in Burundi, funneling support through the 
Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme ran by the World Bank. In 
coordination with the United Nations and South African leadership, donors created an 
operational plan for disarmament and demobilization and established the Joint Verification and 
Monitoring Mechanism to ensure compliance.322 In addition, the World Bank authorized funding 
to support the demobilization of civilian militia members. This process began in late 2005 after a 
series of issues in the planning process. The biggest issue was identifying and verifying the 
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identity of militants; without a unified structure, it was difficult to ensure that those registering 
for demobilization benefits were, in fact, fighters. Several lists of militia members had been 
produced, with estimates ranging from 11,700 to more than 35,000 fighters. The NCDDR 
eventually settled on a list of 24,272 militia fighters.323 
When the conflict with the FNL ended in 2009, the government was faced with the need 
to demobilize an additional 6,500 FNL combatants and dissidents. To support the new wave of 
DDR, the African Union and BINUB came together with the government of Burundi to establish 
a Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism to both monitor the ceasefire and oversee 
disarmament and verification. The NCDDR would handle demobilization and reintegration, 
supported by funds from the UNDP and other donors to subsidize reintegration packages.324 
Donors also funded a series of programs aimed to facilitate community reconstruction and 
reconciliation.325 The actual program of DDR utilized the same processes installed for the first 
wave of demobilization.326  
Outcomes 
DDR in Burundi is generally considered a success. Among the reasons for its success, 
analysts note that the close collaboration of donors among themselves and with the 
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government.327 By the end of the second wave of DDR, a total of 55,000 combatants had been 
demobilized by the World Bank-funded NCDDR, including former government soldiers, rebels, 
and militia members.328 Despite this progress, DDR has failed to engage the Imbonerakure, a 
militia that emerged in 2010 from CNDD-FDD fighters—primarily youths—who were 
unsatisfied with the peace process. This group, whose name means “those who see far”, has since 
aligned with the government operating as a non-state arm of the regime. By some reports, the 
group comprises over 50,000 members across the country.329 Seymour (2015) argues that a major 
factor in the group’s emergence was a failure by the DDR team to properly socialize and 
reintegrate youth soldiers.330 The Imbonerakure has become known for its participation in illicit 
activities throughout the country and its excessive force when dealing with the population. 
In addition, DDR did not address the proliferation of small arms among the civilian 
population, much of which keeps weapons due to continued fears of insecurity. In 2011, an 
estimated 100,000 small arms remained in circulation around the country, despite the DDR 
program and a civilian disarmament campaign.331 In 2013, BNUB supported a second civilian 
disarmament campaign; however, given the considerable security concerns that remained across 
the country, its success was limited.332 In addition, civilians continued to acquire new weapons. 
One Burundian security expert argued that the prevalence of weapons in civilian homes is a 
signal of deep fears among the population of a recurrence of conflict: the cost of an AK-47, the 
 
327 Boshoff, Vrey, and Rautenbach, The Burundi Peace Process: From Civil War to Conditional Peace, 86–87. 
328 Claudia Seymour, “Unprotected: Young People in Post-Conflict Burundi,” Small Arms Survey, 2015, 252. 
329 “Who Are the Imbonerakure and Is Burundi Unraveling?,” The New Humanitarian, April 28, 2015, 
http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2015/04/28/who-are-imbonerakure-and-burundi-unravelling. 
330 Although the program had a special unit for child soldiers, it only included people under the age of 18; 
considering the 13-year duration of the war, this excluded many who spent their childhood fighting. See Seymour, 
“Unprotected: Young People in Post-Conflict Burundi,” 253. 
331 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in 
Burundi,” January 20, 2014, 21. 




weapon of choice for many, is the equivalent of about six months’ salary, yet people continue to 
purchase them.333  
 
Military Integration 
Military reform was one of the major drivers of conflict and, thus, a major focus of the peace 
agreement. Together, the Arusha Accords and the Forces Technical Agreement laid out the 
guidelines for integration and reform. Unlike the failed Ouagadougou Agreement in Côte 
d’Ivoire, the FTA provided very specific guidance for force integration and DDR. Rather than 
integrate into the existing army, the FTA established a new institution entirely. The FTA stressed 
the importance of civilian control, with the President as the Commander-in-Chief. The FDN was 
to be a non-partisan body, comprised of no more than 50% of any particular ethnic group.334 This 
ethnic balance was carried up to the highest levels of the officers corps. To facilitate integration, 
the Arusha Accords created the Integrated Chief of Staff, comprised of 60% former FAB and 
40% former rebel group officers. When military integration first began in 2004, these officers 
took the lead, navigating issues like rank harmonization and immediate training for forces. Their 
coordination was a major factor in the eventual success of integration  
Throughout the conflict, nearly all parties had used promotions as a reward for troops, 
creating significant issues of rank inflation and differences in skill across the board. To solve this 
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problem, the Integrated Chief of Staff devised a system using group size to determine the number 
of allocated spots each group received per rank. The Integrated Chiefs of Staff used a similar 
formula to determine quotas for integration for each use, accounting for both the number of 
combatants and the number of weapons the party possessed.335 Nindorera (2007) credits the 
power-sharing requirements for military high command in the Arusha Accords with the early 
success of integration. Ensuring the continued access to power of both Hutu and Tutsi gave the 
leadership incentives to support the Accords and push their subordinates to follow their lead. 
This initiated a positive feedback cycle: once integrated, it became more and more difficult for 
the leadership to defect on the agreement and risk jeopardizing a democratic process supported 
by both the domestic population and the international community.336  
The new army was composed of mixed units – a structure that offered the best hopes for 
long-term cohesion, but created a combustible situation during the process of integration. 
Tensions were high in the early days of integration. Former CNDD fighters didn’t trust the Tutsi 
officers of the old regime. Ex-FAB soldiers were wary of the newly incorporated CNDD fighters 
who lacked the formal training they had received.337 Worse, until the FAB and CNDD-FDD 
signed the Global Ceasefire Agreement in 2006, conflict between the groups outside of the FDN 
continued. Although integration is widely viewed to be a success today, there were several 
moments when the process came close to unraveling. Many of these disputes can be traced to the 
tight budget constraints faced by the Ministry of Defence, such as a series of mutinies by soldiers 
in February 2009 demanding higher payments.338  
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The first professionalization efforts began immediately after the Joint Comprehensive 
Ceasefire was reached between the CNDD-FDD and FAB in 2006. Through the Peacebuilding 
Fund, the UN organized a professionalization program aimed at improving leadership and 
discipline within the FDN. Specifically, this project sought to “promote discipline, respect for 
human rights, and political neutrality through the reinforcement of knowledge in military 
leadership and international human rights,” measured by the number of violations committed 
against the population.339 This project, while focused primarily on training military leadership, 
was also intended to reach lower-ranked officers and enlisted soldiers. The UN would “train the 
trainers” who could propagate lessons on human rights and international law; it would then 
proceed to the “moral improvement” part of the project, intended to elevate troop behavior by 
training soldiers on proper behavior. In addition to instructing officers would could reproduce 
trainings, this project aimed to support long-term professionalism by creating codes of conduct, 
tailored to every level in the army and translated to Kirundi, the language of most Burundians.340  
In addition to trainings, the UN worked to bring soldiers together by organizing large 
group activities: obstacle courses, bike races, and walks. To improve civilian perceptions of the 
military, these activities were opened up to the local communities in which the soldiers were 
stationed.341 When the Dutch began operating the SSD program with the FDN, they continued 
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this focus on improving community relations. One of the major programs they initiated to do this 
was a series of “open door” days, where the citizens could come and speak with members of the 
military about their questions or concerns. This was one of the only initiatives taken across the 
security sector to improve the confidence and capability of the public to interact with security 
providers.342  
The Netherlands’ SSD program began in 2009, initiating a series of reforms in the 
military, primarily. As stated above, the Dutch program was laid out in four two-year programs, 
each one building on the next. At the beginning, the Dutch built trust with the government and 
the bodies it worked with by adopting a two-track strategy: providing training and equipment to 
fill the material needs of the security forces while also promoting reforms.343 However, the focus 
on governance was not strongly incorporated into the program until the second phase; rather, 
practitioners focused more on building capacity and performance than addressing procedure.  
Operational Assistance 
Despite the volatile security situation at the beginning of integration, many joint trainings 
were held. Training was made a priority by the government and donors with the hope that joint 
sessions could help even out the varied background of the different troops as well as reinforce 
unit cohesion. Reaching a standard level of knowledge would also help the government address 
the issue of rank harmonization that hindered the integration process. Remarkably, there were no 
reported incidents of violence between former FAB and FDD troops during the process of 
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integration.344 Burundi did not begin to receive major flows of operational assistance until the 
comprehensive ceasefire agreement was reached in 2009. Once that agreement was reached, the 
U.S. began limited materiel assistance; in 2011, the U.S. seriously increased its investment in the 
country by providing over $15 million to “train and equip” the Burundian military.345 Since this 
partnership began, the U.S. has become the country’s most significant provider of non-
governance military assistance. The majority of the pre-deployment training Burundian soldiers 
receive comes through the U.S. as part of its African Contingency Operations Training and 
Assistance (ACOTA) program.346  
U.S. capacity building with the FDN began as early as 2007 when the Burundian 
government first requested peacekeeping training assistance. This training has largely focused on 
increasing the FDN’s ability to lead themselves in complex operations. When cooperation first 
began in 2007, the focus was on basic capacity building. Cooperation started small. The U.S. 
sent retired military trainers to the country through the ACOTA program to assist with basic 
infantry training. As cooperation has grown, activities have evolved to include air and ground 
operations. Beginning in 2011, the FDN began receiving assistance through the U.S. Air Force in 
Africa Deployment Assistance Partnership Training – Air and Ground programs, with a focus on 
deploying personnel and equipment via aircraft.347 The army has also provided training for 
support operations, such as surgical training for FDN medical staff. The scope of assistance has 
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grown from a handful of advisors to military-to-military training, in which teams of American 
soldiers have deployed to Burundi to work directly with the FDN.348  
Because of its growing capacity and geographical proximity to al-Shabaab, Burundi 
became an attractive partner in the United States’ Global War on Terror. Burundi also received 
support from other Western partners as well to support counterterror activities, although this 
assistance was marginal in comparison with U.S. security assistance. France provided support 
through equipment donations and by training contingents of officers at their Operational 
Instruction Detachments (Détachement d’Instruction Opérationnel) located in Gabon.349 In early 
2015, France began sending instructional elements to Burundi to lead tactical trainings as well. 
This was meant to be the beginning of a series of trainings to improve the tactical and 
operational capabilities of the FDN to improve their ability to respond with graduated force and 
instruct units on operations in close combat.350 The UK has participated in several training 
missions with the U.S. Army, leading a course on civil affairs to improve the ability of the FDN 
to interact with the civilian population and gain intelligence in Somalia.351  
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In many ways, Burundian military integration was a success. In short order, troops from 
hostile units were integrated into one national army and deployed to fight a common enemy. 
Despite differences in training, a recent history of conflict, and deep ethnic and regional tensions, 
this integration occurred without a single incident of violence. Donors played a significant role in 
this success. Through the SSD program, the military received numerous trainings on ethics and 
human rights. These trainings were part of a structured program with mechanisms to monitor and 
evaluate implementation. Importantly, these trainings appear to have led to significant 
improvements in behavior: national data show a notable decrease in rapes and physical integrity 
violations by members of the military between 2004 and 2011.352  
The Burundian army quickly gained an international reputation for professionalism in its 
behavior during peacekeeping operations. Burundian authorities have linked this directly to the 
ethics trainings provided by the SSD program.353 In addition, the “open door” activities designed 
by the MDNAC groups to improve the accessibility of the military to the population led to a 
visible improvement in relations between the military and the population, evidenced by a 
reduction in reported infractions. Importantly, DSS program evaluators commented on an 
appropriation by the military command of the “open door” policy and the focus on ethnics more 
broadly. According to their report, the high command had envisioned the creation of a center of 
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excellence in governance, leadership, and ethics; already, commanders had begun to integrate 
ethics trainings and other DSS activities into training their units.354 
Participation in international peacekeeping missions brings significant financial benefits, 
making it highly coveted by soldiers and officers alike. Soldiers can earn the equivalent of their 
annual salary in just one month of peacekeeping: the typical salary for a private in the FDN is 
just $80 per month; up though 2015, AMISOM soldiers earned $1,032 monthly.355 One Tutsi 
major argued that the AMISOM funding had been crucial for maintaining order and 
subordination within the army – by providing soldiers with the opportunity to gain this extra 
income, the government has been able to quell demands for greater compensation.356 Without 
this, the government would risk the damaging the threads tying the organization together.  
Despite the positive benefits to the lives of soldiers and their families, the access to this 
operational assistance has had negative effects on accountability and transparency within the 
army. The negative effects outside of the army have been larger. The value of participation in 
peacekeeping missions has made it a valuable tool for maintaining patronage networks. 
Observers note that while most soldiers have had an opportunity to tour once with AMISOM or 
other missions, soldiers who fought for the CNDD-FDD during the war are often privileged over 
former government troops for these lucrative postings. The politicization of selection for training 
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and eventual participation in peacekeeping missions has contributed to a politicization of the 
ranks within the army, undermining the fragile unity gained during integration.357 
Civil society groups have reported questionable purchases made using the government 
revenues from peacekeeping funds. For example, in 2014, the spokesperson for the Burundian 
government announced that the government was withdrawing 8.5 million dollars from this 
account to replace the presidential jet. After an investigation into the purchase, a watchdog group 
reported that the new plane had been gifted to the government in exchange for a lucrative mining 
contract. The true use of the $8.5 million is still unknown. OLUCOME attributes this corruption 
to the nature of the funds: by withholding a fraction of donors’ payments, the government has 
essentially created an extra-budgetary account outside of auditory control.358 This money has 
been an important source of income for the government.  
Although military integration and reform occurred successfully, the process failed to 
produce cohesion. While the groups interacted during training and daily tasks, they did not 
socialize, using separate dining facilities and frequenting different bars. The International Crisis 
Group reported that the CNDD-FDD created an unofficial chain of command within the military 
in an effort to institute some level of control over an otherwise independent system: “This 
situation led to a lack of transparency in management of grades and even to denials of access to 
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training. In addition, it subjected the army to a hierarchy that was unofficial, partisan but known 
to all.”359  
At the highest levels of command, the government has respected the structure of the 
Arusha Accord. However, while the president has appointed the appropriate number of Tutsis, 
their appointments are contingent upon their loyalty to the regime. What from the outside may 
look like a balanced and reformed administration is really a more diversified system of 
clientelism. By incorporating Tutsi officers into its network, the government has been able to 
simultaneously give the appearance of respecting the Arusha Accord while ensuring partisan 
control over the army. To protect this control, the government has relied upon a divided 
command of operations and logistics; although former army commanders have held positions as 
high as the Minister of Defence and Chief of Staff of the Armed forces, their ability to organize 




In late December 2004, the government overhauled the police system and passed 
legislation establishing the Burundian National Police (PNB). This new system represented a 
complete restructuring of the police system from before the war, placing the police under the 
purview of the Ministry of Public Security. In accordance with the Arusha Agreement, the new 
police forces drew its officers from the former army and the seven ex-rebel groups party to the 
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negotiations.361 Most importantly, the new police force was given a new mandate: the PNB 
would be a police de proximité, focusing on needs at the community level to better protect 
citizens. Within months, the new police force accepted thousands of former combatants into its 
ranks: between 2000 and 2007, the Burundian police grew from 2,300 to between 15,000 - 
20,000.362  
The overwhelming military composition of the new police force led observers to register 
concerns about the professionalism of the new force and its ability to function as a purely civilian 
force. With no training in civilian policing, the former combatants operating in the force quickly 
showed a tendency to respond to minor issues with excessive force. Although the Arusha 
Accords and the FTA called for universal basic training, the PNB had to be deployed quickly 
across the country to provide security for the upcoming 2005 elections. Faced with these 
logistical and operational challenges, the governance reforms mandated by the new legislation 
were largely pushed to the side. The reforms that were made were largely surface-level 
changes.363 The variation in professionalism among the groups as well as the distrust between 
their members created challenges at all levels of the PNB, putting a strain on command and 
management, training, and discipline.364 These concerns led a variety of donors to get involved 
in the training and development of the new force. 
 
 
361 Like the FDN, the police were to be integrated according to ethnic quotas, with no affiliations to political parties 
or groups. See “FTA,” 10–11. 
362 “‘Every Morning They Beat Me’: Police Abuses in Burundi” (New York: Human Rights Watch, April 2008), 19, 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burundi0408_1.pdf. 
363 Boshoff, Vrey, and Rautenbach, The Burundi Peace Process: From Civil War to Conditional Peace, 98–99. 
364 Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), “Burundi,” Security Sector Reform Monitor, no. 1 





Police reform under the DSS was primarily led by the German development agency, GIZ. 
While this program placed a nominal focus on governance of the police reform, the program was 
much less governance-focused than the military dimension of the program. German assistance 
focused primarily on rebuilding the infrastructure and equipment stores of the Burundian police. 
Germany also devoted some of its funding to “train the trainers” in the police force, focusing on 
issues like management and organization and human rights.365  
Other European donors focused the majority of their attention on police 
professionalization in Burundi. Most of their efforts were complimentary. France supported the 
Institut supérieur de police, which trained officers; Belgium devoted its assistance to supporting 
local police forces; and the Netherlands focused on reforming the organization of the police force 
and training officers in election security and management.  
Operational Assistance 
The German program consisted predominantly of technical training, physical 
infrastructure development, and some efforts at professionalization of forces.366 Other donors, 
such as France and Belgium, similarly focused their attention on improving police capacity, 
while acknowledging the importance of improving police behavior to improve ties with the 
 
365 Société d’Etudes et d’Evaluation sarl, “Evaluation Conjointe de La Coopération de l’Allemagne, de La Belgique, 
de La Commission Européenne, de La France, Des Pays-Bas, Du Royaume-Uni et de La Suède Avec Le Burundi,” 
45–46. 
366 International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), “Évaluation de La Phase II Du Programme de 
Développement Du Secteur de La Sécurité Au Burundi” (The Hague: International Security Sector Advisory Team: 





community.367 Donors also focused on improving performance through training in investigative 
and reporting techniques as well as some basic education to reduce illiteracy among the force. 
Beyond general capacity, this assistance was intended to improve the accessibility of the police 
to local populations and re-orient the PNB to local needs. In addition, the DSS provided some 
trainings on the use of force, respect of human rights, violence against women, and corruption. 
However, unlike the military, these trainings appeared to have little effect on the behavior of 
police officers, who, external reports confirmed, continued to use excessive force and participate 
in corrupt activities.368 
These trainings had a limited effect on police professionalism for several reasons. First, 
unlike the human rights and ethics trainings included as part of the SSD program for the military, 
trainings for the police have not been built into a coordinated and cohesive program. Rather, they 
have been provided in an ad hoc nature by the various donors involved in police reform. Third, 
the value of training was diluted by the lack of coordination between donors. Although all donors 
shared broadly similar goals and messaging, different prioritization of issues compromised the 
cohesion of the training provided.369  
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These trainings were also insufficient in both the depth and in the number of officers it 
has reached. Most training seminars were short: governance training provided by the DSS 
consisted of one-week training sessions.370 When surveyed, 96.6% of officers who had 
participated in training seminars responded that they valued the information they gained, but 
thought it was insufficient. Significantly, many of these officers complained that they were 
unable to implement changes in their unit because their superior officers were involved in illegal 
activities or did not support changes to the unit.371  
Outcomes 
Major issues remained in the police force several years after the conflict ended. Unlike 
the FDN, the ethnic balance provisions of the peace deal regarding the internal security 
institutions were never incorporated into domestic law.372 This left the PNB and the SNR 
accessible to the regime for political appointments and promotions. The government has taken 
advantage of this, making both institutions highly politicized and loyal to the regime.373  
As predicted by my theory, the focus of donor assistance on tactical training and 
infrastructure did little to improve the behavior of the police. The military backgrounds of most 
officers have contributed to a pattern of excessive force in response to minor community 
incidents. The lack of training is further exacerbated by a lack of appropriate equipment. One 
Burundian security expert argued that police officers may obtain new uniforms from the capital 
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but are unlikely to be given the necessary tools to do their jobs. Without access to batons or light 
arms, many officers rely on the assault rifles that are available on the streets.374 Inadequate 
funding for the PNB hurts professionalism a second way: it encourages corruption. Low salaries 
encourage police officers to exact “tolls” from drivers; one report found that traffic cops can 
obtain the equivalent of their monthly salary in one day from bribes.375 The ineffectiveness of the 
PNB encouraged some vigilantism among the population, as citizens were pushed to adopt 
mechanisms of popular justice.376  
The Burundian police has been viewed by many as a partisan force since its 
establishment in 2004. Despite the power-sharing requirements in Arusha and the stated mission 
of impartiality, the government has filled all leadership roles in the BNP with former CNDD-
FDD officers. The high number of former CNDD-FDD troops integrated into the new force has 
contributed to partisanship within the institution. One officer admitted this politicization in an 
interview with Human Rights Watch in 2007, and suggested that his unit was deployed to a 
district “because the government thinks that people are abandoning the party in power, and that 
the people won’t vote for them in 2010… They sent us there to intimidate the population, to win 
back the population by force.”377  
According to a study on security needs in Burundi, the police lacked accountability 
within the force, particularly for high-ranking officers. This issue was exacerbated by a lack of a 
unified command structure and the political context in which these efforts were taking place. The 
persistence of these governance issues also threatened the impact of donor programs. For 
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example, a Belgian study found that lower-ranking police officers found their training 
insufficient because it did not teach them how to address the illegal operations run by their 
superiors.378 Despite these structural issues with the PNB, survey evidence suggests that trainings 
yielded some improvement in police behavior: in 2008, 63.5% of those interviewed believed that 
the behavior of the police had improved over the past year, a direct result of training provided by 
the Belgians.379  
A national survey found that the population generally had much higher trust in the 
military than the police. 12% of those surveyed cited the police as a source of insecurity in the 
country, while only 0.4% cited the army.380 Part of this difference is likely due to contact: due to 
the nature of their different roles, most of the population interacts very little with the army. Still, 
reports of police abuses by international and local watchdog organizations paint a picture of an 
undisciplined, political force, supporting the lack of trust among the population. 
 
Intelligence Reform 
Burundi’s main intelligence service — the National Intelligence Service Service 
(National de Renseignement, SNR) – began operating in 2006 upon the decree of the newly 
elected CNDD-FDD government. Established in March 2006, the SNR replaced the former 
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National Documentation Office (Documentation Nationale de Burundi), known to be a partisan 
tool of the government. The mandate of the new intelligence service was to investigate unlawful 
acts posing a threat to the nation; specifically, its purpose was to research and pursue “all 
information of a political, security, economic, and social nature necessary for the government to 
act to guarantee the security of the state.”381 Very quickly, observers began to doubt the 
impartiality of the new institution. By waiting until after the 2005 elections and exempting the 
new agency from the ethnic quota requirements of Arusha and the FTA, the newly elected Hutu 
government could stack the SNR with party loyalists.382  
The ambiguity of the law is often exploited by SNR agents, who are rarely held to 
account by the prosecutor, leaving the agency a powerful institution to be employed at the 
pleasure of the president.383 The broad mandate of the SNR was specifically identified by the UN 
as a problem to be addressed by SSR: to ensure good governance of the security sector, the 
responsibilities of the intelligence service should be “limited to gathering and analysing 
intelligence in conformity with international standards.”384 
The SNR was implicated in gross human rights abuses in the fight against the 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL. In the campaign to defeat the FNL after the 2006 ceasefire, the 
government increasingly deployed the intelligence agency to investigate and punish suspected 
rebels or civilians associated with the FNL. In 2005 alone, Human Rights Watch reported over 
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38 extrajudicial killings and 13 instances of torture, in addition to the suspected human rights 
abuses perpetrated at the illegal detention facilities operated by the SNR.385  
 
Institutional Assistance 
Many donors held concerns regarding the SNR. However, despite the clear necessity of 
reform in intelligence, the Dutch MoU excluded the intelligence services from its mandate. The 
Dutch made this decision precisely because of the intelligence service’s role in the human rights 
abuses that occurred during the conflict: the government did not want to be affiliated with an 
institution responsible for so many rights violations.386 This left the UN as the major donor in 
support of intelligence reform.  
The UN made reforming and professionalizing the SNR a central component of its SSR 
assistance in the early years of reconstruction. Between 2007 and 2009, the UNDP provided 
$500,000 in assistance with the following goals: (1) clarify the mission of the SNR, (2) reinforce 
the oversight mechanisms provided for in the Constitution, and (3) reinforce the technical 
capacity and professionalism of intelligence agents. Over the course of the project, the UN 
provided significant amounts of equipment to support SNR activities, provided trainings to 264 
agents, and conducted a sensitization campaign across the country to inform the population about 
the proper role of the SNR.387  
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These trainings contributed to a decline in the use of torture, inhumane treatment, and 
arbitrary arrests by the SNR agents who received them. Unfortunately, this decline was short-
lived. The people most in need of these trainings were not the field agents, but the high 
command of the organization; when they continued to perpetrate human rights abuses, the field 
agents followed suit.388 Ultimately, the institutional assistance provided to the SNR was 
insufficient to improve the governance of the institution because it did not address its 
politicization.  
The institutional framework establishing the SNR created very few opportunities for 
oversight. With its placement directly under the Presidency, the executive has an unusual amount 
of discretion over the agency’s deployment. In addition, the SNR’s budget is not subject to any 
oversight, rendering a vast amount of resources free for use by the executive.389 SNR agents who 
were known to use excessive force and torture suspects were not sanctioned; rather, many were 
awarded by the organization. A report by a Burundian human rights organization details how 
certain SNR agents made infamous for their mistreatment of former transitional government 
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Assessing Security Sector Reform in Burundi 
When the conflict finally ended in 2009, the government quickly re-established its 
authority throughout the country. While general trust of the police was relatively low, much of 
the population believed that the police could be a valuable source of social protection with 
training and assistance.  
Politicization of the security sector began to show in the run up to the 2010 election, the 
first election cycle since the end of the war. After a positive trend towards increased respect for 
human rights, the lead up to the elections saw a return to the use of torture by the SNR. The 
government also called upon the Imbonerakure to intimidate opposition voters.391 Since the 
beginning of his second term, Nkurunziza and other party elites have worked to consolidate the 
CNDD-FDD’s power. In the government, this included manipulating the party’s lists of eligible 
candidates and replacing them with Nkurunziza loyalists.392 In the military, this has been 
accomplished by promoting CNDD-FDD veterans faster than other officers. Although there are 
technically regulations regarding promotions within the military, the Cabinet maintains a level of 
discretionary power which has allowed them to circumvent the rules.393  
Worse, the emergence of the Imbonerakure, a militant youth group pledging allegiance to 
the CNDD-FDD, threatened the legitimacy of the security sector and the fragile stability of the 
country. Since its emergence in 2009, the Imbonerakure has been active during all major 
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elections, using intimidation tactics to threaten the opposition and discourage people from voting 
against the CNDD-FDD.394 Although the group preys on the population, it has continued to 
receive support from the government. As one civil society organization described, the 
Imbonerakure “calls the shots” in provinces across the country, acting with “total impunity.”395 
Imbonerakure members rarely faced arrest; those who were detained by the police were 
immediately released upon request from local authorities.396 APRODH reported that the SNR has 
been active since its inception in the formation, arming, training, and radicalization of the 
Imbonerakure.397 Members of the political opposition have also alleged participation of the PNB 
in the militia’s violence.398 Many of the weapons provisioned to the group have come from 
donors. 
In addition to the Imbonerakure, internal security has been compromised by the large 
number of former combatants who were never formally integrated into the security sector but 
were never fully demobilized. Many of these former troops continue to work for the government 
in a non-official capacity, as informal members of the SNR. Because they are not officially 
recognized staff, these combatants are often the most brutal and abusive agents as SNR 
leadership can still deny responsibility for their actions.399 Even before the 2015 crisis erupted, 
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the activity of these militants has allowed pockets of instability to persist across the country and 
threatened civil rights.  
Improvements in security sector governance stalled the longer Nkurunziza stayed in 
power. Below, I review how Burundi has scored on the five components of security sector 
governance. 
Formal Institutional Framework. Legislation exists to guide the Burundian security 
sector. The Arusha Accords and FTA laid out the framework for the post-war framework; the 
2005 Constitution establishes the new National Security Council; the strategic plan for the 
Ministry of Public Security and defense review for the FDN created with the assistance of donors 
set guidelines for the police and military. However, severe discrepancies exist between the 
security sector on paper and the practices of its members. For example, the National Security 
Council was established to be an independent advisory body. Since its creation, however, 
Nkurunziza has served as its head; furthermore, the body has eschewed its mandated role to 
organize and implement SSR, focusing just on the current security situation.400 
Civilian Control. Although the government has stated a commitment to instituting 
civilian control, military influence in politics remains high. A former army officer himself, 
Nkurunziza leads a government filled with active and retired military officers.401 More 
problematically, the group of generals at the head of the SNR have become a first point of 
contact for most major political decisions in the country. In an investigation into the agency, the 
Burundian Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained People (Association 
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Burundaise pour la protection des Droits Humains et des personnes Détenues) concluded that 
“the military has taken the upper hand on the civilian.”402  
There are very few mechanisms for civilian oversight over defense policy. Although the 
Burundian Constitution grants the Parliament the right to oversee security and defense activities, 
that power is rarely exercised. This lack of action comes down to political calculations: the 
military holds great sway over politics; interference in security policy is thus risky for those 
hoping to stay in office. A similar commission exists in the Senate, which has been slightly more 
active than its parliamentary counterpart. Still, little action has been taken to implement changes 
suggested by the committee’s reports.403 When Parliament has tried to play its role, the executive 
has generally refused to share meaningful information. Defense policy itself is made by army 
generals, keeping civilian involvement to a minimum.404   
Transparent and Accountable Management. Although Burundi is a signatory of the 
UN Convention against Corruption and has created several domestic laws outlawing corruption, 
little action has been taken to address reported instances of corruption by public officials. The 
inquiries that have been brought have not been followed through.405 At the end of the day, it falls 
to civil society and the media to monitor corruption. Organizations like OLUCOME are active 
monitors of corruption and frequently publish reports. Similarly, the media frequently report on 
instances of grand corruption, such as a detailed report on the misuse of DDR funds, alleging that 
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the president’s wife received 100 million Burundian francs intended to support DDR as well as a 
utility vehicle intended for the program.406  
 Some action has been taken within the military to investigate and punish soldiers accused 
of participating in corrupt or illicit activities. For example, there have been many instances where 
officers have been prosecuted for stealing fuel or for taking bribes. However, enforcement has 
been too inconsistent to say that there is a serious commitment within the military to end 
corruption.407 While donors have expressed rhetorical support for anti-corruption measures, they 
have provided little material assistance to support these institutions. The greatest support for anti-
corruption measures has come from the UN through a BINUB initiative providing $1.5 million 
in support of equipment and training for the anti-corruption court and special brigade.408   
 Command and control within the Burundian military are weak and politicized, 
compromising the ability of leaders to control their subordinates and control tensions. As one 
observer noted: “The senior ranks are still part of a violent and corrupt regime operating with 
zero-sum political mentality. Parallel chains of command reach up to the presidency, wielding 
great power, undermining formal structures and sowing distrust.”409 
Capacity. Given its significance to the outbreak of the civil war, donors touted the 
integration of Burundi’s military as exemplary of a successful stabilization and reconstruction 
program. The heavy operational assistance given to the country through training and equipment 
did yield some gains in both the army’s operational capacity and military cohesion. While the 
capacity of the military in the face of an external foe may be limited, the FDN has received 
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significant international recognition for its effectiveness and professionalism in conducting 
peacekeeping missions abroad.410 However, the improvements brought about by operational 
assistance were limited by the lack of accountability and politicization in the ranks.   
Violent crime—banditry in particular—has remained high, allowing insecurity to persist. 
This issue reached a peak in 2014, when citizens reported a surge in violent attacks by young 
men armed with machetes. It is still unclear whether these attacks were personally or politically 
motivated.411 The failure of the DDR process to effectively disarm and fully demobilize troops 
contributed most to the high rates of crime; the low number of economic opportunities for 
demobilized troops added fuel to the fire.412 
After the 2010 elections, displeasure with the ruling party contributed to a spate of 
attacks against security forces in the Bujumbura, Bubanza, and Bururi provinces. These militants 
charged police officers, the most visible agents of the state for most of the population, as 
“bandits” who needed to be “chastised.” Analysis at the time by local and international groups 
identified these attacks as emanating from a small insurgency led by former FNL soldiers.413 The 
fact that these attacks did not transform into larger movement supports the capacity of the newly 
formed security institutions. However, the emergence of the group in the first place illustrates the 
dangers of an incomplete DDR process as well as how a security sector that is perceived as 
illegitimate can threaten the peace. 
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Respect for Human Rights and the Rule of Law. Once the crisis broke out, the 
government took up old tools of repression with new vigor. In particular, the SNR expanded its 
activities to eliminate opponents within the security sector and root out suspected dissidents in 
society. The old Sûreté Nationale was infamous for its repression, but it had never caused the 
society-wide fear that the SNR now creates.414 Since violence has expanded, the police have also 
been involved in repressive activities throughout the country. In contrast, the military has been 
lauded by international observers for its professionalism during peacekeeping operations. The 
seminars led by the Dutch contributed to a noticeable improvement in military relations with the 
population. According to an interlocutor involved in the SSD program, “In some places, the 
population has asked that the police be replaced by the army.”415 
 
2015 Crisis 
In 2015, Pierre Nkurunziza announced his intention to run for a third term as president, a 
move viewed by many as unconstitutional. His announcement created a rupture among Hutus 
and Tutsi alike, sparking violent protests by angry citizens. These protests were met with 
violence by the state, put down with forceful repression by the politically loyal police and SNR. 
When the crisis first broke out in 2015, the army remained neutral. Unlike the police, the 
army did not participate in the repression of protestors or dissidents, vowing not to interfere in a 
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way that would violate the Arusha Agreement.416 Rather, as a spokesperson for the U.S. State 
Department described, the military acted “professionally and neutrally.”417 The outbreak of the 
crisis simultaneously revealed the professionalism of the lower ranks of the army while exposing 
fault lines among the units. In a statement to the U.S. House of Representative, Dr. Joseph Siegle 
argued: 
“Despite extraordinary political pressures, the Burundian military has largely 
stayed neutral during the crisis. During the protests, soldiers regularly acted as a 
buffer between the protesters and police and government-affiliated militias…. 
The enormous value of Burundi’s security sector reforms is underscored by how 
poorly the police, gendarmerie, and intelligence services have behaved in 
comparison to the military. These groups are made up of former combatants who 
were ineligible for integration into the military. Burundi’s police and intelligence 
services, therefore, have remained politicized and are collaborating with the 
CNDD-FDD’s youth league, the Imbonakure, in cracking down on opposition 
and spearheading the pro-government violence.”418 
While the lower ranks admirably continued to protect civilians, higher-ranking officers 
fell into political camps. Two weeks after President Nkurunziza made his controversial 
announcement, soldiers under the direction of General Godefroid Niyombare attempted to 
depose the president. The coup failed to remove the president, but it sparked a series of a series 
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of assassinations within the ranks of the army that unraveled the fragile cohesion built after the 
war.419 Most of the victims of these killings have been high-ranking officers, suggesting that 
these killings have been reprisal attacks for either support of or opposition to the regime.  
Violence has expanded to the lower levels as well, often perpetrated by the police and 
SNR. In 2016, the Ligue Burundaise des droits de l’homme (Burundian Human Rights League, 
“Iteka”) reported that between April 2015 and September 2016 and at least 52 military and 
police officers had been killed, 22 had been disappeared, 7 tortured, 43 arbitrarily arrested, and 
39 injured. It is likely that the actual numbers were much higher.420 The government has also 
intervened to ensure the military’s support of the regime. Factions suspected of participating in 
or being sympathetic of the coup attempt were removed from their post – some getting 
transferred to new units, other units dismissed altogether.421 Between 2015 and 2018, the 
Imbonerakure were responsible for over 110 reported deaths, and have been associated with over 
940 violent incidents across the country.422 
 Warnings from the West to Nkurunziza to respect the constitution seem to have had no 
effect on the President’s decision-making. As the crisis escalated, donors began to take action. In 
May 2015, the U.S. suspended all training activities with the Burundian military.423 In March 
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2016, the EU cut off all development assistance to the cash-strapped country until the 
government took steps to end the crisis. When this failed to deter CNDD-FDD officials, the EU 
ceased payment to the Burundian government of AMISOM salaries, disbursing payments 
directly to the soldiers instead.  
 
Conclusion 
Institutional assistance to Burundi has produced some improvements in the capacity of 
the security sector, but it has failed to produce lasting improvements in other dimensions of 
governance. Even though security sector reform was at the heart of the Arusha agreement and 
received significant donor support, the government was able to manipulate the system put in 
place by the accords and maintain a highly politicized system. It did this three ways: first, by 
elevating the role of the SNR, which remained outside of the prescriptions of the Arusha 
Agreement; second, by filling the PNB with former CNDD-FDD troops, in excess of the quotas 
stipulated by Arusha; and third, by establishing a parallel chain of command with the army and 
police.424 This was all made easier by the late intervention of donors in Burundi and the 
opportunity provided by participation in peacekeeping missions. 
Donor involvement was high in the mediation of the Arusha Accords and subsequent 
agreements and remained significant in the years following the signing of the 2006 ceasefire. 
However, once the agreement was signed with the FNL, donor attention waned. Despite the fact 
that the conflict had just ended, donors evaluated progress as strong and stable, significantly 
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underestimating the hurdles to good governance the country continued to face.425 Donors’ 
hesitancy to hold the government to higher standards of governance became evident when 
Nkurunziza began manipulating the system in the run up to his second term. Although they 
received credible reports of the President’s governance abuses, donors did not restrict aid or 
demand better action from the government.426 In one instance, the EU expressly assured the 
Burundian government that it would not lower aid despite its verbal condemnation of the 
government’s practices.427 Even the Dutch, whose assistance was focused on improving security 
sector governance, did not follow through on threats to withdraw assistance in light of increasing 
extrajudicial killings following the 2010 elections.428  
Part of this is likely due to the proliferation of donors involved in the reconstruction 
process, which created a level of ambiguity that was beneficial for certain political agenda.429 
This was partially due to the security environment when reconstruction began: war was declared 
over while serious conflict continued to rage. The level of insecurity in the country allowed the 
government to postpone serious structural changes or implement governance reforms in the name 
of national security without much blowback from donors. By the time donors began to seriously 
engage in governance reform programs, the “new” security institutions had already been 
functioning for several years. In particular, the disengagement of donors allowed the SNR to 
grow in strength and establish itself as the primary security institution in the country. 
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Still, the difference in behavior of the military towards the population provides a stark 
contrast to the abusive actions of the police and SNR. This supports the value of the Dutch 
program and suggests that it could have brought lasting change had it been able to establish a 






CHAPTER 6  
SECURITY SECTOR TRANSFORMATION IN SIERRA LEONE 
 
 The previous chapters have discussed two examples of security assistance gone wrong. In 
contrast, this chapter focuses on one of security sector reform’s most vaunted success stories: 
Sierra Leone. Together with the United Kingdom, the post-war government of Sierra Leone 
initiated the first attempt at modern security sector reform. Its successes (and failures) have 
become the focus of countless studies. In this chapter, I offer a new perspective on the security 
sector transformation of Sierra Leone. I argue that the early intervention of the United Kingdom 
helped to shape and define the regime’s approach to the security sector. The UK initiated talks 
with the government of Sierra Leone regarding security sector reform even before the conflict 
ended—before the government had decided upon a plan for post-conflict governance. By the 
time fighting ended, the government and its partners had already outlined a strategy for 
rebuilding the architecture of the security sector and developing its institutions. In contrast to the 
large inflows of institutional assistance it received at the outset of peace, Sierra Leone received 
relatively little operational assistance for the first nine years of peace. When it did start receiving 
larger funds of operational assistance, its institutional trajectory was well-enough defined that it 
did not seriously impact the quality of security sector governance. 
 This chapter proceeds in the following sections. In the next section, I provide a 
background for Sierra Leone, discussing how the institutional trajectory of the country 
contributed to the fracturing and politicization of the security sector. Next, I provide a brief 
outline of the events of the civil war and the intervention of the UK towards the end of the 




it reform its security sector. I argue that the British intervened at a critical moment, while the 
institutional trajectory of the country was still in flux. The third section outlines the series of 
interventions undertaken to reform the Sierra Leonean security sector and discusses the role that 
aid played in these reforms. In the fourth section, I assess the quality of security sector 




The roots of the civil war in Sierra Leone can be found in a series of policies instituted 
during British colonialism and carried forward into years of authoritarian rule following 
independence. Policies favoring the ruling elite at the expense of the population, personalizing 
security to protect the regime, and institutionalizing corruption fed decades of poor governance 
and widespread discontent.  
Sierra Leone is a small West African country rich in natural resources, particularly 
diamonds. After serving as a port during the slave trade, Freetown, its capital, began attracting 
international attention as a haven for freed British slaves; the British established a formal 
protectorate over the country in 1896. Once in power, the British adopted a strategy of “divide 
and rule”: focus on the British citizens and “Creoles” in Freetown, co-opt and decentralize power 
to the Paramount Chiefs, and play on ethnic divisions to prevent potentially threatening 
cooperation between groups. Over the years, this strategy created and hardened two major social 
divisions between the Creoles and “natives”, and the southern Mende and northern Temne. 




growth; even less to spur infrastructural or economic development across the country. The 
strength of the Paramount Chiefs encouraged the emergence of “big men” and patronage systems 
began to take root.430  
When Sierra Leone gained 
independence in 1961 and moved towards 
democratic elections, political elites soon 
found that appeals to different ethnic 
identities was an easy way to mobilize 
support. The Mendes and Temnes—united 
in the fight for independence—split, 
leading to the establishment of the Mende-
supported Sierra Leone People’s Party 
(SLPP) in the south and the Temne-
supported All People’s Congress (APC) in 
the north. Six years into independence, 
Siaka Stevens of the APC took power of 
the government in a relatively free and fair 
democratic election. Despite the promising start to the Sierra Leonean democracy, Stevens soon 
began instituting authoritarian measures and concentrating power in the executive to consolidate 
his power.  
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By the late 1970s the APC had instituted a one-party state through cooptation of the 
willing opposition and imprisonment of those unwilling to cooperate. Access to government 
services and basic public goods was limited to regime elites. The legal system under Stevens was 
crafted to strongly favor the government at the expense of the poor, to stifle dissent and imprison 
regime opposition.431 Stevens relied on many of the same techniques employed by other 
patrimonial systems, using government positions as rewards for loyal followers and intentionally 
discouraging institutional development to maintain control.432  
Stevens employed the same tactics to shield himself from any threats from the security 
sector: hiring and promotions were based on political loyalties and personal ties, corruption was 
encouraged, and merit was disregarded. Weak security institutions favored Stevens, who relied 
on hired security services and specialized police units to reduce the risk of a coup and utilized 
the judiciary to punish political opponents—or former allies suspected of disloyalty. Stevens 
relied on these private security forces to maintain some level of order and to reinforce the 
perception that he maintained a monopoly over the use of force, which was crucial for his ability 
to provide patronage.433 In addition to his private security forces, Stevens relied on a specialized 
branch of the police he created called the Internal Security Unit (ISU). Their violent repressive 
tactics quickly earned them a reputation for brutality among the population and the nickname “I 
Shoot U”.434 With the majority of government funding for policing devoted to Stevens’ loyal 
Internal Security Unit, the conventional police force made do without formal uniforms or 
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equipment.435 The Sierra Leone Army (SLA) languished under Stevens’ tenure, intentionally 
underfunded and politicized.  
Beginning in the 1970s and continuing through the 1980s, the economy of Sierra Leone 
slowed. Growing local discontent, combined with the violent overthrow of neighboring dictator 
Samuel Doe of Liberia, pushed Stevens to announce his retirement in 1985, to be succeeded by 
Brigadier-General Joseph Saidu Momoh. Momoh came into office on a campaign of a “New 
Order”, characterized by sweeping reforms of the public sector. However, like Stevens before 
him, Momoh used these new revenue windfalls to build a network of elite support, continuing a 
legacy of government appropriation.436  
By the early 1990s, the people of Sierra Leone had grown sick of the years of corruption 
and government neglect. By 1991, the United Nations Human Development Index ranked Sierra 
Leone 140 out of 144 countries. When Foday Sankoh first launched his rebellion, he was met 
with hope for change, and a willingness to do whatever was necessary to get it.  
 
Civil War 
The decade-long Sierra Leone civil war began in March of 1991, when a group of 
Liberian, Burkinabe, and exiled Sierra Leoneans calling themselves the Revolutionary United 
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Front (RUF) crossed the Liberian border into the Eastern District of Kono.437 Civil war quickly 
spread throughout the provinces, as the capital, politically and infrastructurally disconnected 
from the rest of the country, denied the existence of rebel activity.438 When the government did 
finally acknowledge the spreading civil war, it found itself unable to stop it. In addition to 
lacking the administrative and infrastructural power to quickly extend to the provinces, the 
unskilled SLA lacked the motivation to counter the notoriously brutal rebel group. By the time 
the war broke out, many soldiers outside the relatively better-resourced barracks of the Western 
area felt disconnected and indifferent to the fate of the APC. The result was a widespread 
defection of troops who chose to cooperate with the RUF in the hopes of monetary gain or 
simply survival. As the sobel (“soldiers by day, rebels by night”) problem grew, citizens came to 
rely more heavily on traditional defense forces, known as kamajors, and forming civil defense 
units.439  
Frustrated with the government’s weakness and its reliance on the underpaid and 
undertrained troops of the Sierra Leone Army, a group of officers under the direction of 
Valentine Strasser seized power in 1992. The National Provisional Ruling Council that they 
established initially enjoyed widespread support from the population for its promise to put a 
quick end to the war and restore democratic governance. Soon, however, the junta quickly fell 
out of favor, adopting many of the same practices of the APC. Worse, the new government was 
unable to quell the rogue elements of the national army; rather, the installation of a military junta 
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seemed to empower soldiers, leading to an escalation of violence towards civilians by 
government forces.440  
Pressures for democracy intensified. In January 1996, a fellow officer in the NPRC, 
Julius Maada Bio, forced Strasser out of office. Soon after, he opened negotiations with the RUF 
and organized elections. In February 1996, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP was 
democratically elected to the presidency and the United Kingdom began what would become a 
significant and long-standing partnership with the Government of Sierra Leone. Recognizing the 
critical need to establish security in the country, the UK authorized funding through the Foreign 
Commonwealth Office for projects with the military, police, judiciary, and parliament. In March 
1997, he was deposed by a new military coup.  
With the support of an ECOWAS intervention, Kabbah was restored to power in 1998, 
when he launched a new strategy: mobilize international support, rebuild the SLA with the 
support of the UK, and empower the kamajors. To further reduce the role of the military in 
domestic affairs, Kabbah mobilized resources to rebuild and restructure the Sierra Leone Police 
to take over as the main provider of internal security. In 1998, Kabbah established the new role 
of the police in the Sierra Leone Policing Charter and proclaimed the force a “force for good.” 
Police reform was thus incorporated into SILSEP.  
As all of this was happening in the West, the RUF continued their advance from the East, 
culminating with a siege of Freetown in January 1999. With the government weakened and the 
rebels strengthened, the parties entered into peace negotiations in July; the Lomé Peace 
 




Agreement signed outlined extensive provisions for power-sharing between the government and 
RUF, military integration, and broader security sector reform.441  
Sierra Leone experienced a few months of relative stability after the signing of the Lomé 
agreement. Recognizing the critical need to establish security in the country, the UK authorized 
funding through the Foreign Commonwealth Office for projects with the military, police, 
judiciary, and parliament. Initial SSR efforts were short-lived, as large-scale fighting resumed in 
October of 1999, forcing the newly authorized United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) and the small UK team to focus on supporting the government push back the rebel 
offenses. In early 2000, the UK corralled significant international support and created the 
International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) to train and rebuild the SLA and 
Operation Palliser to evacuate British citizens.442 It was the military intervention of the British 
that proved to be the decisive factor in ending the war. Significant SSR and DDR efforts 
restarted in 2001 as the Sierra Leonean government, with the assistance of its international 
partners, consolidated its victory over the RUF. At that point, the first priority for all parties was 
creating a stable environment that would allow IDPs and refugees to return home and service 
delivery to recommence.  
In January 2002, President Kabbah declared the war officially over. The eleven-year 
conflict had killed over 50,000 people and displaced hundreds of thousands. Sierra Leone fell to 
the bottom of most major development indicators, receiving the lowest score on the Human 
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Development Index, the highest infant and child mortality rates (286 per 1000), as well as the 
highest maternal mortality rates (1,800 per 100,000 live births). Life expectancy at birth was 38 
years, seven years younger than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa. Much of the physical 
capital that existed before the conflict was destroyed during the war, with the greatest destruction 
to health and education facilities. GDP per capita—relatively low to begin with—had dropped 
40% in the 10 years since the start of the war to approximately $142.00. 443   
The security sector was similarly in shambles: after nearly a decade of conflict, mass 
defection of soldiers, and a series of coups, the Sierra Leone Army had lost all appearance of 
professionalism. The elevation by the government of civil defense forces (CDF) and increased 
reliance on private military companies further weakened the monopoly on violence held by the 
government. In addition, internal security institutions had ceased almost entirely to function. The 
local police had become targets of the rebels, leaving an admittedly corrupt and predatory police 
force devoid even of manpower. Courts had been suspended across the country, prisons were 
overcrowded and under-resourced. By the end of the war, people saw the police and judiciary as 
epitomizing injustice.444  
 
Aid Profile 
Discussions about reforming the security sector began as early as 1998, when President 
Kabbah was restored to power. In the midst of continued fighting, the UK mobilized a team of 
personnel to deploy to Sierra Leone and make a plan for SSR. After his personal experience with 
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military intervention, President Kabbah remained deeply skeptical of the military. Internal 
security institutions had ceased almost entirely to function. The targeting of local police had left 
an admittedly corrupt and predatory police force devoid even of manpower. Courts had been 
suspended across the country, prisons were overcrowded and under-resourced.  
The first priority for all parties when the fighting stopped was to create a stable 
environment so that displaced peoples and refugees could return home and service delivery could 
recommence. While institutional reforms began in Freetown, local commanders and British 
advisors focused on quick-impact projects and information campaigns to establish order and win 
the “hearts and mind” of the population. At that time, the British and other international forces 
enjoyed widespread support among the population for their role in bringing peace. Cooperation 
between SLA and international troops in local reconstruction projects helped confer some of that 
legitimacy onto the SLA in the eyes of the population and eased some of the distrust that had 
accrued after decades of predation. The army quickly became involved in a number of projects: 
bringing in equipment to rebuild wells, sending its engineers to build bridges, sending troops 
back to their hometowns to assist in education, and offering army medics to the population for 
care.445  
Donors turned their attention to resuming and completing the DDR process. National 
security was directed by the Office of the President in Sierra Leone, assisted by UNAMSIL, the 
UK, the US, and ECOWAS. DDR would be headed by the newly established National 
Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, with the assistance of the 
United Nations Development Program, UNAMSIL, the World Bank-managed Multi-Donor 
 




Trust Fund, International Development Association, and the African Development Bank.446 




The government and donors began designing a plan for SSR during a point of high 
uncertainty. The President had just been restored to power after being forced into exile. 
Meanwhile, the war still waged, leaving open major questions about the ultimate balance of 
power and post-war settlement. Although Kabbah would eventually win a second election, his 
tenure was far from certain. In other words, regime vulnerability was high.  
When negotiations first began, President Kabbah expressed a desire to disband the 
military completely. Ultimately, it was the advice of Nigerian Brigadier General Mitikishe 
Maxwell Khobe, who was serving as an advisor to Sierra Leone, that convinced the government 
to retain a military and utilize foreign military assistance to reform and professionalize it.447 
Kabbah directed the small UK team (called the Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform 
Programme, or SILSEP) to focus on reforming the armed forces and strengthening civilian 
control. 
When the government negotiated the Lomé Peace Agreement with the RUF in 1999, it 
included provisions stipulating the restructuring of the Sierra Leone armed forces to integrate the 
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RUF and create a “truly national armed forces.”448 Despite the government’s eventual victory 
over the RUF, it remained committed to implementing the Lomé Agreement and continuing 
security sector reforms. Massive inflows of security governance aid flooded into Sierra Leone 
from the UK and other international partners to kickstart DDR and SSR. Integrating and 
reforming the military, scaling up the police, and establishing civilian control were made 
priorities by President Kabbah. 
 
Institutional Assistance 
Sierra Leone received the highest levels of institutional assistance in the years 
immediately after the conflict ended. In 2001 and 2002, Sierra Leone received over $80 million 
in institutional assistance from bilateral donors such as the U.S., UK, Canada, and Japan and 
multilateral donors. As part of its agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone, the UK 
structured its Medium-Term Strategy to achieve stable peace by 2005. Its key objective was to 
construct a security sector capable of providing and maintaining national security independently 
by the time UNAMSIL withdrew from the country in late 2004. This would require fully 
integrating the army and training and equipping the national police.449 Institutional assistance 
reached its peak in 2002 and dropped precipitously between 2003 to 2005, corresponding with 
the drawdown of UNAMSIL.450 The next peak of institutional assistance to Sierra Leone came to 
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support the security sector as the country prepared for national elections, the first real test of 
peace. 
The United Kingdom remained Sierra Leone’s most significant security partner during 
reconstruction. In February 2003, the Government of Sierra Leone signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the United Kingdom outlining a set of commitments for post-conflict 
reconstruction and UK support for their implementation. As the main partner of Sierra Leone, 
this agreement set the framework for all international efforts in the security sector. As part of its 
effort to assist the government consolidate control and improve governance quality, the UK 
made the creation of an effective and democratically governed security sector one of its top 
priorities.451 To achieve this, the program focused on the establishment of civilian control within 
the MoD, strengthening of command structures within the army, creation of sustainable defense 
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and budget policies, and the creation of a civilian-led institution to coordinate across the 
sector.452 A list of the exact commitments made by the UK is provided in Figure 6.3.   
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Figure 6.3. SSR Tenets in UK Strategy for Conflict Prevention in Sierra Leone  
• Provide basic and equipment to 8,500 soldiers in the SLA.  
• Provide advice on military and security strategy and the administration of the SLA, with the Commander of the 
British Forces in Sierra Leone acting as Military Adviser to President Kabbah.  
• Establish an IMATT to provide advice and expertise in operational planning in Defence Headquarters; to follow up 
on training by providing training and operational advice at Brigade HQ level.  
• Increase accountability of SLA by reforming the MOD and establishing effective civil control of the SLA.  
• Refurbish new premises for reformed MOD.  
• Assist with Military Reintegration Package, which includes absorbing limited number of screened ex-combatants 
into SLA, converting CDF militias into a territorial defence force and downsizing SLA to a sustainable level consistent 
with threats to state.  
• Help ensure GoSL and UNAMSIL establish satisfactory DDR and RRR programmes, with adequate reintegration 
projects.  
• Establish team, including UK secondee as Inspector General of Police, to reform, train and equip more 
accountable police force, and assert police primacy in GoSL controlled areas.  
• Push for cost-effective establishment of TRC and Special Court as soon as possible.  
• Help GoSL reform and build capacity of judiciary.  
• Assist National Security Adviser to develop an accountable, non-political security service capable of monitoring 
external and rebel threats.  
• Provide humanitarian support for refugees and internally displaced.  
• Assist in the building of capacity of civil society to engage in peacebuilding activities—in particular reconciliation 
and reintegration of former combatants and refugees.  





By intervening quickly and establishing a long-term strategy for reform, the UK set the 
foundation for continued security sector reforms beyond the immediate political horizon. As the 
distance grew between war and peace, the domestic political pressure for security sector reforms 
diminished. Unsurprisingly, politicians turned their attention from security governance issues as 
the threat of renewed conflict receded, focusing on more immediate issues, like the economy. By 
2005, the administration’s interest in the security sector was severely reduced, to the point that it 
suspended security council meetings up through 2007.453  
 
Operational Assistance 
Sierra Leone received the largest flows of operational assistance during the conflict. 
Shortly following its intervention into the civil war, the UK authorized £21.27 million to support 
training and equipping the Sierra Leone Armed Forces. The majority of this funding went to 
support the British mission Operation Silkman, established in 2001 to consolidate preliminary 
training efforts as part of a broader stabilization mission. By October 2001, 9,300 troops had 
been re-trained by the British, comprising nearly the entirety of the Sierra Leone Armed 
Forces.454  
Once the conflict had ended, the operational assistance provided by the British went 
towards financing infrastructure construction and re-equipment of the military and police. The 
RSLAF Re-Equipment Programme was the most significant UK initiative to provide non-
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governance military assistance to Sierra Leone. After that program ended in August 2002, 
material assistance from the British was provided on an ad hoc basis through the annual budgets 
of the various programs operating in country, including £4.5 million to provide trucks and 
technical assistance for the RSLAF.455 Unlike international support for institutional development 
of the RSLAF, the majority of assistance provided to the SLP was provided as tactical and 
operational assistance. In their largest police assistance project, the UK channeled nearly £25 
million into a procurement program for the SLP between 1999 and 2005.456 The exact timing of 
these disbursements is unclear; thus, Figure 2 portrays only the disbursements of operational 
assistance from the US.  
 Aside from this funding from the UK, the U.S. has been Sierra Leone’s most significant 
source of security assistance. In the years following the end of the conflict, the U.S. provided 
$27.85 million in operational assistance. In the first years of reconstruction, the focus of the U.S. 
was on supporting military hospitals and health initiatives. The majority of aid was provided 
through donations of medical equipment and other basic necessities such as textiles and gear. As 
is clear in Figure 6.2, disbursements remained relatively low until nearly a decade after the 
conflict had ended. 
US operational assistance to Sierra Leone increased dramatically in 2010 and 2014 as the 
U.S. focused more attention on improving the counter-narcotics and counterterrorism capacity of 
Sierra Leone as part of the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program. 
One of the major goals of the Sierra Leonean government at the time was to improve the 
operational capacity of the RSLAF to make it eligible to participate in peacekeeping missions. 
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While Sierra Leone faces a comparatively low threat of terrorism, the government has made 
participation in peacekeeping missions a policy priority since the mid-2000s, hoping to access 
some needed revenue for its security forces.457 The greatest contributor to the spike in assistance 
to Sierra Leone, however, was the outbreak of the Ebola virus While the U.S. provides a 
significant amount of equipment and supplies to Sierra Leone through its Excess Defense 
Articles program, it does not provide Foreign Military Financing, the primary program through 
which other security partners receive funding for arms.  
Sierra Leone receives some assistance from China. Although the exact amounts and 
nature of assistance are unknown, news reports suggest that the majority of Chinese aid has come 
through training and equipment. Like the U.S., China’s main focus in Sierra Leone has been to 
support the medical infrastructure of the military and provide the equipment that it needs to 
become eligible for UN peacekeeping missions.458 Unlike the U.S., China has provided small 
arms and artillery as well. In November 2003, the Chinese Ministry of National Defence 
announced that it was providing 25 million yuan (just over three million dollars) to support 
training and the rehabilitation of RSLAF facilities. In following years, China continued to 
provide training and equipment including surveillance speedboats and artillery ammunition and 
equipment, including through a second grant of 25 million yuan in 2011.459 When Ebola broke 
out, the Chinese military pledged millions of dollars of support and sent a team of military 
medical experts to assist in containment efforts.460  
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Lack of data prevents a complete accounting of security assistance to Sierra Leone. 
However, the data that are available allow for a general understanding of aid trends. In the 
immediate aftermath of the war, the military and major security institutions received large 
amounts of institutional assistance, and relatively little operational assistance. The military 
continued to receive relatively small inflows of operational assistance until 2011, many years 
into its long-term development program with the British. In contrast, while the police received 
some institutional support at the beginning of peace, the SLP was given primarily operational 
assistance. While tactical training has been a component of operational assistance provided to the 
SLP since the beginning, it is only recently that donors have started to seriously focus on 
improving governance.461 
 The combination of high regime vulnerability, high institutional assistance, and low 
operational assistance theoretically created the best conditions for a successful SSR intervention. 
Still, within Sierra Leone, we can expect to see some variation. The high levels of dedicated 
assistance provided for military reform and institution building lead me to expect the greatest 
positive improvements to occur in the army and in the institutional infrastructure, i.e. the 
Ministry of Defence and Office of National Security. In contrast, the high levels of operational 
assistance provided to the Sierra Leone Police should theoretically lead to negative governance 
changes in the police force. Despite this variation, my theory leads me to expect an overall 









Remaking the Security Sector: Early Inflows of Institutional Assistance 
In the following sections, I discuss the role that security assistance played in the development of 
these institutions and how it has impacted the quality of security sector governance. Specifically, 
I evaluate how aid impacts the five components of governance discussed in Chapter 2: (1) the 
presence of a formal institutional framework, (2) civilian control, (3) transparent and accountable 
management, (4) capacity, and (5) respect for human rights and the rule of law. 
 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration 
Institutional Assistance 
DDR officially began in October 20, 1999. The early stages of DDR saw the 
establishment of demobilization centers in Lungi, Port Loko, Daru, and Kenema. By the time 
hostilities erupted in May 2000, 24,042 troops had been disarmed. Progress in weapons 
collection, however, seriously lagged, with only 10,840 weapons collected. When fighting 
resumed, many demobilized soldiers took up arms and rejoined the conflict and formal DDR 
activities were put on hold.462 The second stage of DDR began in May 2001 and lasted until 
January 2002, when it was formally completed. In that time, 47,076 troops were demobilized, 
and 15,840 assorted weapons and approximately 2 million rounds of ammunition were collected. 
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Demobilization was officially completed in January 2002. Though it was considered a success, a 
large number of weapons remained unaccounted for.463 
Reintegration officially concluded in December 2003. By that point, 51,000 ex-
combatants had participated in re-integration projects. An additional 6,845 child combatants had 
participated in a unique program designed for children, and had been reunited with their families. 
Reintegration was funded by a number of donors: together the World Bank-managed Multi-
Donor Trust Fund, Germany, UK, United States, UNDP, UNAMSIL, International Organization 
for Migration, and International Committee of the Red Cross provided enough funding to 
provide reintegration packages to all demobilized soldiers. While medium-term integration was 
successful, concerns remained among observers that reintegration packages would not be 
enough.464 The economy of Sierra Leone was destroyed; vocational training would provide little 
economic security if there were no jobs available.465  
In addition to the official DDR process, the Sierra Leone Police and UNAMSIL 
organized the Community Arms Collection and Destruction program to collect weapons that 
were not considered part of the official DDR program either because they were officially 
exempted (such as shotguns and hunting rifles) or because they belonged to non-combatants. 
Although the UN was unconcerned with the possession of firearms by non-combatants, the 
government initiated the program to address RUF concerns that civil defense forces could rise up 
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again and use these weapons against them.466 The SLP collected several thousand weapons; 
however, because of the continued trafficking of arms across the region and security fears by the 
population, observers believed there to be many more weapons across the provinces.467  
Outcomes 
The greatest contribution of the DDR program to peace, however, was the dismantlement 
of the RUF’s military wing. In addition to losing political support following its losses in the 2002 
elections, the RUF lost most of its leadership when the Special Court for Sierra Leone arrested 
four of its top officers. Those who stepped in to fill their roles proved unable to rally support 
from former combatants, now returned to their communities. With the RUF dismantled, the 
kamajors remained the only potential challenger to government authority. However, unlike the 
rebels, the kamajors posed no significant threat to the state or to the peace. The majority of 
fighters had joined the war effort to protect the government and their communities; even if one 
leader attempted to mobilize, it is unlikely that he could have garnered support.468  
 
Creating the Security Architecture of Sierra Leone 
In January 2002, the Government of Sierra Leone established a new Ministry of Defence 
(MOD) under joint military/civilian control. The MOD was essentially split into two forces: The 
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Joint Force Command, under military leadership, and the Joint Support Command, under civilian 
leadership. Initially, both commands were placed under IMATT leadership in an attempt to guide 
institutional development as well as cultivate local capacity. In addition to increasing civilian 
leadership responsibility, this division was chosen in an attempt to reduce the likelihood of a 
coup by preventing too great a concentration of power.469 With his great distrust of the military, 
Kabbah insisted on maintaining his position as the Minister of Defence. 
The National Security and Central Intelligence Act of 2002 created the institutional 
framework for Sierra Leone’s security apparatus, establishing the National Security Council 
(NSC), Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU), and the Office of National Security 
(ONS). The NSC was formed to centralize all information regarding internal and external 
security threats. At the time of its formation, many of its positions were filled by British 
advisors. CISU was created to collect and assess intelligence relating to threats to the state’s 
security or economic interests as well as threats to the government. Finally, the ONS was created 
to coordinate within all areas of the security sector, maintain a relationship between the national 
security community and civil society, prepare a national security policy, vet all potential staff 
members within the security sector, and to implement any policies required to maintain high 
standards across the government.470  
The Sierra Leonean government also passed a number of new security policies during 
this time, including the 2003 Defence White Paper and beginning the country’s first Security 
Sector Review, which was begun in 2003 and completed in 2005. The 2003 White Paper was 
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prepared by the Ministry of Defence. It outlined a new structure for the armed forces as well as a 
strategy for reducing corruption and increasing democratic accountability within the military and 
the greater security sector, including provisions for defense expenditure management and 
procurement.471 One of the most significant contributions of the 2003 White Paper was to define 
the scope and responsibilities of the police and military, including defining the appropriate 
conditions for military involvement in domestic affairs.472 
One of the biggest innovations of the new security system was the creation of Provincial 
and District Security Committees – PROSECs and DISECS, respectively. These bodies were 
created to form an early warning system to alert authorities of any threat to the province, country, 
or the government.473 These new security committees were an important step towards 
decentralizing the security sector and increasing local trust. These changes reflected a 
recognition among the government and donors that the failure of the central and local 
government institutions to provide law and order had contributed to the conflict. Still, despite 
these positive developments, power was still concentrated in the executive, leaving the security 
services vulnerable to continued politicization. 
Institutional Assistance 
UK support was fundamental in all of these developments, from assisting with the design 
of the new MOD, financing the construction of the new MOD building, and funding training 
courses for new civil servants.474 UK security advisors helped their Sierra Leonean counterparts 
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draft new legislation guiding the sector, delimiting the roles and responsibilities of the new 
institutions. The most important of these developments, however, has been the introduction of 
civilian control, which stakeholders link directly to UK assistance. Today, the Sierra Leonean 
Ministry of Defense has a civilian budget director and a civilian Chief of Defence Staff.475 
Donors helped establish Chiefdom Intelligence Committees to supplement the PROSECs 
and DISECs and improve intelligence collection across the country by training local people to 
conduct analyses. One of the main concerns by donors was that improving the capacity of the 
intelligence institutions would create an incentive among political elites to utilize them to collect 
information on political opponents.476 At the beginning, this was largely the result of strong 
efforts by ONS leadership to maintain its political independence. Professionalization of the ONS 
would be crucial to making sure the body remained an independent agency, rather than a 
personal advisor to the president.  
Outcomes 
Institutional assistance and the presence of external advisors within the security sector 
allowed the post-conflict institutions to develop, encouraging professionalization and political 
independence by creating space between political influence and civil servants. Kellie Conteh, the 
National Security Coordinator in the early years of reconstruction, argued that the British advisor 
to the ONS had been a crucial buffer for the institution, allowing it to develop as an independent 
agency, rather than a personal advisor to the president: “Our advisor had been fighting wars in 
the sense that much of their job was to protect the institution [from political interference] and 
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allow it to grow. Election time [in 2007] showed security was still an issue and the entire system 
could have been thrown down.”477  
Significant challenges remain, however. While civilian control has been introduced in 
some areas of the security sector, such as budgeting and procurement, many areas remain totally 
under military control. Problematically, the introduction of civilians into the Ministry 
of Defence has not led to greater democratic governance. This is partially due to a lack of formal 
institutions. In spite of efforts to introduce greater oversight over the security sector, monitoring 
is limited to executive bodies: the ONS, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the National 
Security Council Coordinating Group. More problematically, there is often a low appetite among 
civilian officials to apply any pressure on the military. Thus, the formal channels that do exist to 
enforce accountability are rarely used.478 Lack of institutional oversight also contributes to 
continuing corruption within the security sector. Despite the introduction of public expenditure 
management reforms, corruption is still widespread in security procurement processes. Often, 
donor funds are diverted towards contracts that are never expected to go through.479 
The ONS has consistently developed and published Security Sector Reviews since its 
creation, demonstrating a level of ownership of the institution and a commitment to self-
evaluation. However, the government of Sierra Leone has not put forward any formal defense 
policies since the publication of the White Paper in 2003. Without a coherent, forward-looking 
defense strategy, security sector development is unlikely to continue after the UK leaves.480 
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Furthermore, there is a tendency among government ministers to bypass the ONS when they are 
in need of the security sector and reach out directly to contacts within the military.481 This 
challenges the effectiveness of the institution and its ability to organize and regulate the 
performance of security actors. The experience of the ONS is illustrative of a broader issue 
within the security sector: policies and institutions designed by the British are not always 
implemented.482  
 Other institutional reforms have yielded better results. One Sierra Leonean security 
official posited that one of the greatest successes of UK support has come through the creation of 
local intelligence, such as the Chiefdom Intelligence Committees. In this case, it was the 
combination of creating the institutional structure (institutional assistance) and providing 
trainings to build local capacity (operational assistance) that made the project successful.483 This 
supports the arguments for capacity building through operational assistance, and suggests that it 
can, in fact, be good for governance when it is coupled with strong institutional support to ensure 
that the assistance is being utilized well. 
 
Military Reform and Integration 
Institutional Assistance 
Preparation for military integration began in early 2000. Although the British had been 
providing some small-scale trainings and reform projects through IMATT, the UK authorized the 
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creation of a Military Reintegration Programme to integrate former RUF and civil militia 
soldiers who had been through the disarmament and demobilization process into the national 
army. By May 2002, the British had trained 2,600 former combatants and integrated them 
officially into the military. All soldiers were mixed across and within units. Impressively, 
military integration was completed without any reports of incidents between soldiers from 
opposing parties and little evidence even of friction between them. Former SLA soldiers were 
also retrained through the program. As the program moved forward, IMATT advisors gradually 
transferred control for training exercises to Sierra Leonean commanders, which one expert 
observed led to a “discernible increase in confidence” of the force and improved performance in 
training exercises.484 
Despite the peacefulness of the integration process, tensions ran high even among the 
different factions in the military. Former RUF members who were integrated into the RSLAF 
were often greeted with mistrust by leadership and their peers. CDF fighters often felt 
themselves to be short-changed.485 The MoD identified overcoming this distrust as crucial to 
achieving the ultimate goal of integration: uniting ex-combatants into a single force that was 
“professional, efficient, effectively structured and representative.”486 Military leadership and its 
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IMATT advisors approached this through continued trainings and professionalization efforts 
involving all troops.  
On January 21, 2002, President Kabbah announced a new official name for the military: 
the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF). This new name was chosen to signify a 
new military: the former military, though called the Sierra Leone Army, comprised separate land, 
sea, and air forces; the new RSLAF would be a joint force structure, restructured and retrained at 
almost every level.487  Changes in the military were not limited to integration. Under the 
direction of IMATT, RSLAF embarked on a process of wholesale reform of top-down and 
bottom-up reform. The British installed advisors in all major positions in the military. For 
example, the head of logistics was a British officer with Sierra Leoneans under him.488 This 
organization provided a loud voice for the British and led to the imposition of the British system 
on Sierra Leone.489 The restructuring of the process was also intended to draw the military down 
to a more sustainable size, from 14,000 to 10,500 troops and, later, to 8,500.490 This restructuring 
process was viewed by Sierra Leonean officials as crucial for supporting civilian control as well 
as improving effectiveness. In a statement in 2002, the Deputy Defense Minister insisted that the 
process would lead to better governance: “Though the unfortunate event of the recent past has 
been blamed on the military, we believe that the ongoing restructuring of the RSLAF has made 
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us see the new armed forces as a force that would be democratically accountable to the 
people."491 
The 2003 White Paper made professionalization of the forces a priority. In order to avoid 
repeating the past, the government would need to instill a set of values that would make them 
“loyal and accountable to the government of the day, regardless of its political composition, 
while retaining their professional effectiveness.”492 Advisors to the military have implemented a 
number of professionalization programs, most of which involved “train the trainer” programs. 
The most significant contribution of donors to the professionalism of the RSLAF was the 
establishment of Horton Academy – a military academy intended to provide junior staff formal 
training on “soft skills” such as military ethics and leadership. While initially founded to support 
military professionalization, Horton has expanded its mandate in recent years to include officials 
in other security institutions. Now, the first stage of program provides a certificate in public 
administration and is open to the military, police, and ONS.493  
Operational Assistance  
 The majority of operational assistance from the UK in the post-conflict period was 
provided to support military infrastructure construction. Military housing, where it existed, was 
dilapidated and substandard. In an initiative to support the new military, the government of 
Sierra Leone and the UK came together to design an infrastructure development plan to construct 
new or refurbish existing military barracks across the country to provide a better standard of 
living for soldiers. Operation Pebu (“Op PEBU”), as it was named, would be funded through a 
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combination of British and Sierra Leonean funds. The UK pledged £3.6 million to the project. 
The project was to be completed by the time the rainy season began in the summer of 2004.  
It quickly became clear that the Sierra Leonean military lacked the materials and 
technical knowledge to complete the project. By the beginning of 2004, assessors concluded that 
only 12% of the project would be completed by the time the rainy season began that summer. In 
addition to unrealistic planning and poor construction choices, there had been a deep mismatch 
between what RSLAF officers envisioned and what was possible with the resources available.494 
A British advisor to the Sierra Leone Ministry of Defence argued that the operation “failed on so 
many counts that it is best described as conceptually flawed.”495 Shortly after the failure of Op 
PEBU came to light, the project was abandoned.496 
In 2011, the US also began providing military assistance to Sierra Leone to support their 
counterterror abilities. Much of this assistance was provided to securing Sierra Leone’s borders 
and prevent the cross-border flows of illicit goods so common in that region. Years later, the 
project has yet to advance beyond its beginning stages.497  
The next spike in operational assistance came in 2014, with the outbreak of the Ebola 
virus. The U.S. provided equipment to Sierra Leonean forces to support their containment efforts 
and over $11 million in assistance through the Department of Defense’s Cooperative Biological 
Engagement Program, an initiative created to “implement biosafety and biosecurity measures for 
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facilities housing pathogens of security concern and to enhance partner ability to quickly detect, 
diagnose, and report diseases with implications for international security.”498 
Outcomes 
The institutional assistance provided to set up and support Horton Academy will likely 
yield governance improvements for years to come. As more officers are given a professional 
education, they may push to change the politicization and corruption that persist among the 
higher ranks of the RSLAF. According to a former RSLAF officer, the junior officer corps, 
brought up through Horton, are anxious to abandon the personalistic system perpetrated by the 
former combatants who now hold many of the institution’s leadership positions. Instead, they 
want a system based on merit and accountability; they want the RSLAF to become a more 
professionalized force.499  
The assistance of the UK and the other contributors to the IMATT force played a key role 
in developing the command system, capacity, and professionalism of the new army. However, 
politicization remains a problem. Selection for prestigious posts often requires a vetting process 
to make sure you are loyal to the party. While formalized processes have been created to ensure 
selections are merit-based, officials often “check the boxes” to make donors happy.500 In some 
cases, the continued British presence has allowed Sierra Leonean officers experiencing political 
pressure to defer decision-making responsibility. For example, cognizant of continued 
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politicization within the military, the Chief of Defence Staff has turned to the British to select 
Sierra Leonean officers to receive overseas training.501  
Much of the operational assistance that has been provided has gone to waste. As part of 
its work addressing the Ebola outbreak, the U.S. and other security partners set up a nationwide 
Ebola response system and build up the medical capabilities of the military.502 However, once 
the acute crisis had ended, the system was neglected.503 If a new outbreak were to occur, it is 
questionable whether it would still function. 
 
Police Reform 
British support for the SLP took a very different form than its support for the RSLAF. By 
the end of the civil war, the Sierra Leone Police Force had lost the one resource it had before the 
conflict began: manpower. It is estimated that the SLP lost 30% of its officers during the course 
of the war, either through death or attrition (from 9,500 to around 6,000).504 In addition, the SLP 
was greatly hampered by a lack of resources and equipment. Unlike its holistic approach to 
military reform, donor support for the SLP was thus largely focused on providing equipment and 
training specific elements of the police force for rapid deployment.505 The SLP did receive 
substantial institutional support, most significantly, through the leadership of guidance of Keith 
Biddle – a retired British police officer named the first Inspector General of the Police. However, 
the UK undertook few projects to reform or support the Ministry of the Interior, the institution 
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charged with the oversight and supervision of the police and internal security forces.506 In 
contrast, the focus of donors was on traditional capacity-building.  
Institutional Assistance 
In 1998, the government signed into force the Sierra Leone Policing Charter, which 
established the police as the primary force for establishing order within the country and re-
christened the SLP a “force for good.”507 Kabbah’s strong support for police reform contributed 
to a high level of buy-in across the administration to support police reform. This was evidenced 
by the inclusion of police salaries in the national budget in 2003 – a sharp contrast from the total 
reliance on donor funds to maintain the military in the immediate postwar period.508  
To support the changes envisioned by Kabbah, the UK sent Keith Biddle—a retired 
police officer who had focused his career on police reform—to serve as Inspector General of 
Police (IGP). As the IGP, Biddle spearheaded major structural changes in the force, along with 
rank reforms and the introduction of new offices. To better serve the needs of local populations, 
the SLP adopted a community policing approach called “Local Needs Policing,” with the aim of 
“creating a community police service, which is accountable to the people and is not an organ of 
the government.”509 This new approach aimed to increase community participation in matters of 
security through the establishment of decentralized Police Partnership Boards. In light of the 
gender-based violence that occurred during the conflict, the SLP created a Family Support Unit, 
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which deployed across the country.510 In addition, the government created the Complaints, 
Discipline and Internal Investigation Department to receive and investigate reports of 
misconduct by the police. In 2014, an additional body was formed to increase accountability, 
called the Independent Police Complaints Board (IPCB).511 
While implementing these changes, the government faced a very real shortfall in policing 
capacity. UNAMSIL was set to withdraw in 2004, leaving the government completely 
responsible for internal stability. Rather than extend the army, the government decided to invest 
more heavily in the better-trained, armed unit of the police: what had begun as Siaka Stevens’ 
Internal Security Unit was re-christened the Operational Support Division (OSD) in 2003 and 
deployed across the country. 
The appointment of British Keith Biddle as Inspector General of the Police from 1999 – 
2003 facilitated major reforms and restructuring. Security experts describe his appointment as 
crucial for increasing confidence in the SLP. Considering the highly politicized nature of the 
SLP, the appointment of an international advisor alleviated fears that politically-contentious 
reforms—such as reforming the rank structure—would follow a political agenda. Albrecht and 
Jackson quote an SLP officer: “If outsiders had not come, there would have been a lot of political 
pressure on the IGP at the time.”512  
However, beyond the work done by Keith Biddle, donors did relatively little to 
implement lasting institutional change. Although legally under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
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Internal Affairs, police matters are left to the discretion of the Police Council, a pre-war body 
under the leadership of the Vice President. Without real legislative or cabinet-level oversight, the 
SLP are under direct control of the executive.513  
Operational Assistance 
By 2006, the SLP had accumulated 700 vehicles, including motor bikes, over 1,000 hand-
held communication sets, mobile HF communication sets, and around 80 HVF base sets.514 In 
addition to providing equipment to the SLP, the UK offered training courses. Most of this 
training has focused on specific elements within the police force, with the intention that these 
elements could then share their training with the rest of the force (“train the trainer” missions). 
Recently the UK has widened the mandate of ISAT to include improving governance; before this 
point, all trainings have focused on improving occupational skills, like crime scene 
investigation.515  
The training and re-equipment of the SLP did little to improve its capacity. Training 
seminars often were not tailored to fit the realities faced by the police force. A British expert on 
SSR in Sierra Leone noted that early training programs often focused on teaching policing 
techniques that required expensive equipment inaccessible to the country at the time.516 
 
513 Peter Albrecht, “Transforming Internal Security in Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone Police and Broader Justice Sector 





514 Kabbah, “Keynote Speech by the President His Excellency Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah at Seminar on ‘The 
Role of the Sierra Leone Police in the 2007 Elections.’” 
515 Interview with author, June 20, 2019. 





Discussions with a current advisor to Sierra Leone suggest that donors have continued to make 
the same mistake, severely liming the value of these training seminars.517 
Outcomes 
As expected by my theory, an increase in access to uniforms and equipment has not led to 
appreciable improvements in policing. Reports of lagging response times and violent armed 
robberies carried out by individuals wearing police uniforms in the early post-war years 
prompted concerns that the police were, at best, inept or, worse, active perpetrators. One 
journalist posed the question: “with a fleet of vehicles at the disposal of the police force at the 
moment and a reliable means of communication, coupled with an appreciable personnel, why is 
the response time of the police still very poor?”518  
 Public perceptions of police conduct have improved since the end of the war, but 
complaints of police misconduct remain.519 The OSD, in particular, has repeatedly garnered 
international condemnation for its excessive use of force against civilians. The continuation of 
these tactics in the face of governmental condemnation flows from failures in the chain of 
command: one human rights report noted that many in the OSD do not respect orders from the 
conventional police, listening only to the Inspector General.520 
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Pervasive corruption by the police, such as at traffic stops, has contributed to a 
widespread distrust of the police by the population.521 While reform efforts have been made to 
reduce corruption, funding for police and salaries is too low for most of the changes to make 
place or for anti-corruption efforts to take hold. For example, an Inspector makes less than £3 a 
day, a sergeant makes even less.522 Poor accountability throughout the lower ranks of the SLP 
has allowed this persist. The decentralization of the SLP that was instituted to improve service 
delivery may actually contribute to this:  the lack of a strong hierarchy within the SLP and 
prevalence of local systems of governance make it impossible to know what the true level of 
crime is across the country, or whether police reforms have taken hold.523  
The institutions that have been created to enforce accountability generally lack the 
resources and the mandate to significantly change police practices. The IPCB was created to 
replace the ineffectual CDIID; even the new institution, however, is seen by many as little more 
than a “paper tiger.”524 Evidence suggests that the high level of operational assistance provided 
to the SLP may have contributed to the lack of institutional accountability. As early as 2007, 
analysts noted that the high level of donor support was having a perverse effect on the institution 
– the Sierra Leone Police was acting as an “autonomous entity vis-a-viz its constitutional 
obligations to its supervisory ministry.” Further, they noted, the lack of oversight of the police 
should be corrected “in the interest of democratic and accountable governance.”525 
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Assessing Security Sector Governance in Sierra Leone 
Two decades have passed since security sector reform efforts first began in Sierra Leone. 
Despite its faults, the security sector has witnessed a dramatic transformation from the corruption 
and predation of the pre-war period to a democratic and professionalizing system. This progress 
is due in no small part to the dedicated assistance of the UK. Supported by the institutional 
assistance of the British, the government of Sierra Leone has made improvements across all five 
dimensions of security sector governance: (1) the presence of a formal institutional framework, 
(2) civilian control, (3) transparent and accountable management, (4) capacity, and (5) respect 
for human rights and the rule of law. 
Formal Institutional Framework. The institutional infrastructure established by the 
2002 National Security and Central Intelligence Act and 2003 Defence White Paper continues to 
operate today. Despite its weaknesses, the Office of National Security has persisted as an 
independent, apolitical institution long after the departure of its British leadership. The military 
has maintained the joint force structure established by the 2003 White Paper and has relied upon 
the framework set out in the Military Aid to Civil Authorities provision to guide its domestic 
operations. This framework has reduced tensions between the military and internal security 
forces and facilitated cooperation.    
Civilian Control. The institutional assistance from the British was instrumental in 
establishing civilian control. Beginning with the 2003 White Paper, successive policy documents 
have stressed the importance of maintaining civilian authority over the military. The 2007 
Presidential Transition Team Report applauds the progress of the security sector in this respect:  
“Both the MoD and RSLAF now have a clear understanding and focus with 




and among the wider civil society have been restored, as the military is now 
subjected fully to civil authority and conducts itself in a manner that guarantees 
transparency, openness and accountability, a situation that was hitherto non-
existent. Civil-military relations are now enhanced as the MoD is jointly run and 
managed by both civilian and military personnel in an atmosphere that is 
congenial.”526 
As discussed above, work remains in extending parliamentary oversight of defense, particularly 
over police matters. However, the legal provisions granting Parliament the right to exercise 
oversight of defense leave an opportunity for improvement.  
Transparent and Accountable Management. Sierra Leone has a suite of policies 
designed to regulate defense procurement, acquisition, and budget management. For example, 
the 2004 Public Procurement Act regulates transparent procurement within government 
ministries, including the MOD. In addition, the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior 
are subject to annual audits by the Auditor General. All evidence indicates that the Auditor 
General is an independent office whose reports are comprehensive. However, to this point the 
government has been less thorough in following through with these accountability measures. 
There have been several notable instances of corruption within the security sector, many of 
which have gone unpunished. Although IMATT advisors helped their Sierra Leonean 
counterparts draft anti-corruption policy, there has been little action to train or inform lower-
 




level military or police personnel. Furthermore, the government does not subject the intelligence 
service to the same level of scrutiny as it does the military and police.527  
Within the RSLAF, the strong command and control structures implemented with the 
help of the British have helped to improve vertical accountability. The weakness of command 
hierarchies within the SLP, in contrast, is one of the reasons that corruption has been able to 
persist for so long. This issue is exacerbated by tensions between the regular police and the OSD. 
Capacity. The government of Sierra Leone has achieved the most fundamental objective 
of regaining a monopoly on the use of force. Since the beginning of reconstruction efforts, it has 
improved its administrative and security capacity across the country and is now able to extend 
security services across all the provinces. While questions remain regarding the capacity of the 
RSLAF to respond to a significant external threat, the military is considered able to respond to 
all primary threats to the country.528 By 2011, the military was deemed sufficiently professional 
to participate in international peacekeeping missions, and the government sent its first battalion 
of soldiers to Somalia.529 When the country faced its first major crisis since the civil war in 2014, 
the military was able to provide effective and professional services across the country. The 
professionalism and effectiveness of the RSLAF stands in strong contrast with the SLP, which 
continues to receive heavy criticism for excessive use of force and ineffectiveness, in addition to 
the challenges it faces regarding corruption and enforcing accountability.  
Respect for Human Rights and the Rule of Law. Respect for human rights and the rule 
of law has improved since the pre-war era. Since post-conflict reconstruction first began, respect 
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for physical integrity rights has increased. However, as discussed above, there is significant 
variation across security institutions. While the RSLAF is respected as a professional force, the 
police are distrusted after repeated instances of violence. Survey data reveals a significant 
difference in public perception of the two forces, as depicted in Figure 5. In 2011/2012 (the first 
years data are available), 63.8% of people trusted the army “a lot” or “a very great deal.” By 
2017/2018, that number had increased to 81.6%. In contrast, in 2011/2012 only 33.9% of people 
trusted the police; that number only increased to 36.8% by 2017/2018.530 
Improvements to the quality of security sector governance have not only improved its 
legitimacy in the eyes of the population, they have left the country better able to respond to 
significant security threats. The outbreak and spread of the Ebola virus in 2014 launched the 
country into the greatest national security crisis since the civil war. The government’s response 
illustrates the gains made to security sector governance and the impact they had on maintaining 
domestic stability. 
 
Security Response to the Ebola Outbreak 
The government of Sierra Leone was late to recognize the security threat posed by Ebola. 
Despite the centralized structure of ONS and its mandate to coordinate a response to all issues of 
human security, the government called first upon the Ministry of Health and Sanitation to 
coordinate a response. After months of a “haphazard and ineffective” response, the government 
declared a national state of emergency in late July 2014, activating the security sector and 
delegating crisis response to a new unit headed by the President and the former Minister of 
 




Defence. The new working group acted expeditiously, “with the sense of a military operation”, 
activating the security institutions to quickly implement stay-at-home orders, inform the 
population, and slow the spread of the disease.531  
When called upon to secure infected areas, the RSLAF successfully deployed and 
engaged teams of personnel in a timely and efficient manner. A UK advisor at the time argued 
that the success of this operation came from good leadership and strong command structures, 
showing an understanding among the officer corps of how to command and hold people 
accountable.532 The military’s effective and professional response to the crisis further increased 
public confidence in the military and strengthened the institution’s legitimacy in the eyes of the 
population.533 The high capacity of the RSLAF has made led the government to call upon it to 
fill more and more positions. Today, the RSLAF is much more than an army: it is the country’s 
crisis response and disaster management system.534  
As with the RSLAF, the SLP’s response to the Ebola outbreak provided insight into its 
performance. Although the force showed surprising professionalism at the operational level, its 
participation in the Ebola response revealed major problems at the strategic level. For much of 
the early intervention, the integration of strategy and operations fell to the Inspector General of 
Police, as the rest of the SLP command focused solely on operational issues. This failure of 
delegation led to holes in the SLP’s response.535  
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The preceding sections outlined the security assistance received by Sierra Leone in the 
years following independence. Generally, the institutions that received the most institutional 
assistance have witnessed the greatest improvements in governance quality as well as operational 
effectiveness. In contrast, the SLP received mostly tactical and operational assistance, with the 
exception of the expertise provided by IGP Biddle. The introduction of local policing has led to 
important improvements in access to police services by the population. However, without an 
institutionalized plan for force professionalization, practices among the SLP have not improved.  
The training and equipment provided to the SLP did not yield long-term governance 
improvements. Today, it is unclear how useful this aid has been – whether it fits into the wider 
scope of the reform process or optimizes the resources possessed by the force. Much of the 
equipment already provided to the force has fallen into disarray as the SLP’s budget is too small 
to maintain their transportation and communications systems.536 For their part, the British are 
forced to devote a significant amount of aid resources towards “fire-fighting” – addressing small 
emergencies as they appear, rather than working towards long-term reforms.537   
The continued provision of equipment has created a dependency within the SLP on donor 
assistance, and an expectation that when machinery breaks down, it is up to the donor 
community to replace it.538 This problem extends beyond the SLP: one security official explained 
that the presence of the British prevented various security agencies from creating realistic 
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budgets: without a hard date set on the British exit, long-term strategies to deal with budget 
constraints were never developed.539  
Some evidence suggests that the government has adopted policies to appeal to donors that 
weaken performance. One official argued that in an attempt to get more assistance from China, 
the government has started using its funds to purchase uniforms made in China, as opposed to 
taking advantage of the tailoring units in the RSLAF. This has not only prevented capacity 
building within the RSLAF, it has taken away much needed income from soldiers.540  
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CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSION 
 
Between the growing focus on foreign military capacity building and security sector 
reform, post-conflict states have received increasing amounts of security assistance to help 
rebuild and reform their security sectors. The track record of this assistance, however, has been 
mixed: while some states have been able to use that assistance to build professional and effective 
security forces, others have fallen back into historical patterns of patronage and repression. There 
is no clear relationship between security assistance and the probability that the states that receive 
it are able to secure peace. In this dissertation, I have aimed to provide one explanation for why 
this variation occurs.  
Understanding the impact of security assistance on post-conflict governance is important 
for several reasons. Most importantly, the security assistance provided to states may have an 
important impact on whether it remains at peace or relapses into conflict. Beyond the immediate 
threat of conflict relapse, the quality of security sector governance is connected to a number of 
other important policy goods. Good security sector governance may support accountability and 
transparency in other sectors of the government. When the police and intelligence agencies 
respect the rule of law and operate under transparent and accountable management, they may be 
less vulnerable to politicization or manipulation by other state actors. In contrast, poor security 
sector governance may undermine political governance. The quality of security within a country 




less able to access the government services and protections required to build up their local 
economies.541  
Gains in security sector governance may lead to improved operational effectiveness as 
well. In her study of military effectiveness, Talmadge argues that the tenor of civil-military 
relations has significant implications for battlefield success. Take, for instance, Saddam 
Hussein’s policy of promoting politically loyal Ba’thist officers. Conditioning promotion on 
political loyalty and ethnic affinity constituted an effective measure to prevent a coup d’état but 
proved to have catastrophic consequences on the army’s ability to fight and win a conventional 
war.542 Improving the processes of recruitment and promotion within security forces, as well as 
increasing transparency in selection for training opportunities, is likely to have noticeable 
benefits for the capacity and effectiveness of forces. 
 
Summary of the Dissertation’s Main Arguments 
In the chapters that followed, I made a series of arguments. In Chapter 2, I argued that we 
should care about the effect of security assistance on security sector governance because the 
quality of governance is an important predictor for the likelihood that post-conflict states remain 
at peace. I based this argument out of the assumption that control of the security sector is a prize, 
one that is coveted by all parties to a conflict. Although most actors would prefer full control 
over the security sector, post-conflict regimes are more likely satisfy their opponents and their 
population when they adopt a governance structure that is inclusive, transparent, and 
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accountable. I present five main facets of security sector governance: (1) the presence of a formal 
institutional structure, (2) civilian control, (3) transparent and accountable management, (4) 
capacity to extend security throughout the country, and (5) respect for human rights and the rule 
of law. I argue that states with good security sector governance will be better able to assure their 
opponents that they are committed to power-sharing, which may reduce their justification to 
work outside the system. A series of logistic regressions provided support for this argument: 
states with higher levels of civilian control and lower rates of repression were less likely to 
relapse into conflict. Post-conflict regimes that followed through on their promises for security 
sector reforms were also less likely to relapse into conflict: Models 3 and 4 presented in Chapter 
2 showed that states that agreed to and fully implemented reform programs in their police forces 
and military had a lower probability of conflict relapse.   
Chapters 3 through 6 examined the relationship between security assistance and security 
sector governance. In Chapter 3, I presented a theory of why security assistance can lead to such 
divergent outcomes in post-conflict states. I argue that the effect of security assistance is a factor 
its level of fungibility: aid that is provided for education and institutional development (i.e. 
“institutional assistance”) is less likely to be misused and more likely to lead to governance 
improvements than aid that is provided to improve tactical and operational skills (i.e. 
“operational assistance”). The impact of this aid is further conditioned by the institutional 
context of the state receiving this aid: aid will have a larger effect on governance when it is 
provided during periods of regime vulnerability than when it is provided during periods of 
stability. 
The cases examined in the chapters that followed were carefully selected to illustrate the 




examines the experience of Côte d’Ivoire following the First Ivorian War (2002-2007) and the 
Second Ivorian War (2010-2011). The first and second peace spells in Côte d’Ivoire show a wide 
variation in assistance provided: after the First Ivorian War, donors provided large sums of 
assistance for reintegration, but little funding to support the integration and demobilization 
activities of the CCI and ADDR, respectively. Rather, the majority of support for the military 
was provided as operational assistance from France. Lacking resources, the CCI and ADDR 
were unable to make necessary progress in force integration and DDR. When elections came in 
2010, Côte d’Ivoire relapsed into conflict. Learning the lessons of the First Ivorian War, donors 
jumped in to support DDR and SSR following the end of the Second Ivorian War in 2011. 
Unfortunately, security sector governance did not improve dramatically under Ouattara, either. 
While donors channeled millions more into institutional assistance, regime vulnerability was 
low: donors had little leverage over the victorious government to push for deeper reforms. 
Although it did not lead to serious declines in security sector governance, this aid did little to 
improve the professionalism, accountability, or quality of command and control of the Ivorian 
security sector. 
Chapter 5 looks at Burundi, a state that received large inflows of both operational and 
institutional assistance during a period of moderate regime vulnerability. In Burundi, access to 
operational assistance in the early post-conflict period allowed the government to maintain a 
large umbrella of patronage in the military. By the time the Netherlands initiated its SSD 
program, it was too late: the government had already begun down a path of power consolidation. 
Although this aid did lead to improvements in the army that received the most institutional 




Chapter 6 presents the experience of Sierra Leone. Unlike donor efforts in Côte d’Ivoire 
and Burundi, the British intervention in Sierra Leone was able to secure lasting security sector 
improvements. The British began negotiating a security sector reform plan with the Sierra 
Leonean government as early as 1998, while the future of the state and the security sector were 
still unclear. Working under an sector-wide framework for reforms, the British and other donors 
worked with the government to implement a series of structural reforms across the security 
sector. By the time the military began receiving high levels of operational assistance in 2011, it 
had been transformed into a professional force. Although this assistance did little to improve the 
capacity of the RSLAF, it also did not lead to a notable deterioration in governance quality. 
 
Cross-Case Comparison 
Separately, the case studies presented in this dissertation have allowed for a deeper 
examination of the causal mechanisms shaping the relationship between security assistance and 
security sector governance. This section will compares some of the variation among across cases. 
The relative success of the Sierra Leonean army in instituting a coherent chain of 
command despite the tensions between troops strongly contrasts with the experience of Côte 
d’Ivoire, where parallel chains of command continue to threaten both military capacity and 
command and control. In Sierra Leone, the decision to integrate combatants both within and 
across units helped to establish unit cohesion and bolster the legitimacy of leaders from opposing 
groups. It also helped to prevent wartime social networks from persisting. At the same time, the 
experience of Burundi illustrates that platoon-level integration is not sufficient to build cohesion. 




of command within the army contributed to factionalization within the army when the 2015 crisis 
broke out.  
The different military institutions established in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone give 
further evidence to the nature of reforms. The establishment of Horton Academy and the shared 
experience it created among officers was crucial in supporting greater unity among the officer 
corps and supporting the diffusion of essential norms of civilian control and democratic 
governance. The Ivorian military academy (Centre Interarmées de la Formation Initiale des 
Militaires) addressed the variation in basic training among enlisted soldiers, but did not include 
the focus on “soft skills” necessary to transform the officer corps.  
When asked about the impact of donor assistance, an officer in the RSLAF argued that 
one of the most valuable results of the British intervention was that it pushed Sierra Leonean 
officials to undertake politically difficult reforms, such as installing such a strong corps of 
civilian leaders into the Ministry of Defense. This highlights one of the limits of nationally led 
reform projects in post-conflict states: rulers face strong political needs to support those who 
brought them to or kept them in power. In Sierra Leone, external advisors created a demand for 
necessary but unpopular reforms; more importantly, their presence also created a buffer for 
leaders to enact them protected from some of the domestic political pressures that might have 
prevented them from doing so otherwise. President Ouattara did not have this. Instead, the strong 
pressures from the FN leadership pushed him to impose “victor’s justice.”  
The proliferation of donors and lack of a comprehensive strategy for reform weakened 
the impact of institutional assistance that was provided in Côte d’Ivoire and Burundi. For 




fundamentally different from discussions held by the UNDP, which Burundians see as “one-off” 
events.543 Similarly, the uncoordinated anti-corruption seminars held by donors in Côte d’Ivoire 
had little impact on policy or policymakers.544 This supports the experience of the SLP who have 
received a series of individual training seminars from various donors, as opposed to the 
institutionalized training provided to RSLAF. Provided outside of an institutionalized 
framework, there has, to date, been no way of gauging the impact and longevity of these 
trainings. More significantly, it is likely that this lack of accountability has disincentivized those 
receiving the training from implementing it in their units.545  
For the Dutch specifically, reform was limited by a failure of program leaders to build 
meaningful relationships with the powerholders that mattered in the Burundian government: 
CNDD-FDD leadership.546 Without the necessary buy-in from the government, the SSD could 
accomplish little more than surface-level reforms. Thus, although the SSD brought measurable 
improvements within the military, all gains were compromised once the crisis broke out. One of 
the greatest contributing factors to security sector reform success in Sierra Leone was the 
political buy-in by President Kabbah at the end of the war. This support was crucial for allowing 
the breadth and depth of reforms to occur; it created enough support to initiate structural reforms 
and gave the British authorization to hold politically contentious roles until institutions could 
develop independence. In Burundi, in contrast, one of the biggest impediments to deep security 
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sector reform was a lack of support among the highest-ranking officials – the ones who are 
responsible for initiating deep reforms and ensuring that they are respected.  
This lack of high-level support was not a foregone conclusion: political buy-in can be 
gained. The experience of Uganda illustrates this. In an effort to gain political buy-in for the 
defense review process, the military officer leading the exercise communicated extensively with 
senior military officers and politicians. This informal networking proved to be essential in 
gaining their support for the process and the eventual product.547  
 
Limitations 
The experiences of Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, and Sierra Leone provide strong support for a 
relationship between security assistance and security sector governance. Still, these findings are 
limited by the possibility of the endogeneity of aid and the confounding effect of regime 
vulnerability. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is difficult in any study of aid and governance to 
disentangle the effects of donor motivation, regime intent, and aid itself. While qualitative 
studies may be better positioned to identify these competing influences, it may still be the case 
donors provide more governance aid to reform-minded states, which may have undertaken 
positive governance reforms regardless of the type or amount of aid they received. 
The experience of Burundi provides some evidence that this may not be the case: after 
declaring his intention to stop sector-wide reforms from occurring, most donors should have 
questioned the commitment of Nkurunziza to implementing security sector reform. Despite this, 
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the Netherlands pushed for a strong reform program, which was agreed to and implemented in 
the military. Although their program was ultimately ineffective in changing the broader security 
sector, their assistance had a measurable effect on the professionalism and behavior of the 
military. 
Second, as mentioned earlier, the choice to implement governance reforms may actually 
be a factor of the internal balance of power, rather than external pressures. Regimes that come to 
power following a negotiated settlement may feel a greater need to accommodate the opposition 
than regimes that come to power following a military victory. In other words, regime 
vulnerability may be driving adoption of governance reforms, independently of aid. However, as 
most governance reforms involve giving the opposition more power, states that adopt these 
changes while in a state of vulnerability may actually be increasing the risk of relapse by 
bringing the balance of power closer to parity. This was the case following the First Ivorian War, 
which ended the fighting but left both parties mobilized and well-equipped and the regime in a 
state of high vulnerability. Rather than appeasing the opposition, Gbagbo chose not to implement 
deep governance reforms. Receiving relatively little institutional assistance, progress on SSR and 
DDR stalled, and the country quickly relapsed into conflict.  
The experiences of Liberia and the DRC provide a valuable opportunity to explore these 
questions. While the post-conflict trajectories of these countries helped to drive my theory, I did 
not test it on them. Looking at their experiences now may help to gauge the validity of my theory 
outside of the three cases studied in depth. First, to examine the role of endogeneity in aid 
provision, I consider the role of donor motivation – did donors base their aid packages to support 




 Following the end of the Liberian civil war in 2003, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was elected to 
the presidency. As a former World Bank official and human rights advocate, she campaigned on 
promises of peace, development, and democracy. Upon assuming office, Johnson-Sirleaf made 
inclusion and security sector reforms major priorities. More importantly, she followed through 
on these priorities by reaching out to international partners to help fund an SSR program.548 With 
ongoing conflict in neighboring Côte d’Ivoire, and a recent end to war in Sierra Leone, donors 
were anxious to end the cycle of violence in Liberia and prevent further destabilization of the 
region. When Joseph Kabila took office following the first democratic elections in the DRC in 
2006, the international community praised the country for achieving such a milestone of good 
governance and began to organize programs to support political and security reforms. One year 
later, however, repression by state security forces was on the rise.549 By 2010, the government 
had made no more progress towards SSR than when Kabila first took office.550 Despite these 
signals, Western donors continued to provide aid in the interest of regional stability and to ensure 
continued access to the country’s resource wealth.551 
 If donors base their aid packages off of recipient state priorities, we should see variation 
in the amount of institutional assistance provided to Liberia and the DRC. Both Liberia and the 
DRC presented immediate security concerns to donors, raising the probability that donors might 
provide high levels of operational assistance in an attempt to secure peace. However, the 
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commitment to reform of Johnson-Sirleaf and Kabila varied significantly; hypothetically, donors 
should have provided a high level of institutional assistance to Johnson, and little institutional 
assistance to Kabila once it became clear that he was not committed to SSR. 
The real aid patterns defy what we would expect if aid was, in fact, endogenous to 
recipient priorities. As expected, both Liberia and the DRC received high levels of operational 
assistance. However, while Johnson received levels of institutional assistance that match her 
policy priorities, donors did not alter their aid practices to correspond with Kabila’s revealed 
policy preferences. In fact, despite observations by experts that reforms had not progressed, 
donors continued to increase the amount of institutional assistance they provided. 
 The experience of Liberia casts further doubt on the concern discussed above of selection 
into governance reforms. When Johnson-Sirleaf took office in 2005, the country had been at 
peace for two years. Although she did not face the same level of stability enjoyed by President 




Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire, her administration was bolstered by both the electoral victory she had 
won. The capture and arrest of Charles Taylor–the leader of the opposition and former 
president—in 2006 further reduced the vulnerability of her administration.552 Johnson-Sirleaf 
was in a position of strength relative to the opposition, yet she initiated and carried out deep 
security sector reforms. 
 These cases do not prove that endogeneity and selection bias do not exist. However, they 
do support my assertion that observed relationships between aid and security sector governance 
cannot be solely attributed to these factors. 
 
Contributions 
Theoretical Contributions and Implications for Future Theory-Building 
 A growing body of literature has emerged examining the impact of SSR programs in 
post-conflict states. These studies have revealed important variation in the success of donor-
funded projects and the mechanisms influencing the success of international aid. We know that 
security sector reform is most likely to be effective when it is accompanied by a strong 
government commitment to reform, when the reforms are tailored to the customs and norms of 
the post-conflict state, and when they engage local actors who take ownership of the program.553 
Still, these studies leave important questions unanswered. The majority of scholars writing on 
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security sector reform employ single case studies to examine the impact of specific programs. 
This method allows for a deep analysis of the mechanisms and processes shaping that state’s 
experience; however, it remains unclear how these factors function in other states. More 
importantly, studies on SSR rarely consider the impact of traditional military assistance flows on 
the quality of security sector governance in the states they examine. By focusing only on the SSR 
interventions underway, these studies leave unaddressed the effect that traditional military 
assistance may be imparting on states in question. Similarly, while the literature on traditional 
military assistance is growing, the majority of studies focus on a single assistance program, such 
as arms transfers or the US International Military Education and Training Program.554 By 
incorporating all forms of security assistance into my theory, this dissertation helps to explain 
why some governance interventions are successful when others are not. 
Future Research 
The process of examining these cases has illustrated several points for future work and 
examination. At the outset of this project, I did not have strong theoretical predictions regarding 
the interaction between different types of aid. The results of my case research suggest that there 
may be an interesting relationship between the levels of different types of security assistance. 
Future research into the potential threshold or interaction effects of different types of aid is 
needed to fully parse this relationship. 
This dissertation also did not address the potential interaction of security assistance and 
development assistance on governance and post-conflict reconstruction. However, some 
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evidence from Burundi indicates that the development aid practices of donors sent important 
signals to President Nkurunziza, which likely impacted his decisions to politicize the security 
sector. Specifically, although donors vocally pressed the government to more stringently uphold 
the spirit of the Arusha Accords in the early days of Nkurunziza’s tenure, they did not alter stop 
providing development assistance.555 Future research into the impact of development assistance 
on security sector governance and the potential interaction effects of development and security 
aid would add an important dimension to our understanding of how donor decisions shape local 
policymaking. 
Finally, this dissertation presented a strong empirical correlation between the quality of 
security sector governance and conflict relapse. Unfortunately, this study was limited by the 
availability of existing quantitative indicators for security sector governance. Future qualitative 
research into the dynamics of security sector governance and peace duration would add needed 
nuance to our understanding of this relationship, and could reveal the mechanisms through which 
governance is linked to relapse. This field would also benefit from an exploration into other 
potential measures for security sector governance, or the creation of new measures to capture 
dimensions such as integration, cohesion, transparency, accountability, and capacity of local 
forces such as the police. 
The theory that I present in this dissertation presents important implications for the 
provision of security assistance to states emerging from conflict. In the following section, I will 
apply these insights to the case of South Sudan, a country that has been fighting an internal war 
for the past seven years.  
 




Policy Implications: Application of Theory to South Sudan 
South Sudan gained its independence in 2011 after decades of conflict with its former 
ruler. Its experience as an independent state has been dominated by civil war, costing the lives of 
up to 400,000 people and displacing as many as four million.556 Although the majority of 
fighting stopped in 2018, peace still hangs in the balance. Policy disagreements between 
President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, Kiir’s former Vice President and current rival, have left 
the country suspended between war and peace: although major fighting has stopped, violence 
continues. Earlier this year, Kiir and Machar made an important step towards ending the conflict, 
announcing the creation of a unity government on February 22, 2020. At the time, this agreement 
was heralded as “the most serious bid in years” towards ending the war.557 Today, it appears the 
peace is once again in jeopardy. Despite progress towards peace, Kiir and Machar have faltered 
on two key points: how to delegate state authority and how to integrate military forces.558 South 
Sudan is at a vulnerable point in its transition to peace.  
The theory that I have presented in this dissertation presents clear policy implications for 
the approach of the international community towards South Sudan. The creation of a transitional 
government and deliberation of post-conflict policy occurring at the moment have created a 
situation of high regime vulnerability. Donors have an opportunity to influence positive 
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governance changes if they provide high levels of institutional assistance under a coordinated 
framework.  
When South Sudan emerged from its war with Sudan in 2005, it was faced with 
transforming an oversized guerilla force into a professional national army. In addition to 
integrating the various militias that made up the force, the government would have to severely 
reduce its numbers, bringing the force down from 210,000 to 90,000 soldiers. DDR failed. Little 
more than 12,000 fighters completed the official process; at the same time, the government 
recruited new soldiers into its military.559 Military integration also hit a snag. To maintain the 
loyalty of the disparate groups making up the new national army, President Salva Kiir appointed 
Riek Machar of a rival group as his vice president and appropriated the country’s vast oil 
revenue towards the military. Rather than integrate and reform the force, the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SLPA) remained in their wartime state: a collection of ethnic militias driven 
by patronage and personal loyalties.560 The failure of DDR and SSR following the end of the 
country’s war with Sudan were major contributors to the outbreak of the current conflict. As in 
Côte d’Ivoire, the prevalence of armed fighters across the country created a combustible 
situation: a political crisis quickly exploded into conflict. 
The South Sudanese civil war first broke out in late 2013, when President Kiir accused 
Machar of plotting a coup d’état and removed him from government. Shortly after his removal, 
clashes broke out across the country, which quickly escalated into organized violence. The 
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majority of the conflict has been fought along ethnic lines, pitting the Nuer, who support Machar, 
against the Dinka, who support Kiir. The real roots of the conflict, however, are not found in 
ethnic rivalries, but weak state institutions – specifically, the oversized and unreformed army.561  
For the first nine years of independence, the US had been South Sudan’s most significant 
international partner. Since 2011, the US has provided billions of dollars in development 
assistance and approximately $460 million in security assistance.562 That changed in January 
2020, when the US government announced it would no longer support the much-delayed peace 
process and began placing sanctions on individuals associated with the conflict.563  
The current moment provides an unparalleled opportunity for the international 
community to intervene in support of stabilization and security sector reform. The decision of the 
US to step back as South Sudan’s largest international partner has created an opportunity for the 
African Union to step in to lead institutional reform efforts. A multilateral body such as the AU 
has a unique capacity to step in a politically-neutral body to assist with monitoring integration 
and DDR as well as mediation of any disputes that arise between groups.564 
The 2013 AU Policy Framework on SSR emphasizes a commitment to the normative 
goals of democratic governance of Western SSR doctrine while stressing the importance of 
“African ownership.” The emphasis the AU Policy Framework places on national and regional 
ownership creates a valuable opportunity for context-specific policies. Significantly, this 
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framework includes provisions to address all five aspects of security sector governance I lay out 
in Chapter 2. To boost national ownership of reforms, the AU framework advocates for the use 
of national institutions to guide donor coordination. This provision may be valuable to promote 
local institutional development; however, donors should be careful to carefully monitor donor 
coordination, as the reliance on national structures for donor coordination has historically 
hindered the implementation of a cohesive, sector-wide reform plan.565 
Key to the success of SSR will be effectively integrating soldiers into a unified national 
army and thoroughly disarming and demobilizing all remaining fighters. The importance of 
ethnic ties and personal connections among the various militia groups fighting in South Sudan 
will make military integration difficult, particularly during the cantonment phase. The easy 
fracturing of the military in the leadup to the current conflict suggests the importance of 
integrating troops at the platoon level in order to prevent wartime networks from persisting in the 
new military. Maintaining current leadership hierarchies creates a risk of recreating the 
experience of Côte d’Ivoire, where parallel command structures have allowed the military to 
languish as a politicized and unprofessional force. As the experience of Burundi shows, this 
approach can produce very high tensions without the promise of success. Still, until the 2015 
crisis broke out, the FDN had made significant progress towards professionalization and showed 
surprising cohesion. It is likely that had the crisis been contained, the army would have 
continued to consolidate its progress. 
The international focus on Kiir and Machar obscures the prevalence of rival militia 
leaders across the country, many of whom are likely to be wary of a peace deal that reduces their 
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power and position.566 Donors should be wary of repeating the mistakes following the First 
Ivorian War, in which a lack of domestic and international funding for DDR hindered the 
dismantlement of militias across the country before elections take place.   
In addition to supporting institutional reform, donors should refrain from providing 
operational assistance to the security institutions of South Sudan. Even with a strong institutional 
development program in place, operational assistance is unlikely to lead to great improvements 
in capacity in the immediate aftermath of a conflict. In the best-case scenario, this assistance 
would likely go to waste. Seven years of conflict have crippled the South Sudanese economy; it 
is highly unlikely that the government would have the funds to maintain expensive technology 
and equipment donations provided to the police force or military. In the worst-case scenario, this 
assistance would be used to reward political supporters in the security institutions, fueling 
politicization and undermining reforms. 
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